Adtran Personal Phone Manager 10.8.1 – ’emailAddress’ Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

• Exploit Database
• 118 阅读

• 作者： 3ndG4me
  日期： 2021-04-21
• 类别：

  • webapps
  平台：

  • hardware
• 来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49785/
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  # Exploit Title: Adtran Personal Phone Manager 10.8.1 - &apos;emailAddress&apos; Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) # Date: 1/21/2021 # Exploit Author: 3ndG4me # Vendor Homepage: https://adtran.com/web/page/portal/Adtran/wp_home # Version: v10.8.1 # Tested on: NetVanta 7060 and NetVanta 7100 # CVE : CVE-2021-25679   # CVE-2021-25679 - Adtran Personal Phone Manager Authenticated Stored XSS in Change Email Address Form   --Summary--   The AdTran Personal Phone Manager software is vulnerable to an authenticated stored cross-site scripting (XSS) issues. These issues impact at minimum versions 10.8.1 and below but potentially impact later versions as well since they have not previously been disclosed. Only version 10.8.1 was able to be confirmed during primary research   ADTRAN, Inc https://adtran.com   --Affects--   - AdTran Personal Phone Manager - Verified on v10.8.1 - **Note**: The affected appliances NetVanta 7060 and NetVanta 7100 are considered End of Life and as such this issue will not be patched. It is recommended impacted users update to an actively supported appliance.   --Details--   The AdTran Personal Phone Manager software is vulnerable to an authenticated stored cross-site scripting (XSS) issues. These issues impact at minimum versions 10.8.1 and below but potentially impact later versions as well since they have not previously been disclosed. Only version 10.8.1 was able to be confirmed during primary research. These issues work by passing in a basic XSS payload to vulnerable POST parameters that are rendered in the output without saniztization. Since the forms do require authentication to access these issues cannot be exploited without credentials. This can allow for several issues including but not limited to:   - Hijacking another user&apos;s session - Modifying a user&apos;s configuration settings - Using XSS payloads to capture input (keylogging)   -- Proof of Concept -- The following form was impacted and can be exploited with the sample payloads provided below: - https://example.com/userapp/userSettingsAction.html - POST - formAction=changeEmailAddress&emailAddress=+data%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%<code>document.cookie</code>60%3C%2Fscript%3E+&emailAddress2=&emailApply=Apply+Changes   The vulnerable parameters that were identified are: - emailAddress - emailAddress2   --Mitigation--   Sanitize any user controlled input in both form fields and URL paramaters to properly encode data so it is not rendered as arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.   --Timeline--   - 1/21/2021: XSS Vulnerability was discovered and documented. A temporary CVE identifier was requested by MITRE. AdTran was also notified with the full details of each finding via their product security contact at https://adtran.com/web/page/portal/Adtran/wp_product_security. A baseline 90 day disclosure timeline was established in the initial communication. - 1/22/2021: Placeholder CVE-2021-25679 was assigned by MITRE. - 1/29/2021: A response from AdTran&apos;s Product Security Team was received. - 2/8/2021: The researcher responded to the email acknowledging receipt. The encrypted email contents appeared to be corrupted so a request was made to resend the data. - 2/9/2021: AdTran&apos;s Product Security Team replied with a re-encrypted copy of the previous communication made on 1/29/2021. The reasearcher was able to successfully decrypt the contents of this communication. The communication informed the researcher that the disclosed issues targeting NetVanta 7060 and NetVanta 7100 would not be addressed. The justification for this decision is that software support ended in June of 2018, and product EOL occurred in December of 2020. As such AdTran would not be invesitgating the issues leaving the details of the findings as is. The reseacher responded with acknowledgement to the decision and requested support to proceed with full disclosure outside of the previously established 90 day timeline. - 2/11/2021: AdTran&apos;s product security team responded to the request for full disclosure. They informed the researcher that they would like to discuss the decision internally first. The researcher acknowledged the request and affirmed they would not procceed with disclosure until further notice. - 3/1/2021: AdTran&apos;s product security team reached out to inform the researcher that they would support the full disclosure of the vulnerability at the researcher&apos;s discretion. They provided a few details on model names to include as EOL for the disclosure details. - 3/2/2021: The researcher acknowledges the approval and informs the product security team that a link will be provided to any future publications once the vulnerability is publicly disclosed. - 3/3/2021: The researcher begins constructing a private repository to prepare the write ups for release. - 4/17/2021: The researcher publishes the repository for full disclosure and notifies MITRE to update the CVE entry details.