Flash – PCRE Regex Compilation Zero-Length Assertion Arbitrary Bytecode Execution
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=224&can=1&q=label%3AProduct-Flash%20modified-after%3A2015%2F8%2F17&sort=id There’s an error in the PCRE engine version used in Flash that allows the execution of arbitrary PCRE bytecode, with potential for memory corruption and RCE. This issue is a duplicate of http://bugs.exim.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1546 originally reported to PCRE upstream by mikispag; I rediscovered the issue fuzzing Flash so have filed this bug report to track disclosure deadline for Adobe. The issue occurs in the handling of zero-length assertions; ie assertions where the object of the assertion is prepended with the OP_BRAZERO operator. Simplest testcase that will crash in an ASAN build is the following: (?(?<a>)?) This is pretty much a nonsense expression, and I'm not sure why it compiles successfully; but it corresponds to the statement that 'assert that named group 'a' optionally matches'; which is tautologically true regardless of 'a'. Regardless, we emit the following bytecode: 0000 5d0012 93 BRA [18] 0003 5f000c 95 COND [12] 0006 66 102 BRAZERO 0007 5e00050001 94 CBRA [5, 1] 000c 540005 84 KET [5] 000f 54000c 84 KET [12] 0012 540012 84 KET [18] 0015 00 0 END When this is executed, we reach the following code: /* The condition is an assertion. Call match() to evaluate it - setting the final argument match_condassert causes it to stop at the end of an assertion. */ else { RMATCH(eptr, ecode + 1 + LINK_SIZE, offset_top, md, ims, NULL, match_condassert, RM3); if (rrc == MATCH_MATCH) { condition = TRUE; ecode += 1 + LINK_SIZE + GET(ecode, LINK_SIZE + 2); while (*ecode == OP_ALT) ecode += GET(ecode, 1); <---- ecode is out of bounds at this point. If we look at the execution trace for this expression, we can see where this code goes wrong: exec 0x600e0000dfe4 93 [0x60040000dfd0 41] exec 0x600e0000dfe7 95 [0x60040000dfd0 41] exec 0x600e0000dfea 102 [0x60040000dfd0 41] <--- RMATCH recursive match exec 0x600e0000dfeb 94 [0x60040000dfd0 41] exec 0x600e0000dff0 84 [0x60040000dfd0 41] exec 0x600e0000dff3 84 [0x60040000dfd0 41] exec 0x600e0000dff6 84 [0x60040000dfd0 41] exec 0x600e0000dff9 0 [0x60040000dfd0 41] <--- recursive match returns before 0x600e0000dfe7 24067 <--- ecode == 0x...dfe7 after 0x600e00013dea If we look at the start base for our regex, it was based at dfe4; so dfe7 is the OP_COND, as expected. Looking at the next block of code, we're clearly expecting the assertion to be followed by a group; likely OP_CBRA or another opcode that has a 16-bit length field following the opcode byte. ecode += 1 + LINK_SIZE + GET(ecode, LINK_SIZE + 2); In this case, the insertion of the OP_BRAZERO has resulted in the expected OP_CBRA being shifted forward by a byte to 0x...dfeb; and this GET results in the value of 0x5e00 + 1 + LINK_SIZE being added to the ecode pointer, instead of the correct 0x0005 + 1 + LINK_SIZE, resulting in bytecode execution hopping outside of the allocated heap buffer. See attached for a crash PoC for the latest Chrome/Flash on x64 linux. https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/37839.zip |