扫码分享
验证：
体验盒子|
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 |
=================================================================== Title: Unauthenticated admin password change Product: Davolink modem Tested model: DV-2051 Vulnerability Type: Missing Function Level Access Control [CWE-306] Risk Level: High Solution Status: No fix available Discovered and Provided: Eric Flokstra =================================================================== [-] About the Product: The Davolink DV-2051 is an ADSL modem with 4 Fast Ethernet ports, Wireless Access Point and VoIP (2 times FXS). [-] Advisory Details: Basic authentication is in place to authenticate the administrative user against the web application. To change the administrator password the old password must be provided, which is validated by JavaScript. By intercepting a successful password reset request the JavaScript validation can be bypassed. It was also noticed authorisation checks are missing on the password reset functionality. Combining these vulnerabilities enable unauthenticated users to change the admin password with a single request. [-] Proof of Concept: The following request can be used to change the admin password to the value ’FooBar’: 192.168.1.1/password.cgi?usrPassword=FooBar ======================================================== Title: Lack of CSRF protection Product: Davolink modem Tested model: DV-2051 Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Request Forgery [CWE-352] Risk Level: Medium Solution Status: No fix available Discovered and Provided: Eric Flokstra ======================================================== [-] About the Product: The Davolink DV-2051 is a an ADSL modem with 4 Fast Ethernet ports, Wireless Access Point and VoIP (2 times FXS). [-] Advisory Details: The web application enables users to set a password in order for clients to connect to the SSID. Currently no measures against Cross-Site Request Forgery have been implemented and therefore users can be tricked into submitting requests without their knowledge or consent. From the application's point of view these requests are legitimate requests from the user and they will be processed as such. This can result in for example changing the WPA2 password. [-] Proof of Concept: The following link can be used to trick a logged in user to set the WPA2 Pre Shared Key to ‘FooBar01’. 192.168.1.1/wlsecurity.wl?wlAuthMode=psk2&wlAuth=0&wlWpaPsk=FooBar01&wlWpaGtkRekey=0&wlNetReauth=36000&wlWep=disabled&wlWpa=tkip+aes&wlKeyBit=0&wlPreauth=0 =============================================================== Title: Multiple persistent Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities Product: Davolink modem Tested model: DV-2051 Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting [CWE-79] Risk Level: Medium Solution Status: No fix available Discovered and Provided: Eric Flokstra =============================================================== [-] About the Product: The Davolink DV-2051 is a an ADSL modem with 4 Fast Ethernet ports, Wireless Access Point and VoIP (2 times FXS). [-] Advisory Details: The web application enables users to add virtual servers to direct incoming traffic from WAN side to an internal server with a private IP address on the LAN side. It was noticed insufficient validation is performed on several places such as the ‘srvName’ parameter which is sent with the request when adding a new virtual server. This vulnerability makes it possible to remotely execute arbitrary scripting code in the target user's web browser by adding a persistent JavaScript payload to the application. [-] Proof of Concept: The following request can be used as POC, it opens port 4444 to an internal IP address. An iframe is added to the ‘srvName’ field and displays a pop-up box. 192.168.1.1/scvrtsrv.cmd?action=add&srvName=FooBar<iframe%20onload=alert(0)>&srvAddr=192.168.1.100&proto=1,&eStart=4444,&eEnd=4444,iStart=4444,&iEnd=4444, [-] Disclosure Timeline: [04 06 2016]: Vendor notification [07 06 2016]: Vulnerability confirmed. No fix will be released. [16 07 2016]: Public Disclosure |
体验盒子
