Microsoft Windows 10 – Sandboxed Mount Reparse Point Creation Mitigation Bypass (MS15-111)

• Exploit Database
• 119 阅读

• 作者： Google Security Research
  日期： 2015-10-15
• 类别：

  • local
  平台：

  • windows
• 来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38474/
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  Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=486   Windows: Sandboxed Mount Reparse Point Creation Mitigation Bypass Platform: Windows 10 (build 10240), earlier versions do not have the functionality Class: Security Feature Bypass   Summary: A mitigation added to Windows 10 to prevent NTFS Mount Reparse Points being created at integrity levels below medium can be bypassed.   Description:   Windows 10 has added some new mitigations to block the creation or change the behaviour of certain symbolic links when issued by a low integrity/sandboxed process. The presumed aim to to make it harder to abuse these types of tricks to break out of a sandbox.   In earlier builds on Windows 10 NTFS Mount Reparse Points were blocked outright from a sandboxed process, however in 10240 (what can only be assumed a final build) the check was moved to the kernel in IopXXXControlFile and changed slightly so that sandboxed processes could create some mount points. The check is roughly:   if (RtlIsSandboxedProcess()) { if(ControlCode == FSCTL_SET_MOUNT_POINT) { if (FsRtlValidateReparsePointBuffer(buffer) && buffer->ReparseTag == TAG_MOUNT_POINT) { NTSTATUS status = ZwOpenFile(..., buffer->ReparseTarget, FILE_GENERIC_WRITE, ... , FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE); if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { return status; } } }   The kernel is therefore checking that the target of the mount point is a directory and that the current process has write access to the directory. This would sufficiently limit the ability of a sandboxed process to abuse this to write files at a higher privilege. Unfortunately there’s a perhaps unexpected problem with this check, the sandboxed process can redirect the ZwOpenFile call arbitrarily to something it can open for write, yet the original value is set as the mount point. This is because the file open check is being made inside the process which is doing the call which means it honours the user’s device mapping.   While the sandboxed process cannot change the per-user drive mappings, it can change the process’s device map using NtSetInformationProcess with the ProcessDeviceMap information class. As we can create arbitrary object directories and symbolic links (which while they also have a mitigation it only prevents a higher privilege process following them, which we don’t care about) we can build a completely fake device map which redirects the open to another directory. A good target turns out to be \Device\NamedPipe\ (note the trailing slash) as that can be opened from any privilege level (including Chrome renderer processes) for write access and as a directory. So if we want to set an arbitrary mount point to say \??\c:\somewhere we can build something like:   <UNNAMED>(DIR) -> C:(DIR) -> somewhere(LINK to \Device\NamedPipe\)   If we set the unnamed directory to the process device map we can bypass the check and create the mount point.   Perhaps from a fix perspective you could query for the opened path and use that to write to the NTFS reparse point rather than using the original value.   Proof of Concept:   I’ve provided a PoC which will demonstrate the bypass. It should be executed at low integrity using psexec or modifying the executable file’s ACL to low. Ensure you use the correct version for the architecture on Windows, as there seems to be a bug in NtSetInformationProcess which blocks Wow64 apps from setting the process device map. You can compare the operation to the command shell’s mklink tool that will fail to create the mount point at low integrity. The archive password is ‘password’. Follow these steps:   1) Extract the PoC to a location on a local hard disk which is writable by a normal user. 2) Execute the poc executable file as low integrity passing two arguments, the path to a directory to create (must be somewhere than can be written to as low integrity user such as AppData\Temp\Low) and the arbitrary file path to set the mount point to. For example: poc.exe c:\users\user\appdata\local\low\abc c:\notreal.   Expected Result: It shouldn’t be possible to create a mount point pointed at a location not writable by low integrity user   Observed Result: The mount point is created successfully.     Proof of Concept: https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/38474.zip